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## THE MANIFEST AND SCIENTIFIC IMAGES OF THE WORLD

### S u m m a r y

The article below consists of two parts. In the longer first one, we present the salient features of Sellars' conception of the manifest and scientific images of the world, and seek to determine the ways in which these two elements may be said to be related to one another. On the basis of this, we then point out one of the sources of the contemporary mind-body problem. In the shorter second part, we outline a variety of philosophical and neuroscientific proposals for resolving the issue of the relationship between our everyday intuitive understanding of what the mental states of a person amount to and their brain states as described in strictly scientific terms.

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