

Mimo to trzeba przyznać, że przy takiej teologicznej roli tak filozofia, jak i wiara chrześcijańska doznają na końcu uszczerbku. W religii zostaje osłabiony dogmatyzm, umacnia się za to w filozofii, w której nie powinien mieć miejsca. Przy tej okazji wspomina się zachowanie W. Jamesa, który, gdy dyskutował na swym seminarium problem idealności czasu i przestrzeni, zwykł brać do ręki *Metafizykę Bowne'a*, pytając, co też Jahwe ma do powiedzenia na ten temat.

Bowne potrafił dobrze uchwycić problemy filozoficzne swego czasu. Można nawet powiedzieć, że w tym względzie wyprzedził nawet współczesnych mu filozofów. Sam jednak nie podał szczególnie oryginalnych i doniosłych rozwiązań tych problemów. W XX wieku niektóre zagadnienia rozwiązywane w metafizyce Bowne'a zostały podjęte właściwie na nowo. Dotyczy to szczególnie zagadnień antropologii filozoficznej, takich jak np. *mind-body*, niepowtarzalność doświadczenia człowieka, rola jaźni czy wolność osoby ludzkiej. Do omówienia tych zagadnień potrzebne by było jednak osobne opracowanie.

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THE CONCEPT OF PERSONALISTIC METAPHYSICS OF BORDEN PARKER BOWNE

Summary

Borden Parker Bowne was the founder of the School of Philosophy in Boston, taught there for more than a generation, and made a lasting impression on American philosophy. During Bowne's career at Boston University (from 1876 until his death 1910), many of his students, who later also became professors in different areas, were inspired by his thinking and his person.

His basic conviction is that it is the human person that is at the basis of Ontology and Ethics : the person that preserves its identity within change thanks to memory; the person that is active in knowing and choosing; the person that acts deliberately towards values; the person that thinks – all these at least potentially.

The purpose of the article is to examine Bowne's metaphysics, i.e. the roots of his view of Personalism. What emerges is his idea of existence in general and of human existence in particular. This is done also historically, by examining some earlier views of man and reality in general, which were the background for Bowne's specific ideas.

He begins from his idea of existence as active and self-determining, and of nature as activated by the intellect and will of God, the Most-High Person. That is why the human person has the attributes of awareness and self-awareness, freedom and the ability to act, and self-control.

The connection of Bowne's Personalism with idealism also presents the problem of how do we come to discover the notion of person, which is not from simple experience of reality, but is rather developed or postulated. For Bowne the model for the notion of person is the Person of