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ON PARADOX OF CONFIRMATION

S u m m a r y

This paper is devoted to analysis of co-called paradox of confirmation formulated by C. G. Hempel in the 1930s. In particular, the author proposes a solution of this puzzle. The proposal consists in refining the concept of confirmation by adding a clause that if *A* confirms a hypothesis *h*, the former must be a logical consequence of a latter, eventually derived with the help of additional assumptions. This leads to an additional constraint requiring that confirmations act relatively to sets of reference. Finally, if *h* and *h'* are logically equivalent, a sentence *A* confirms both to the same degree if and only if related sets of reference are the same.

Summarised by Jan Woleński

Information about Author: Prof. Dr JAN WOLEŃSKI – Department of Epistemology, Institute of Philosophy, Jagiellonian University in Krakow; address for correspondence: ul. Grodzka 52, PL 31-044 Kraków; e-mail: wolenski@if.uj.edu.pl