

SYNABA (to be translated into Polish as well)

The title of my dissertation is *Towards Virtue Ethics: Action and Morality in Elizabeth Anscombe and Karol Wojtyła*. In choosing to research on this theme, I had set out to search out for philosophical responses to such key questions as: 1. Can we ascertain a foundation for virtue ethics from the works of Anscombe and Wojtyła? 2. How is action and morality related to virtue ethics? 3. What are the challenges of constructing a virtue ethics on the basis of the ethical view of Anscombe and Karol Wojtyła? Needless to emphasize that the key protagonists in this research were Elizabeth Anscombe and Karol Wojtyła, both of whom are moral philosophers belonging to two different philosophical traditions, namely the analytic and the Thomistic traditions respectively. The main thrust of the whole research was to arrive at some synthesis of these two approaches to virtue ethics. Accordingly, this work centres around the theory and praxis of virtue ethics, relying upon divergent historical sources, but with an eye on the positions of Anscombe and Wojtyła regarding what should be the foundation of virtue ethics. In addition, I tried also to underscore their common respect for the classical tradition as both philosophers advocated for a return to Aristotle and Aquinas arguments for virtue ethics while taking different cues with regard to their allegiance to contemporary approaches.

With regard to methodology, this work is basically expository, analytic and discursive in nature. It is expository in that it stems out from the work of philosopher beginning from Aristotle concept of virtue down to medieval philosopher like Aquinas, down to modern philosophers Philippa Foot and other contemporaries of Elizabeth Anscombe and then Karol Wojtyła on the nature of the acting person. It is analytic because it is done in a bid to organise and understand Elizabeth Anscombe psychological foundations of virtue ethics and Karol Wojtyła's anthropological foundations of virtue ethics. It is discursive because of divergent opinions and it tends to interact with the reader and raises critical questions and ideas in relation to virtue ethics.

The structure of the dissertation consists of three chapters. Chapter One begins with an overview of the philosophical traditions on virtue ethics. I had tried to show in this first chapter that virtue ethics has been cultivated and practiced in all places irrespective of cultural diversity while highlighting that contemporary virtue ethics is the renewal or revival of Greek virtue ethics after it was interrupted by secularism and enlightenment. In Chapter Two, I focused on Elizabeth Anscombe's pre-ethical considerations of action theory and virtue ethics as can be gleaned from her famous article "Modern Moral Philosophy" which had accounted for what

constitutes a human action and how its proper description is affected by psychological factors, the most significant of which is motive. This second chapter thus presents Anscombe as arguing that the key element to the understanding of virtue ethics is a philosophy of psychology. In the third chapter, I moved on to consider Karol Wojtyła's anthropological foundations of virtue ethics as entrenched in his conception of moral action as rooted in the personal subject. In this chapter, I demonstrated that Wojtyła's virtue ethics reflects his considerations in his two significant monographs, namely *Love and Responsibility* and *The Acting Person*. In *Love and Responsibility* – he develops the seminal ideas of his personalism and attempts to refute utilitarianism; whereas in the later work, *The Acting Person*, Wojtyła continues to search for the anthropological (but in the depth metaphysical) foundations of morality. I had eventually discovered in the course of the research that it is however in his last philosophical book *Man in the field of responsibility*, that he writes explicitly on place of virtue in morality. In this chapter, I made it obvious that Wojtyła's account of virtue ethics approximates to Elizabeth Anscombe's considerations, even though both philosophers did not correspond with each other despite the fact that they were contemporaries. Notably, Wojtyła goes beyond a psychological analysis of lived-experience of morality and digs deeper into the specifically ethical significance of moral life which he tries to ground on anthropological foundations. I realized thus that Wojtyła builds his virtue ethics on the anthropological foundations of morals in contrast to Anscombe who attempts to search for a psychological foundation for her own virtue ethics. It is the conclusion of my thesis that for both Anscombe and Wojtyła, virtue ethics can be grounded on a synthetic foundation which incorporates the psychological insights of Anscombe's moral philosophy as well as the anthropological presuppositions of Wojtyła's moral personalism. In this sense, virtue is seen as constituting the human personality of a subject. However, this conclusion does not deny the fact that there is a difference of trajectories as to how Anscombe and Wojtyła views what should constitute the project of virtue ethics. For Anscombe, virtue ethics requires moral psychology but for Wojtyła, virtue ethics requires a philosophical anthropology which takes into consideration the metaphysics of the human being.