Spis treści



Spis treści



Piotr Stanisław Mazur: Prowidencja ludzka w ujęciu klasycznym


Maria Joanna Gondek: Problem celu ludzkiej pracy


Wojciech Daszkiewicz: Intuicja jako specyficzna sprawność intelektu (św. Tomasza z Akwinu rozumienie intuicji intelektualnej)


Anna Kozanecka­‑Dymek: Zagadnienie czasu w dziejach myśli europejskiej


Artur Szutta: Granice wolności słowa. O pewnym argumencie za prawem do wyśmiewania







Ks. Michał M. Maciołek: Naukowe dziedzictwo średniowiecza, rec.: M. Markowski, Pierwowzory uniwersytetów, Wydawnictwo Wszechnicy Mazurskiej, Olecko 2003; M. Markowski, Uniwersytet Krakowski w kontekście środkowoeuropejskim późnego średniowiecza i wczesnej nowożytności, Wydawnictwo Wszechnicy Mazurskiej,
Olecko 2005; S. Wielgus, Zachodnia i polska nauka średniowieczna – encyklopedycznie, Płocki Instytut Wydawniczy, Płock 2005

Ks. Paweł Podeszwa, rec.: Francesco Testaferri, Ripensare Gesù. L’interpretazione ebraica contemporanea di Gesù, Assisi 2006

Paweł Zdziech, rec.: Ks. Janusz Mariański, Społeczeństwo i moralność. Studia z katolickiej nauki społecznej i socjologii moralności, Tarnów 2008

Irena Wodzianowska: Informatory prawosławnych diecezji Patriarchatu Moskiewskiego, rec.: A.I. Razdorski, Sprawocznyje izdania eparchii Russkoj Prawosławnoj Cerkwi. 1861–1915, Sankt Pietierburg 2002

Irena Wodzianowska: Prowincjonalna administracja w Cesarstwie Rosyjskim przed 1917 rokiem, rec.: N.M. Bałackaja, A.I. Razdorskij, Pamiatnyje kniżki gubiernij i obłastiej Rossijskoj impierii 1833–1917: Swodnyj katałog­‑riepiertuar, Sankt Pietierburg 2008






Human Providence in the Classical Framework

The work is composed of two principle parts. The first presents, from the historical point of view, the scope of the process of the formation of the classical understanding of human providence, whose beginnings ought to be sought not only in philosophy, but also in religion: Greek myths and Biblical tradition. An important role on the basis of philosophy in the process of realistically interpreting forecasting as an element of human moral activity played the perceptions of Heraclites, Plato, Aristotle, Cicero and Boethius.



The Issue of the Goal of Human Work

Understanding the goal of work contains essential cultural significance. The main goal of work (understood as the actualization of the personal potentials of a person) is located, according to Thomas Aquinas, in the very person themselves, and not outside of him and depends on obtaining virtues – respective abilities of the person’s powers in the direction of obtaining the good, which accomplishes a person’s nature.  The understanding of the goal of work which arose from the thoughts of F. Bacon and Descartes as the transformation of the nature of the world (grasped as matter) which leads to work in the field of material production or the spheres serving the development of material production.  It is related not so much with interpreting the conditions of the really existing work, but rather the prior attributing to it goals and significance in the form of ruling over the world or subjugating nature. The priority treating of the field of human productivity which is observable on the basis of contemporary technological advancements leads to objectively treating man and a radical lowering of other spheres of work, as a consequence in the area of culture as a result of work.



Intuition as a Specific Proficiency of the Intellect (St. Thomas Aquinas’ Understanding of Intellectual Intuition)

The article undertakes the issue of realistic cognition which is related with intellectual intuition. Based on an analysis of St. Thomas Aquinas’ texts, intellectual intuition is described as a specific intellectual proficiency. Intuition can not be understood as separate from the intellect’s power of cognition.  The name “intellect” points to the function of the power of cognition, able to perceive the whole of what is complex, unity in that which is plural and the causes of the things which are their results.  Intuition understood in such a way makes the foundation for the type of cognition which is not discursive and direct.



The Issue of Time in the Works of European Thinking

The article is dedicated to the problem of time and has as a goal to summarize the up to present reflections about time (of course in the limited scope). This issue is, however, examined under a somewhat other point of view than up to now.  Toward the end of the first half of the XX century in literature on logic, works appeared in which constructions called systems of temporal logic were presented.  These systems can find application on the basis of various sciences, among others natural sciences.
The condition for applying these systems in natural sciences, mainly in modern physics and cosmology, is the adequate presentation by these systems of the properties of time in the physical sense. With the goal of performing a meritorical evaluation of the systems of temporal logic in this respect, a characteristic of this type of time is necessary. The following article therefore contains the characteristic of physical time, through which attention is primarily paid to its properties, which would find their reflection (through the help of axioms) in various systems of temporal logic.
In the first part of the article, several observations are made on the topic of the method of time’s existence and its nature, in the second part of the article the idea of time and moment is defined, as well as a characteristic of temporal relation, which is the relationship of earlier/later. After these introductory deliberations, in the third and last part of the article, the main concepts concerning the properties of time are presented, which arose on the basis of philosophy, physics and cosmology.



The Limits of Free Speech. About an Argument for the Right to Mock

The object of this paper is Brian Barry’s argument supporting the right to mock the views of other persons. According to him, the right to mock can be defended as inseparable from the right of free speech, and what more, as a necessary mean to criticize the views of the persons who are closed to rational debate.
I analyze Barry’s argument in order to answer whether we can treat mocking as exercising free speech, as well as, whether resorting to this method of counteracting other views is such a necessary mean to fight irrational views. First, I analyze the arguments supporting the right to free speech: one referring to Lockean idea of self-possession; one to J.S. Mill’s idea of autonomy and social utility free debate; and finally Barry’s argument that mocking is a necessary means to oppose irrational and fundamentalist views.
The arguments for freedom of speech show that there are limits of that freedom, namely free speech cannot breach other persons rights, and if it does so it should be justified. Barry seems to argue that such justification is to be found in the fact that some irrational and fundamentalist views are closed to rational debate, and the only means to fight them is to ridicule and mock them. Mocking, however, is not the only alternative in the face of the views (and those who hold them) that are closed to open, rational debate. The other way, much more desirable, is civil disobedience.
Civil disobedience, apart from its being at least equally effective as mocking, has some advantages over mocking. Namely, it does not offend its opponents and does not destroy the sense of community, as it is in case of mocking. In stead of accepting and deepening the irrational elements in public debate, civil disobedience, as a moral appeal, is a strive towards regaining the possibility of rational, just, and open debate.
Nevertheless, showing that mocking does not automatically mean a justified use of free speech, does not lead to a conclusion that mocking should be legally forbidden. It is so for two reasons: first, it is hard to draw a sharp distinction between mocking that objectively breaches the rights of others and ridiculing that may be not in good taste but is not a case of such a breach; second, formulating such restrictive laws against mocking might trigger a slippery slope mechanism that could lead to so restrictive legislation that even a modest jest could be treated as illegal. The most reasonable answer to mocking would be proper civic education in the society, and a proper level of civic sensitivity that would support the atmosphere of disapproval for acts of mocking.


Autor: Robert Kryński
Ostatnia aktualizacja: 29.05.2009, godz. 08:59 - Robert Kryński