

WAR IN HISTORY

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The History of Polish and General Military Science

pod redakcją Andrzeja Niewińskiego

SERIA HOMO MILITANS

VI

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Pracownia Wojskowo-Historyczna

ISBN 978-83-65172-88-4

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Skład: Studio Format

Zdjęcie na okładce: Dominika Lipska

Druk: „Elpil”, Artyleryjska 11, 08–110 Siedlce

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Ashurnasirpal II's campaign to the Upper Tigris region in 879 B.C.¹

From roughly the time of Adad-nerari I (1307–1275 B.C.) the Upper Tigris region belongs to the sphere of influence of Assyria. It was an important area economically, since there were valuable raw materials necessary for the efficient development of the empire. At the end of the 2nd millennium, this area began to gradually pass into the hands of more and stronger politically and economically Arameans, so that in the 10th century BC Assyrians almost completely lost control over the region. It was the time of crisis, not only on the northern border of Assyria, but in the whole country. However, it did not last long, because as early as next century could be seen the beginnings of the process of the rebirth of the empire. Certainly, this process gained momentum in the time of the first of the great Neo-Assyrian kings – Ashurnasirpal II (883–859 B.C.).

Undoubtedly, Ashurnasirpal paid particular attention to the areas of the Upper Tigris, since he went there with his troops three times: during the second, fifth and tenth campaign. Already during the second expedition², which took place in the year 882 B.C., he conquered important cities lying on the right side

¹ Abbreviations: CAD – *The Assyrian Dictionary of the Oriental Institute of Chicago*, ed. I. J. Gelb, T. Jacobsen, B. Landsberger et al., Chicago 1956–; RIMA 2 – A. K. Grayson, *Assyrian Rulers of the Early First Millennium BC, I (1114–859 BC)*, (The Royal Inscriptions of Mesopotamia. Assyrian Periods 2), Toronto 1991; RGTC 5 – K. Nashef, *Répertoire géographique des textes cunéiformes. Die Orts- und Gewässernamen der mittelbabylonischen und mittelasyrischen Zeit*, (TAVO, Reihe B, Geisteswissenschaften 7/5), Wiesbaden 1982; RGTC 9 – I. M. Diakonoff, S. M. Kashkai, *Répertoire géographique des textes cunéiformes. Geographical Names According to Urartian Texts*, (TAVO, Reihe B, Geisteswissenschaften 7/9), Wiesbaden 1981; RLA – *Reallexikon der Assyriologie und Vorderasiatischen Archäologie*, Bd. 1, ed. E. Ebeling, B. Meissner et al., Berlin 1932–;

² In fact, it was the third campaign, but in this article we adopted numeration, which M. Live-rani applied in his topographical work *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II 2, Topographical analysis*, (Quaderni di geografia storica 4), Roma 1992. Regarding the description of the course of this expedition in the royal inscriptions, see RIMA 2, A.O.101.1: i 99–ii 23; A.O.101.17: ii 1–76.

of the Tigris River, such as Kinabu³, Mariru⁴ and Tela⁵. Ashurnasirpal also went to Tušhan⁶, lying on the Tigris River, where he had old city wall cleared away and rebuilt, founded a palace, and set up a limestone stela with a depiction of himself and an account of his recent deeds. Moreover, during his stay in this strategically

³ This city should be located in the area between the Tigris, Tur-Abdin and Karaca Dağ, not far from Damdammusa. See E. Forrer, *Die Provinzeinteilung des assyrischen Reiches*, Leipzig 1920, p. 27; K. Kessler, Kinabu, *RLA* 5, p. 597; Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 36. According to E. Lipiński, *The Aramaeans: Their Ancient History, Culture, Religion*, (Orientalia Lovaniensia analecta 100), Leuven 2000, p. 148, Kinabu can be identified with modern Aktepe or Tauşantepe. K. Köroğlu, *Üçtepe I: Yeni Kazı ve Yüzey Bulguları Işığında Diyarbakır/Üçtepe ve Çevresinin Yeni Assur Dönemi Tarihi Coğrafyası*, (Türk Tarih Kurumu 45), Ankara 1998, p. 106, in turn suggested the possibility of identifying with İncirtepe (Tilarap). Cf. M. Streck, Das Gebiet der heutigen Landschaften Armenien, Kurdistan und Westpersien nach den babylonisch-assyrischen Keilinschriften, *Zeitschrift für Assyriologie* 13 (1898), pp. 74–75, and A. Šanda, *Untersuchungen zur Kunde des alten Orient*, (Mitteilungen der Vorderasiatischen Gesellschaft 7/2), Berlin 1902, p. 4, who proposed emendation Kinabu to Sinabu.

⁴ According to A. T. Olmstead, The Calculated Frightfulness of Ashur Nasir Apal, *Journal of the American Oriental Society* 38 (1918), p. 227, the city corresponds to the modern Aktepe. Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 37, suggested that this site should be located to the south-east of Damdammusa. Köroğlu, *Üçtepe I*, p. 106, pointed to the possibility of identifying Mariru with Tauşantepe, which lies 27 km south-east of Diyarbakır. Lipiński, *The Aramaeans*, pp. 148–149, suggested that Mariru may correspond to the modern Kürthaçitepe or Sihratepe.

⁵ This city was situated in the western part of Tur-Abdin, probably between Derik and Mazıdağı. See Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 38. Cf. Olmstead, The Calculated Frightfulness, p. 227, who suggested the identification with Sihratepe, and Lipiński, *The Aramaeans*, pp. 149–150, who pointed to Tepeköy.

⁶ It seems now evident that Tušhan should be identified with Ziyaret Tepe, especially in the light of recent archaeological investigations that have been carried out at this site. See e.g. T. Matney, T. Greenfield, K. Köroğlu, J. MacGinnis, L. Proctor, M. Rosenzweig, D. Wicke, Excavations at Ziyaret Tepe, Diyarbakır Province, Turkey, 2011–2014 Seasons, *Anatolica* 41 (2015), pp. 125–176.

significant city, he received tribute “from the kings of the lands of Nairi”⁷: Bit-Zamani⁸, Shubria⁹, Nirdun¹⁰, and Urumu¹¹.

The fifth campaign, which is the main topic of this article, was conducted three years later, i.e. in 879 B.C.¹² Before Ashurnasirpal had reached the Upper Tigris region, he entered the land Katmuhu¹³, and the Kašiiari Mountains region¹⁴. In Katmuhu the Assyrian monarch stopped in the city Til-uli¹⁵, where he consecrated a palace and received tribute. Trip through “rugged terrain”¹⁶

⁷ RIMA 2, A.O.101.1: ii 13 (šá MAN.MEŠ-ni šá KUR.KUR na-i-ri). Nairi is a generic toponim, which underwent an evolution throughout time. At the time of Ashurnasirpal, Nairi seems to have been comprised of a group of four autonomous polities, lying around the Upper Tigris, on the north and south sides of the river. See RIMA 2, A.O.101.1: ii 12–15; A.O.101.17: ii 37–48.

⁸ This Aramaic kingdom should be located in the Tigris River valley around modern Diyarbakır. Cf. Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 40; Lipiński, *The Aramaeans*, pp. 137–151; J. Szuchman, Bit Zamani and Assyria, *Syria* 86 (2009), pp. 58–59.

⁹ At the time of Ashurnasirpal Shubria probably lay between Eastern Taurus and the valleys of the Gorzan River, Upper Tigris River and Ambar River. Cf. Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 39; Kessler, Šubria, *RLA* 13, p. 239.

¹⁰ This kingdom was probably situated southeast of Tušhan. Its main city was Madara, which is identified with the modern town of Matar, located near the mouth of the Savur Çay. Cf. Streck, *Das Gebiet der heutigen Landschaften*, pp. 78–79; Šanda, *Untersuchungen zur Kunde*, p. 5; Olmstead, *The Calculated Frightfulness*, p. 237; Forrer, *Die Provinzeinteilung*, p. 21; K. Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie Nordmesopotamiens: Nach keilschriftlichen Quellen des 1. Jahrtausends v. Chr.*, (Tübinger Atlas des Vorderen Orients, Reihe B, Geisteswissenschaften 26), Wiesbaden 1980, pp. 71–75; Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, pp. 40, 60; Lipiński, *The Aramaeans*, p. 154; B. J. Parker, *The Mechanics of Empire, The Northern Frontier of Assyria as a Case Study in Imperial Dynamics*, Helsinki 2001, p. 170.

¹¹ Probably this country should be located to the south or south-west of Tušhan. As suggested by Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, pp. 40–41, toponym Urumu can be combined with the literary term Nirbu relating to the area of Kašiiari Mountains. Cf. Šanda, *Untersuchungen zur Kunde*, p. 13; Streck, *Das Gebiet der heutigen Landschaften*, pp. 79–82; Olmstead, *The Calculated Frightfulness*, pp. 228–229; RGTC 9, pp. 95–96.

¹² A. Millard, *The Eponyms of the Assyrian Empire*, (State Archives of Assyria, Studies 2), Helsinki 1994, pp. 25, 56.

¹³ It was located west of the modern Cizre and occupied lands between the Tigris, the eastern part of Tur-Abdin and Sinjar. Cf. J. N. Postgate, Katmuhu, *RLA* 5, p. 487; Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie Nordmesopotamiens*, pp. 16–20; Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, pp. 29–30.

¹⁴ Modern Tur-Abdin. See K. Radner, How to reach The Upper Tigris: The Route through The Tūr-‘Abdin, *State Archives of Assyria Bulletin* 15 (2006), pp. 283–286.

¹⁵ This city should be probably identified with Tall Rumailan. Cf. Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie Nordmesopotamiens*, pp. 9–15; Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 57.

¹⁶ RIMA 2, A.O.101.19: 60–61 (A.ŠĀ nam-ra-ši).

of the Kašiiari Mountains took “six days”¹⁷, during which Ashurnasirpal moved through numerous small towns and villages¹⁸. Some of these cities paid tribute and those that did not were plundered and burned. Once leaving the Kašiiari Mountains, the Assyrian monarch “went down for a second time to the land Nairi”¹⁹ and headed to the fortified town Madara. Ashurnasirpal laid siege to this city, probably because its ruler, Labturu, did not pay tribute, like he did three years earlier. After the capture of Madara, Ashurnasirpal marched to the Assyrian provincial capital of Tušhan, where he consecrated a palace and received tax and tribute from the land Nirdun.

In the next phase of campaign, Ashurnasirpal – with an elite force of heavy chariots, cavalry and specially trained troops – set out from Tušhan and headed north toward the Tigris River. According to inscriptions, he crossed the river “by means of a bridge of rafts”²⁰ and marched to the city Pitura (URU.*pi-tu-ra*)²¹, an important city of land Dirra²². After the capture of this well-fortified town, Ashurnasirpal moved to the city known as Kukunu (URU.*ku-ú-ku-nu*), which was located at the foot of the mountain Matnu (KUR.*ma-at-ni*). This town, as well as 40 other not mentioned by name²³, was also captured and destroyed. After leaving the land Dirra and its city Pitura, which probably was the starting point for the conquest of the following centers of the country, the king of Assyria „went down”²⁴ to the city Arbakku (URU.*ar-ba-ak-ki*), lying in the “inner Habhu” (*Ḫabḫu ša bitāni*). At the sight of the approaching Assyrian troops, inhabitants of Arbakku and nearby cities fled and climbed up Mount Matnu, but finally they

¹⁷ RIMA 2, A.o.101.19: 60 (6 UD.MEŠ-*te*).

¹⁸ Note that the account of campaign vary between the standard Annals and the Kurkh Monolith. Compare RIMA 2, A.o.101.1: ii 86–125 and A.o.101.17: iii 138’-iv 120 with A.o.101.19: 25–103. In this article we use the Kurkh Monolith as a main source, because this text can be considered as the direct source of the shorter text of the Annals.

¹⁹ RIMA 2, A.o.101.19: 63 (2-*te-šú ana KUR na-ir-ri at-tar-da*).

²⁰ RIMA 2, A.o.101.19: 70 (*ina ra-ak-su-[te]*). Parker, *The Mechanics of Empire*, p. 151, recently suggested that this bridge was probably made of a series of pontoon boats.

²¹ Regarding the localisation of Pitura and most of the following toponyms see discussion below.

²² Cf. K. Radner, A. Schachner, From Tushan to Amedi: Topographical Questions Concerning the Upper Tigris Region in the Assyrian Period, [in:] N. Tuna, J. Özturk, J. Velibeyoglu (eds.), *Salvage Project of the Archaeological Heritage of the Ilisu and Carchemish Dam Reservoirs: Activities in 1999*, Ankara 2001, p. 762, who prefer the translation of KUR.*di-ir-ra-a-ia*, KUR.*di-ri-a* and KUR.*di-ir-ra-a-a* as “people of the country of Dirru”.

²³ Information about 40 cities comes from the Kurkh Monolith (RIMA 2, A.o.101.19: 78). In later versions of Ashurnasirpal’s annals this numer increases to 50 (RIMA 2, A.o.101.1: ii 111; RIMA 2, A.o.101.17: iv 86).

²⁴ RIMA 2, A.o.101.1: ii 112; A.o.101.17: iv 92; A.o.101.19: 80 (*at-tar-da*). See CAD A/2, *arādu*, pp. 212–220.

were caught and killed by Ashurnasirpal's troops. The Assyrian monarch, during his stay in these areas, conquered, moreover, fortified city Ijaja (URU.*i-ia-ia*) and Salaniba (URU.*sa-la-ni-ba*), which were controlled by Arbakku, and turned into a ruin hills 250 cities of the land Nairi.

Ashurnasirpal's expedition against Bit-Zamani was the final phase of his fifth campaign. The pretext was provided by an inner rebellion and an assassination of Amme-ba'li, who was installed by Ashurnasirpal's father Tukulti-Ninurta II (890–884 B.C.) as ruler of this kingdom in 886 B.C.²⁵ Amme-ba'li was loyal to Assyrians²⁶, therefore the king of Assyria marched to Bit-Zamani in order to avenge his death. The rebels submitted quickly and paid considerable tribute, which including, among others, chariots, horses, metals, bronze vessels, textiles and livestock. The rebel leader, Bur-Ramanu, who fled and probably hid in Sinabu²⁷, was captured and flayed alive by Assyrians. Ashurnasirpal appointed Bur-Ramanu's brother, Ilanu, as sheikh of Bit Zamani and imposed heavy tribute obligations. Moreover, the Assyrian monarch took the opportunity of submission of Bit-Zamani and established two Assyrian strongholds along the Tigris between Amedi and Tušhan – Sinabu and Tidu²⁸. On the trip back to Nineveh, Ashurnasirpal's troops clashed with "fighting men"²⁹ of the city Shura (URU.*šu-ú-ra*)³⁰. According to the Kurkh Monolith, Assyrians killed 900 warriors and took 2000 captives from this city³¹.

It is worth to note that in the description of the fifth campaign – conducted mainly in the Upper Tigris region – was mentioned many toponyms, but never

²⁵ RIMA 2, A.O.100.5: 14–29; Millard, *The Eponyms of the Assyrian Empire*, pp. 24, 96.

²⁶ He paid tribute to Ashurnasirpal in 882 B.C. See RIMA 2, A.O.101.1: ii 12–15; A.O.101.17: ii 37–48.

²⁷ This city should be located on the Upper Tigris River and probably identified with modern Pornak. Cf. Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, pp. 28, 111, 117–121; Lipiński, *The Aramaeans*, pp. 141–142.

²⁸ The most likely location of Tidu is Kurkh/Üçtepe. Cf. Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, pp. 28, 111, 117–121; Lipiński, *The Aramaeans*, pp. 143–144.

²⁹ RIMA 2, A.O.101.19: 103 (ÉRIN.MEŠ *ti-<du>-ki-<šu>-nu*).

³⁰ Modern Savur. See T. A. Sinclair, *Eastern Turkey. An Architectural and Archaeological Survey* III, London 1989, pp. 321–322; Radner, *How to reach The Upper Tigris*, p. 292.

³¹ In the Kurkh Monolith we can also find the hint about city Damdammusa as a place where Ashurnasirpal received the tribute of the land Shubria. Since this city is mentioned in the passage summarizing Ashurnasirpal's achievements, it is difficult to indicate in which phase of campaign he visited it. If we assume that Damdammusa was located not too distant from Amedi, i.e. capital city of Bit-Zamani, then we can conclude that Ashurnasirpal marched to this city in the final phase. Regarding the localisation of Damdammusa, see Forrer, *Die Provinzeinteilung*, p. 23; Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, p. 119; Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 36; Lipiński, *The Aramaeans*, p. 148; Koroğlu, *Üçtepe I*, p. 105.

once mentions the land Shubria, which lay opposite Tušhan. In previous literature we can find a few concepts trying to explain this situation. In one of his pioneering work, A. Šanda stated that probably the expedition against Dirra and Arbakku automatically involved Shubria³². M. Liverani noticed that in the Kurkh Monolith's final list of conquered cities of the fifth campaign, between Dirra and Arbakku, were listed toponyms Aggunu and Ulliba³³, therefore in his opinion they could be part of Shubria³⁴. According to K. Kessler, this situation suggests that Shubria did not occupy the entire region between Amedi and Batman River valley³⁵. K. Radner i A. Schachner, in turn, stated that Dirra was probably part of Shubria, so that there was no need for mentioning the name of the kingdom³⁶.

An analysis of this problematic issue, and therefore attempt to create a political picture of Upper Tigris region in time of Ashurnasirpal, certainly requires determination of location of the most important toponyms listed in the campaign's description. Undoubtedly, a major difficulty in this situation is to indicate the position of Dirra. This fact was noted, among others, by Liverani, who pointed to the possibility of the location of this land on both the west and east of the Batman River basin, which is seen by him as a central region of Shubria. According to Liverani, the first option can be seen as possible, since inscription describing the Ashurnasirpal's tenth campaign mentions „the cities of the Dirria”³⁷ in the area of Arqania and the Amadanu pass, i.e. in the Upper Tigris valley. An eastern location, in turn, can find support in the fact that the land Arbakku is considered a part of *Ḫabḫu ša bitāni*, which is identified in his opinion with the Bohtan River basin³⁸. Finally Liverani, however, stated that Dirra should be identified with toponym Dirria³⁹, therefore the most likely option is a western location for this land and an eastern one for Arbakku, although the text implies a direct link between Dirra and Arbakku through the pass of Mount Matnu⁴⁰.

An interesting concept regarding this problematic issue was presented by K. Radner and A. Schachner. In their opinion, the main city of Dirra – Pitura, was

³² Šanda, *Untersuchungen zur Kunde*, pp. 11–12.

³³ RIMA 2, A.O.101.19: 98 (KUR.ag-gu-nu KUR.ul-li-ba).

³⁴ Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 61.

³⁵ Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, p. 107.

³⁶ Radner, Schachner, *From Tushan to Amedi*, p. 762.

³⁷ RIMA 2, A.O.101.1: iii 100 (URU.MEŠ-ni šá KUR.dir-ri-a).

³⁸ Cf. Forrer, *Die Provinzeinteilung*, pp. 27, 30, who due to the identification of city Beširi with modern Pitura and Arbakku with Arwah, also advocated the eastern location.

³⁹ Such identifikation was pointed out also by Streck, *Das Gebiet der heutigen Landschaften*, pp. 96–97, and Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, pp. 103–104.

⁴⁰ Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, pp. 60–61. Cf. Olmstead, *The Calculated Frighfulness*, p. 238, 260 (map).

probably situated 15–25 km from the place, where the Assyrian army crossed the Tigris after leaving Tušhan. Therefore, the only site that fits information contained in the royal inscriptions and is located within the required distance, is Salat Tepe. Moreover, according to them, Mount Matnu should be identified with one of the hill ranges, which were situated in the region north of this modern city. Arbakku, in turn, probably lay west of the Batman River, because Ashurnasirpal's inscriptions do not mention crossing of a major river during the march from Pitura. In this case, therefore, the best candidate for location of Arbakku in their opinion is the mound of Gre Dimse, which have the size of a walled settlement⁴¹.

A suggestion regarding the localization of Dirra was presented also by archaeologist B. J. Parker, who led the research in the area of the Upper Tigris. According to him, toponym Dirria known from Ashurnasirpal's tenth campaign, can not be equated with that land, because the distance between Tušhan and Dirria is far too great even for a highly mobile force to have covered in one 24-hour period. Moreover, Parker stated that the theory about the location of Dirra west of the Batman River must also be rule out, since any region north of Tušhan and west of the Batman River, which the Assyrian army could have traveled in 24-hour period, was within the state of Shubria. In his opinion, therefore, Dirra should be located east of the Batman River in the region of the Garzan and Bohtan river valleys, which lie at a distance of about 50 kilometers from Tušhan. Parker stated also that in this context Mount Matnu may correspond to the Began Dağı, the mountain that lies between the Garzan and Bohtan river valleys. The latter valley, in his opinion, should be seen as a location of Arbakku, since this region is identified with *Ḫabḫu ša bitāni*⁴².

It seems that the location of Dirra, known from the Ashurnasirpal's fifth campaign, largely depends on the determination of the merits of identifying this country with toponym Dirria (KUR.*dir-ri-a*), which was mentioned in the description of the events from the tenth campaign⁴³. The term Dirria appears only once in the royal inscriptions, as the name of the country in which the king of Assyria conquered many cities⁴⁴. According to the text, these centers were located between Mount Amadanu (KUR.*a-ma-da-ni*) and Mount Arqania (KUR.

⁴¹ Radner, Schachner, From Tushan to Amedi, pp. 763–765, 752 (map).

⁴² Parker, *The Mechanics of Empire*, pp. 107–109.

⁴³ It is worth to note that A. K. Grayson, RIMA 2, both forms occurring in the inscriptions describing fifth campaign: KUR.*di-ir-ra-a-ia* (A.o.101.1: ii 104, A.o.101.17: iv 65, A.o.101.19: 71), KUR.*di-ri-a* (A.o.101.1: ii 111, A.o.101.17: iv 86), KUR.*di-ir-ra-a-a* (A.o.101.19: 78), and form KUR.*dir-ri-a* (A.o.101.1: iii 100) from the text relating to tenth campaign, translated as „Dirru”.

⁴⁴ RIMA 2, A.o.101.1: iii 100–101.

ar-qa-ni-a). The first mountain should be identified with Karaça Dağ⁴⁵ or located in the western part of Tur-Abdin⁴⁶. The second one, in turn, most likely was situated in the region of Ergani⁴⁷. In this situation the area occupied by Dirria should probably refer to areas located north of Diyarbakır⁴⁸. Therefore, if we assume that the country Dirra can be identified with this toponym, the main direction of the Ashurnasirpal's expedition from Tušhan was west and the areas situated north of Bit-Zamani. In our opinion, this option, contrary to the above quoted author, cannot be ruled out.

According to the inscriptions, Ashurnasirpal left Tušhan for Dirra taking with him only his "strong chariots, cavalry and crack troops"⁴⁹, thus, generally, a leaner assault force. This kind of force was undoubtedly much more mobile than the Assyrian army with heavy equipment and support staff and could have covered considerably more territory in the same amount of time. It seems to be generally accepted that the Assyrian army marched about 15–25 km per day over favourable terrain and half of this distance when traveling through mountainous terrain⁵⁰. If, therefore, an expedition from Tušhan began in the early morn-

⁴⁵ See M. Falkner, Studien zur Geographie des alten Mesopotamien, *Archiv für Orientforschung* 18 (1957–58), p. 16; RGTC 5, p. 28; Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, pp. 83–84. Russel, Shalmaneser's Campaign to Urartu in 856 B.C. and the Historical Geography of Eastern Anatolia According to the Assyrian Sources, *Anatolian Studies* 34 (1984), p. 184, identifies KUR.a-ma-da-ni with KUR.a-ma-da-na from the inscriptions of Tiglathpileser I (RIMA 2, A.o.87.1: iv 58), and thus locate it in the area of the Ergani-Maden pass. Cf., however, Kessler, Šubria, Urartu and Aššur. Topographical Questions around the Tigris Sources, [in:] M. Liverani (ed.), *Neo-Assyrian Geography*, Roma 1995, pp. 61–62, who prefer separate both toponyms.

⁴⁶ See Lipiński, *The Aramaeans*, pp. 145–146.

⁴⁷ See F. Hommel, *Geschichte Babyloniens und Assyriens*, Berlin 1885, p. 585; Streck, Das Gebiet der heutigen Landschaften, p. 95; Olmstead, The Calculated Frightfulness, p. 252; E. Ebeling, Arqānia, *RIA* 1, p. 154; E. I. Gordon, The Meaning of the Ideogram ^dKASKAL.KUR = "Underground Water-Course" and its Significance for Bronze Age Geography, *Journal of Cuneiform Studies* 21 (1967), p. 86; Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 84; Köroğlu, Üçtepe I, p. 101; S. Yamada, *The Construction of the Assyrian Empire, A Historical Study of the Inscriptions of Shalmaneser III (859–824 B.C.) Relating to his Campaigns to the West*, (Culture and History of the Ancient Near East 3), Leiden–Boston 2000, p. 72; Ö. Harmanşah, 'Source of the Tigris': Event, Place and Performance in the Assyrian Landscapes of the Early Iron Age, *Archaeological Dialogues* 14 (2007), p. 189. Cf. Lipiński, *The Aramaeans*, pp. 146–147, who suggests the area west of Mardin.

⁴⁸ Cf. map °11 in Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, p. 194, and map °5 in Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, p. 121.

⁴⁹ RIMA 2, A.o.101.19: 70 (GIŠ.GIGIR.MEŠ KAL-tu pit-ḫal-lu šá-ri-su i-si-ia).

⁵⁰ See G. I. Davies, The Significance of Deuteronomy 1.2 for the Location of Mount Horeb, *Palestine Exploration Quarterly* 111 (1979), pp. 92–93; Salvini, Some Historic-Geographical Problems Concerning Assyria and Urartu, [in:] M. Liverani (ed.), *Neo-Assyrian Geography*, Roma 1995, p. 47.

ing and after the day of marching the decision was made to continue through night, we may assume that the Ashurnasipal's smaller force could have traveled between 40 and 60 kilometers in this period, both in eastern and western direction⁵¹. Parker argued that the latter direction should be excluded, since "any region 40 to 80 kilometers north of Tušhan and west of the Batman River was well within the state of Šubria"⁵². He did not, however, convincingly explain why the region of Diyarbakır should be seen as a western "border" of this kingdom⁵³. Moreover, his conclusions on the area occupied by Šubria⁵⁴ were largely based on analyses of Kessler⁵⁵ and Liverani⁵⁶. Their inferences, in turn, do indicate the possibility of location Dirra in the areas east of Diyarbakır and west of the Batman River. The thesis, excluding the possibility of marching the Assyrian force west, should be therefore considered unfounded.

In Parker's opinion, another argument supporting the hypothesis that Dirra was located east of the Batman River, is information about the location of Arbakku in *Ḥabḫu ša bitāni*, which is identified by him with Bohtan river valley. It is worth to note, however, that the form *Ḥabḫu ša bitāni* (inner Habhu), as demonstrated recently by A. Fuchs, was used by Assyrians primarily to determine the particular isolated mountain regions, where one can enter only after overcoming difficult routes and mountain passes⁵⁷. In Ashurnasirpal's inscriptions we can find information that after leaving Dirra king of Assyria „went down" to Arbakku, so it may suggest that this city was located in a secluded valley⁵⁸. Moreover, the text indicates that Assyrian monarch would have reached Arbakku coming from Pitura

⁵¹ We should be aware that night travel must have been somewhat slower than day travel, especially in difficult terrain. Cf. Parker, *The Mechanics of Empire*, p. 108, who assumed that this force could have traveled between 40 and 80 kilometers in the 24-hour period after departing from Tušhan.

⁵² Parker, *The Mechanics of Empire*, p. 108.

⁵³ Parker, *The Mechanics of Empire*, p. 164: "Directly north of Tušhan, located in the hilly terrain between the Batman River and Diyarbakır, was the state of Šubria".

⁵⁴ Parker, *The Mechanics of Empire*, pp. 107–108, 164, 231–232.

⁵⁵ *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, pp. 103–104, 106–108, 121 (map 5); Šubria, Urartu and Aššur, pp. 56–59.

⁵⁶ *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, pp. 39, 60, 188 (map 6).

⁵⁷ A. Fuchs, *Māt Ḥabḫi*, [in:] J. Marzahn, H. Neumann (eds.), *Assyriologica et Semitica: Festschrift für Joachim Oelsner*, (Alter Orient und Altes Testament 252), Münster 2000, 79, pp. 86–87. Cf. M. Salvini, *Nairi e Ur(u)atri, contributo alla storia della formazione del regno di Urartu*, Roma 1967, pp. 81–94; J. N. Postgate, The Inscription of Tiglath-pileser III at Mila Mergi, *Sumer* 29 (1973), pp. 58–59; Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, pp. 25–27.

⁵⁸ Cf. Radner, Schachner, From Tushan to Amedi, p. 764, who translate the verb *arādu* as „to go downstream" and interpret the text as referring to march downstream along the river, from Pitura to Arbakku.

through a pass, thus the entrance to it undoubtedly was not easy⁵⁹. In this context, we can conclude that Arbakku does not have to be located in the Bohtan river valley, but as well it could be located in one of the valleys on the west side of the Batman River.

Assuming, therefore, that after leaving Tušhan Assyrian troops marched west toward areas located north of Diyarbakır, it must be considered likely to identify the country Dirra with toponym Dirria. In this situation we should probably say about one term “Dirr(i)a” referring to areas located both on the western and eastern side of the Tigris River⁶⁰. It is worth here to note that, according to inscriptions, Ashurnasirpal during the fifth campaign conquered “40 (50) cities of the Dirra” and in the time of tenth campaign destroyed the cities of Dirria “which are between Mounts Amadanu and Arqania”. These references, in turn, undoubtedly suggest that the term Dirr(i)a was used by the Assyrians to determine relatively extensive area⁶¹. If, therefore, Ashurnasirpal invaded only “eastern” part of this land, his force did not even have to cross the Tigris River north of Bit-Zamani.

In this context, the main center of Dirr(i)a – Pitura, should be located in the area north-east of Diyarbakır. Since this city is described as a site „surrounded by two walls” and with a „citadel lofty like a mountain peak”, the best candidates for identification with this center are, in our opinion, the mound Karaçalı⁶², with a diameter of 200 m and a height of 40 m⁶³, and Pir Hüseyin, the ancient settlement situated on a high terrace overlooking the floodplain of the Ambar River⁶⁴. The city Kukunu, in turn, was situated, according to inscriptions, “at the entrance to the pass of Mount Matnu”. The only proper mountains in that region is the range

⁵⁹ Cf. Liverani, *Studies on the Annals of Ashurnasirpal II*, pp. 61–62; Fuchs, *Mât Habḥi*, p. 79.

⁶⁰ Cf. S. Ponchia, Mountain Routes in Assyrian Royal Inscriptions (Part I), *Kaskal. Rivista di storia, ambienti e culture del Vicino Oriente Antico* 1 (2004), p. 170, who suggests, in this case, the occurrence of the phenomena of homonymity, i.e. exchange of names due to common features of the landscape, etc., however, she does not rule out the hypothesis of a westward direction of the attack.


⁶¹ Cf. Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, pp. 103–104, 106–108, 121 (map °5).

⁶² This mound is located about 50 km from Ziyaret Tepe (Tušhan) and only 15 km from Diyarbakır, which is identified with Bit-Zamani’s capital – Amedi. However, as rightly pointed out by Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, p. 108, „(...) gibt es nicht den geringsten Hinweis darauf, dass sich das aramäische Reich von Bit Zamāni und die spätere Provinz Na’iri/Amedi auf das linke Tigrisufer nach Osten hin ausgedehnt hat”. Cf. Olmstead, *The Calculated Frightfulness*, p. 238, who suggested the identification of Pitura with modern Batrik, situated to the north-east of Diyarbakır.

⁶³ Köroğlu, *Üçtepe I*, pp. 106–107.

⁶⁴ This site is located about 60 km from Ziyaret Tepe (Tušhan) and some 25 km from Diyarbakır. See B. Peasnell, G. Algaze, *The Survey of Pir Hüseyin*, 2004, *Anatolica* 36 (2010), pp. 165–195.

of Eastern Taurus, thus this city should be located north of Pitura. The distance between Pitura and Kukunu is not mentioned by Ashurnasirpal, so it is at present impossible to suggest one site in particular. We can only state that Kukunu lay in the vicinity of Taurus, most likely east of the Tigris⁶⁵. A very general conclusion can be also drawn for Arbakku, which was situated “in the interior of the land Habhu”. As was stated above, this city lay in the isolated mountain region, therefore we should place it in one of the valleys of Eastern Taurus.



Reconstruction attempt of Ashurnasirpal II's raid from Tušhan to Arbakku

Due to the difficulty in location of many toponyms listed in Ashurnasirpal's inscriptions, it is unfortunately hard to determine accurate course of the main part of the fifth campaign. In our opinion, however, the western direction of the expedition from Tušhan is more probable than eastern. Assyrian force, most likely, just after crossing Tigris headed west and marched along the left bank of the Tigris River⁶⁶. Ashurnasirpal's invasion of Shubrian kingdom, which

⁶⁵ One of the candidates is Hani, which lies at the foot of Taurus and at the route leading through this mountains.

⁶⁶ Cf. Parker, *The Mechanics of Empire*, p. 108, who suggests that in the case of western direction of expedition „(...) it would have made much more sense to follow the king's road along

was situated opposite Tušhan, was in this case simply unnecessary, because its ruler Anhitti turned submissive and paid tribute to Assyria three years earlier⁶⁷. The main objective of Assyrian expedition was the land of Dirr(i)a, and more precisely the area located to the north-east of Diyarbakır, since Bit-Zamani and Shubria were at that time already dependent to Assyria. An intervention in Bit-Zamani probably took place already after returning Ashurnasirpal's force from Dirr(i)a and Arbakku to Tušhan⁶⁸. On this occasion Assyrian monarch captured also two fortresses – Tidu and Sinabu, and most likely marched to Damdammusa, where he received tribute from Shubrian ruler.

Reconstruction attempt of Ashurnasirpal II's raid from Tušhan to Arbakku

Summary

In 879 B.C. Assyrian king Ashurnasirpal II conducted a military expedition to the Upper Tigris region. It was the second time when he visited this areas with his troops, but in this case he crossed the river and marched to conquer, among others, Pitura in the land of Dirra, Kukunu and Arbakku. Unfortunately, there are problems with location of these toponyms, so it is difficult to reconstruct the itinerary of the campaign. Scholars generally suggest that Ashurnasirpal II, after leaving Tushan and crossing the Tigris River, headed east in direction of Batman and Bohtan river valleys. Author of this article, in turn, believes that more likely is the western direction of the expedition. Assuming that it is probable to identify the country Dirra with toponym Dirria, known from other Ashurnasirpal II's campaign, he indicates that Pitura should be located in the area north-east of Diyarbakır. In this context, Kukunu, in his opinion, probably lay in the vicinity of Eastern Taurus, and Arbakku in one of the valleys of this mountains.

the south bank of the Tigris (...). However, it is worth to note that cities lying on this route – Tidu and Sinabu, were at that time under direct control of Aramaeans, and were conquered by Assyrians after the expedition to the country Dirr(i)a. See RIMA 2, A.O.101.19: 70–94.

⁶⁷ As is recorded in the Kurkh Monolith, Shubrian ruler offered tribute to Ashurnasirpal also during the fifth campaign. See RIMA 2, A.O.101.19: 101–102.

⁶⁸ This situation suggests the phrase located just before the information about the revolt in Bit-Zamani: „I reaped the harvest of their land (and) stored the barley and straw in the city Tušhan”, which is typical end of episode in Ashurnasirpal's relations. E.g. RIMA 2, A.O.101.1: ii 9, ii 86, iii 82. Cf. Kessler, *Untersuchungen zur historischen Topographie*, p. 104.

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How to choose the best field of battle – according to the authors of Roman military treatises¹

*Quemadmodum idoneus locus eligatur ad pugnam*²

Choosing a suitable location to fight a battle has always been one of the most crucial factors determining the outcome of the ensuing clash. In the Antiquity, it was often the deciding factor, especially if the opposing sides utilized heavy infantry or cavalry formations, which required open areas to operate effectively. Another aspect that affected the choice of the battlefield was the composition of one's forces, the size of cavalry units, and the make-up of the enemy army. A properly selected deployment area oftentimes ensured the cohesion of one's formation; it could also serve to negate an enemy's advantage, thus determining which force would have the upper hand. Before a battle it was the commander's duty to ensure the most favorable conditions for his army, while simultaneously weakening the position of the enemy. It is worth emphasizing that in the Antiquity leadership was more about motivating the army rather than tactics. Common ideas about how ancient battles were fought are often incorrect, particularly with regard to the role of the commanding officer. It was a leader's task to mentally prepare his men before the clash³ and to choose a suitable location for the battle, which

¹ I have already touched on the subject of the battlefield in: Ł. Różycki, *Quemadmodum idoneus locus eligatur ad pugnam Czyli jak wybrać najlepsze miejsce walki – zdaniem autorów rzymskich traktatów wojskowych*, [in:] *Pola bitew wczoraj i dziś*, ed. A. Olejko, P. Korzeniowski, K. Mroczkowski, Oświęcim–Rzeszów 2013, p. 151–158. This work is an expanded and supplemented version of the aforementioned Polish piece.

² Vegetius 3.13.1. further cited as „Veg.”

³ See for example: A. K. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War 100 BC – AD 200*, Oxford 2009, p.116–167.

would be advantageous to his forces, while neutralizing the advantages held by the enemy. During actual fighting, contrary to popular belief, the commander's role was less important and usually boiled down to deploying the reserves⁴. It was not unheard of for the opposing sides to maneuver into position for hours or even days. Each general would attempt to find the best deployment area and at the same time to put the enemy at a disadvantage. However, once an ideal position has been occupied, one also had to make the enemy accept a battle under these particular conditions. Avoiding a clash in such a situation was not difficult. Normally the opposing forces would only engage if both commanders wished for it to happen, which meant that they were both convinced of their own strength or the strength of the occupied position (or, for that matter, its weakness, if the enemy was at a disadvantage). It was only once the leading officers were satisfied with their deployment that a battle was fought. Notably, there have been instances where a clash was avoided altogether because no side wished to abandon an advantageous position⁵.

The generals of the Antiquity were well aware that the choice of the battlefield may affect the outcome of the battle. This is clearly the guiding idea in Late Roman military treatises that deal with the issue of where to fight a battle. The purpose of this piece will be to compare two works about warfare. The first will be the most popular and highly influential⁶ Roman military treatise – *De Re Militari* by Vegetius; a work written in the comfort of the author's home, by someone with no military experience, but based on previous works about the theory of warfare. The second work, *Strategikon*, is a manual created at the end of the 6th century C.E. by a military practitioner fighting with the Slavs and Persians⁷. A comparative analysis of the two texts may yield other unexpected benefits, but most importantly the results will fairly accurately identify the crucial factors taken into account when evaluating specific locations in terms of their military value. One additional benefit of analyzing the *Strategikon* will be the possibility to determine the major stages of deciding on where to fight a battle. In this par-

⁴ Ibidem. p. 149–163.

⁵ It happened, for example, during the conquest of Gaul. Compare: *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*, 1. 48; 2. 7; 5. 17; 7. 19; 7. 53.

⁶ Concerning the significance of Vegetius' work in the middle ages, see: C. Allmand, *The De re militari of Vegetius in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, [in:] *Writing War Medieval Literary Responses to Warfare*, ed. C. Saunders, F. le Saux, N. Thomas, Cambridge 2004, p. 15–29. More comprehensively in: C. Allmand, *The de Re Militari of Vegetius: The Reception, Transmission and Legacy of a Roman Text in the Middle Ages*, Cambridge 2011.

⁷ See the unpublished Ph.D. dissertation: J. Wiita, *The Ethnika in Byzantine Military Treatises*, University of Minnesota 1977.

ticular case it is imperative to follow the chronological order, especially since the author of *Strategikon* most likely knew the work of Vegetius and drew from it⁸.

What we learn from *De Re Militari*

We will begin by analyzing the work of Publius Flavius Vegetius Renatus – *De Re Militari*⁹, written in Latin most likely during the reign of Theodosius I¹⁰. The author had no practical military experience, but was an insightful observer, meaning that most of his knowledge came from his personal assessments and reading of other texts on military theory, which he in large part summarized and compiled for use in his own work. There are many antiquarian passages in *De Re Militari*, copied from other military pieces, which often had no practical application anymore in Late Antiquity. This impedes the interpretation of the work and forces scholars to monitor if a given passage is not outdated when confronted with the organization of the army in the 4th century. In numerous instances Vegetius refers back to the republican character of a Roman army, citing the description that we know from the work of Polybius¹¹ as an example to be followed¹². This gives Vegetius' work a partially moralizing quality – the author urged the return to Roman virtues and the restoration of heavy legionary infantry to its previous

⁸ For a list of similarities between the treatises, which supports the conclusion that the author of *Strategikon* was familiar with *De Re Militari* (either directly or indirectly – i.e. being familiar with works, which Vegetius himself made use of), see: Ł. Różycki, *Mauricii Strategicon praktyczny podręcznik wojskowy i dzieło antykwaryczne*, Poznań 2015, p. 167–189.

⁹ It often appears under an alternative title *Epitoma Rei Militaris*.

¹⁰ On the subject of dating of Vegetius' work, see: M. Charles, *Vegetius in Context Establishing the Date of the Epitoma Rei Militaris*, Stuttgart 2007; T. Barnes, *The Date of Vegetius*, Phoenix 1979, Vol. 33/3, p. 254–257.

¹¹ Polybius, *Historiae*, 6.25.

¹² In the Roman literature of the late Empire period the example of the Republic was often brought up as the time of prosperity and strict moral principles. This was done by both Christian and pagan authors.

prominent role¹³, disregarding other formations¹⁴. It bears mentioning that this moralizing character was actually common to many other works on military theory; it was one of the distinctive literary features of East Roman military manuals¹⁵.

Although Vegetius himself has never set foot on any battlefield, thanks to his familiarity with numerous works on military matters he was usually able to identify the crucial aspects of a given subject. One of these fundamental issues, an opinion shared by Vegetius, was the choice of the battlefield. The author of *De Re Militari* has the following to say on the subject:

Good commanders realize that victory depends in large part on the choice of the location for the battle. Consider then the advantages that any given position offers in a fight. The higher the ground, the better. Weapons thrown

¹³ See the introduction to Book II. *Instituta maiorum partis armatae plenissime clementiam uestram peritissimeque retinere continuis declaratur uictoribus ac triumphis, siquidem indubitata adprobatio artis sit rerum semper effectus. Verum tranquillitas tua, imperator inuicte, altiori consilio, quam mens poterat terrena concipere, ex libris antiqua desiderat, cum ipsiam antiquitatem factis recentibus antecedit. Igitur cum haec litteris breuiter comprehendere maiestati uestrae non tam discenda quam recognoscenda praeciperer, certauit saepius deuotio cum pudore. Quid enim audacius, quam domino ac principi generis humani, domitori omnium gentium barbararum, aliquid de usu ac disciplina insinuare bellorum, nisi forte iussisset fieri, quod ipse gessisset? et rursum tanti imperatoris non oboedire mandatis plenum sacrilegii uidebatur atque periculi. Miro itaque more in parendo audax factus sum, dum metuo uideri audacior, si negassem. Ad quam temeritatem praecedens me indulgentia uestrae perennitatis anaimauit. Nam libellum de dilectu atque exercitatione tironum dudum tamquam famulus obtuli; non tamen culpatus abscessi. Nec formido iussus adgredi opus, quod spontaneum cessit inpune.* The author was faced with a true conundrum; at times praising the emperor as the best tactician, but on the other hand wishing for the return of the Roman legions of old. The solution was simple: to describe the ruler as someone who puts into practice the instructions found in the treatise (*“it is obviously not my intention to lecture Your Imperial Majesty about the glory of the past, rather to remind You of Your own”*). Thus, the Emperor would not feel admonished by Vegetius, which could end badly for the Roman author.

¹⁴ This sentiment is evident as seen on the example of cavalry, particularly armored formations. Vegetius ignored the existence of heavy cavalry, which in the 6th century was already a force to be reckoned with on the battlefield. The author limits his notes on mounted formations to a single conclusion – that they are well trained and there is no need to elaborate on them. Compare: Veg. 3. 23. with the Battle of Argentoratum, especially: Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res gestae*, 16. 12. 36–41. Concerning sources dealing with Roman cavalry, see also: K. R. Dixon P. Southern, *The Roman Cavalry: From the First to the Third Century Ad*, London 1992, p. 11–19, especially 11–16.

¹⁵ *Oxford Dictionary of Byzantium*, p. 1962. It's impossible to determine exactly when this new genre came into being; its early representatives were Vegetius in the West and Syrianus Magister in the East. Compare the introductions to *De Re Militari*, *Strategikon*, *Tactica*, *De uelitatione bellica*, or the works of Syrianus Magister. Moralizing passages appear in all of them, and with the sole exception of the writer of *De uelitatione bellica*, every author claims that their treatise is the only solution to the current crisis in the army.

from a height gain additional momentum and are better at penetrating the enemy's defenses. Additionally, our foes will have to fight two battles, against the slope itself, and then against our soldiers. But there is one difference that you need to be aware of: if you're facing mounted units with your infantry, you should look for an area that is difficult to approach, uneven and hilly; but if your strength lies in cavalry, which will face the enemy's foot soldiers, then do not seek out hills, but rather open plains, where no forests or marshlands will stand in the way of your troops¹⁶.

Vegetius was aware of the importance of choosing where to fight. This decision often made the difference between winning and losing and, consequently, living and dying. The author placed a heavy emphasis on occupying a high ground. This advice is inherently tied to the purpose of the work, which was to restore the prominence of Roman infantry (Vegetius makes no mention of any army with a large cavalry force – as horsemen were not suited for operating in difficult terrain). But it is also consistent with how infantry units were used in Late Antiquity – it was preferable to receive an enemy's charge in a defensive formation, relying on the strength of one's position, armor, shields and projectile weapons. Vegetius' focus on deploying in an elevated position would have most bearing on the use of ranged weaponry.

According to the treatise, before a fight the legionnaires should occupy the highest position available. This was believed to provide nothing but advantages to the defenders, while seriously hindering the attackers¹⁷. First of all, any projectiles thrown by infantry were more effective as they gained additional force. It is worth mentioning that positioning an infantry unit on a hill slope allowed more legionnaires to throw their *pila* without the danger of hitting anyone standing in the front ranks¹⁸. This was particularly important in the case of the *pilum*, as the range of this weapon was only around 30 meters¹⁹, but positioning the sol-

¹⁶ Bonum ducem conuenit nosse magnam partem uictoriae ipsum locum, in quo dimicandum est, possidere. Elabora ergo, ut conserturus manum primum auxilium captes ex loco, qui tanto utilior iudicatur, quanto superior fuerit occupatus. In subiectos enim uehementius tela descendunt, et maiore impetu obnitentes pars altior pellit. Qui aduerso nititur cliuo, duplex subit cum loco et hoste certamen. Sed illa distantia est, quod, si de peditibus tuis uictoriam speras contra equites hostium, loca aspera inaequalia montuosa debes eligere, si uero de equitibus tuis contra aduersarii pedites uictoriam quaeris, sequi debes paulo quidem editiora loca, sed plana atque patentia, neque siluis neque paludibus impedita. Veg. 3. 13.

¹⁷ Centuries later, a similar observation will be made by the author of *De uelitatione bellica*, 3, 11.

¹⁸ A. Goldsworthy, *The Roman Army at War 100 BC-AD 200*, Oxford 2009, p. 184.

¹⁹ Goldsworthy's work includes the most important calculations regarding the *pilum*. Ibidem, p. 184.

diers on a slope increased the effective range. A similar result was achieved for the *plumbatae* used in the times of Vegetius²⁰. While on a hill, the commander could set up his men in more ranks, without losing effectiveness. It also placed a natural obstacle before the enemy soldiers, who were forced to advance uphill, which additionally sapped their strength and significantly reduced their ability to respond with ranged weapons of their own. There is also the issue of psychology, although the author makes no mention of it. Nevertheless, having the high ground always provides a boost to the defenders' morale. Secondly, an army in deep formation is less likely to flee²¹. By occupying an elevated position the commander not only ensured that more ranks of his soldiers could contribute in ranged combat, but also improved the spirits of his men and made them more likely to stand their ground. The attackers, on the other hand, had to face a sustained barrage of Roman projectiles while charging uphill without the possibility of returning fire as effectively. This would surely have been a serious blow to the soldiers' motivation.

Additionally, we should further factor in the psychology of the battlefield. If the enemy relied on discipline, they had another issue to deal with. Advancing up a slope while under fire was disheartening, and the soldiers' feeling of helplessness could result in two outcomes. One was that they would break formation to close in with the defenders as quickly as possible, charging with no regard for tactics. Alternatively, finding themselves under constant fire and not being able to fight back, the attackers would begin to retreat, not wanting to risk their lives in a situation which, from their perspective, could not bring victory. Both outcomes were, obviously, more than acceptable for a Roman commander.

Vegetius also pointed out one of the oldest rules of war, namely that specific types of military forces differed in terms of effectiveness depending on the terrain²². Cavalry is best suited for fighting in open plains, so a primarily mounted force should strive to confront any opponents in similar areas. But if a Roman

²⁰ Vegetius, 1. 17. M. C. Bishop, J. C. Coulston, *Roman Military Equipment from the Punic Wars to the Fall of Rome*, Oxford 2013, p. 200–2.

²¹ See: Vegetius 3. 15, as well as *Strategikon*, for cavalry: 2. 6, and for infantry: 12. 11. Both authors suggested deploying less reliable soldiers in deeper ranks. Compare: A. Goldsworthy, op. cit., p. 222–224. This issue seems to have been disregarded by such scholars as: I. Syväne, *The Age of Hippotoxotai: Art of War in Roman Military Revival and Disaster (491–636)*, Tampere 2004; T. Kolias, *Byzantinische Waffen: ein Beitrag zur byzantinischen Waffenkunde von den Anfängen bis zur lateinischen Eroberung*, Wien 1988.

²² Which is rather funny, once we realize that the author of *De Rei Militari* had no idea why different types of troops were effective against others. Another author who had difficulty with understanding these interactions was R. M. van Nort, who in *The Battle of Adrianople and*

army of mostly infantry faced enemy horsemen, the instruction was to deploy on uneven, mountainous ground, which was unfavorable for the mounted attackers²³.

The instructions provided in *De Re Militari* regarding the choice of the field of battle were not comprehensive. This serves as yet another proof that the author had no practical experience and learned everything through observation and by reading historical treatises. Although the instructions are fairly basic, it is worth mentioning that they contain no blatant mistakes and are clear for the reader.

What we learn from *Strategikon*

The other Late Antiquity source to be analyzed is the *Strategikon*, which was most likely written during the reign of Emperor Maurice, in the years 582–602²⁴. The *Strategikon* was the work of a practitioner, demonstrating a unique view of the Roman military at the end of the 6th century. The goal of its author was to put down instructions and basic tenets of leadership for novice commanders²⁵. In essence, *Strategikon* was intended as a military theory manual, although it also included numerous references to previous works²⁶. The author of the treatise devoted much space to the issue of preparing for battle and the crucial points to be remembered before a clash²⁷. Detailed instructions guide the reader through the process of choosing a suitable battlefield and specify the responsibilities

the Military Doctrine of Vegetius, New York 2007, p. 390 who claims that only the Roman cavalry was unable to fight in difficult terrain.

²³ Compare: Onasander, *Strategikos*, 31. The author suggested seeking out hilly ground when facing superior numbers of enemy cavalry. A similar tactic was employed by Arrian against the Alan horsemen; he later on gave a detailed description of his formation in the work *Ectaxis*. It clearly indicates that the battle's outcome was decided even before making contact with the enemy, i.e. during the shooting phase, which the barbarians had no hope of winning due to their unfavorable position.

²⁴ Different arguments regarding the dating of the work have been compiled and summed up by Dennis in the introduction to the German edition of *Strategikon*. *Das Strategikon des Maurikios*, ed. G. T. Dennis, translated by E. Gamillscheg, Wien 1981, p. 15–19. A different dating has been suggested by: П. В. Шувалов, *Секрет армии Юстиниана восточноримская армия в 491–641 гг.*, Санкт-Петербург 2006, p. 257–259.

²⁵ Strat 1. pr.

²⁶ See: Ł. Różycki, *Mauricii Strategicon praktyczny podręcznik wojskowy i dzieło antykwaryczne*, Poznań 2015; В.В. Кучма, «Стратегикос» Онасандра и «Стратегикон Маврикия»: опыт сравнительной характеристики, Византийский временник 1982, 84, 86, vol. 43, 45, 46, p. 35–53, 20–34, 109–123.

²⁷ See introduction to Book VII. Strat. 7A.

of the commander. The most valuable information on the subject is compiled in book VII of *Strategikon*, which includes guidelines on what to do before an engagement. In the following paragraphs I will try to analyze the procedures that a commanding officer was to follow when choosing where to fight.

First of all, the commander should send out a reconnaissance party²⁸ tasked with scouting out the area between the Romans and the enemy force²⁹. This indicates that the author of the treatise had practical experience and was well aware of the importance of learning about the enemy and the terrain lying between the two armies. It is worth noting that in the work of Theophylact Simocatta, which describes the reign of Emperor Maurice – i.e. the period when *Strategikon* was most likely written – we find an interesting passage dealing with the reconnaissance before the Battle of Solachon³⁰. It proves the importance of scouting missions; in the case in question intelligence was gathered by Christian Arabs, who had excellent knowledge of the area where the Romans fought against the Persians³¹.

Several passages in *Strategikon* deal exclusively with the subject of scouting operations³², which demonstrates how important it was to have knowledge about the enemy. What is more, the author assumed a situation, in which it was the enemy who dictated the conditions of the engagement. This was a novel approach, because other military works written prior to the *Strategikon* by such authors as Syrianus Magister or Vegetius did not account for any initiative

²⁸ Compare with the actions of Caesar leading a relief force to aid the besieged Cicero. *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*, 5. 49. Caesar sent out scouts tasked with reconnoitering the area before the advance of the army. Also, *Commentarii de Bello Gallico*, 7. 44. where we learn how proper reconnaissance was equally important to both Caesar and Vercingetorix.

²⁹ Strat. 7B. 13. Apart from inspecting the field of battle, the horsemen were also tasked with capturing deserters from both sides.

³⁰ ἡ οὖν ἐπιούση ἄνδρας λογάδας ἐπὶ κατασκοπῇ τοῦ πολεμίου ἐξήρτυσε Σεργίῳ τε τῷ λοχαγῷ ἀνατέθεικεν, ᾧ ἡ τοῦ Μάρδιος φρουρὰ ἐγκεχείριστο, τόν τε Ὠγυρον καὶ Ζώγομον· φύλαρχοι δ' οὗτοι τῆς συμμάχου τῶν Ρωμαίων δυνάμεως, οὓς Σαρακηνοὺς εἵθιστο Λατίνοις ἀποκαλεῖν So on the next day he prepared a select group of soldiers to gather intelligence on the enemy, and entrusted them to logarch Sergius, who led the defense of Mardes, and to Ogyrus and Zogomus, chieftains of tribal auxiliaries, whom the Latins call Saracens, delivered to the Romans.

³¹ A detailed description of the clash has been provided in: A. Kotłowska Ł. Różycki, *The Battle of Solachon of 586 in light of the works of Theophylact Simocatta and Theophanes Confessor (Homologetes)*, Travaux et Mémoires vol. XIX (2015), p. 315–327. See also the popular scientific piece: J. Haldon, *The Byzantine Wars Battles and campaigns of the Byzantine era*, Charleston 2001, p. 53–6.

³² See, e.g.: Strat. 2. 3; 7.3; 7A.8; 7B.5, 7B.13; 9.5.

on the part of the opposing force³³. Vegetius instructs about the best locations to be occupied, but fails to advise on what to do if the opponent avoids confrontation or begins maneuvering into position that favors his troops over ours; a similar disregard is shown by Syrianus, the author of *Περὶ Στρατηγικῆς*. This approach is typical for Roman intellectuals of the Late Antiquity, who described their own idea of war, which was not backed by any actual experience. The author of *Strategikon* realized that the choice of the battlefield depends on both sides, and that it is difficult to force the enemy to act according to one's designs. The duty of the scouting party was to reconnoiter the *terra nullius* that separated the two armies, round up any deserters from their own forces, and observe the enemy's movements. Gathering intelligence about the field of battle was the responsibility of the *mandator* (μανδάτωρ)³⁴, who would also serve as a messenger during the battle, moving between the formations of the Roman army. Only smart and responsible soldiers could fulfill this role. The author of *Strategikon* had this to say about their duties:

Mandators should scout the area where the battle will be fought, that is the terrain separating the two armies. They should pay particular attention to channels, marshland and any other obstacles³⁵.

Similarly to Vegetius, *Strategikon's* anonymous author emphasized the importance of natural obstacles, which were to be identified beforehand. If the army failed to do that, the soldiers could discover similar obstructions while advancing

³³ For example: *In the event that the enemy attacks us with such numbers that we will have no chance of victory and no chance of avoiding battle, this is what must be done. The army should occupy the highest ground available, and when the enemies begin their ascent, repel them with slings and thrown stones, then retreat under cover of night. If the opposing army continues to be a threat, the maneuver should be repeated. Retreat in the night and in the morning occupy a new position on nearby hills.* Syrianus 37. Vegetius and Syrianus Magister were both theoreticians, so they normally did not account for any counter-action by the enemy. Case in point – their instructions on army arrangement, which do not in any way account for changes in the opponent's behavior. Veg. 3. 20. Each of the tactics suggested by Vegetius is based on the assumption that the enemy will do exactly as the Roman general wishes.

³⁴ The word is of Latin origin and refers to a messenger. On the use of Latin in the Roman-Byzantine army in the East, see: H. Mihăescu, *Les terms de commandement militaires latins dans le Strategikon de Maurice*, *Revue Roumaine de Linguistique* 1969, vol. 14, p. 261–272. as well as H. Mihăescu, *Les éléments latins des Tactics strategica de Maurice-Urbicius et leur echo en neo-grec*, *Revue des études sud-est européennes* 1968, vol. 6, p. 481–498., and H. Mihăescu, *Les éléments latins des Tactics-strategica de Maurice-Urbicius et leur echo en neo-grec*, *Revue des études sud-est européennes* 1969, vol. 7, p. 155–166, p. 267–280.

³⁵ Strat. 7B. 16.

or, worse still, while engaging the enemy, which could lead to breaking formation – a disastrous outcome for the Roman units, who lived and died by their discipline³⁶. What is more, some natural obstacles offered the perfect place to stage an ambush, so discovering and neutralizing any hidden enemy units was of utmost importance³⁷.

The treatise continues in similar fashion about the work of scouts and spies:

Every effort should be made to send out motivated soldiers at suitable intervals to act as spies and scouts and gather intelligence about the enemy's movements, strength and organization, which will be a safeguard against any surprises³⁸.

The author made a distinction between two similar functions; a spy (κατάσκοπος) was tasked with assessing the enemy's capabilities, took great risks, and usually operated alone or with a small squad, while a scout (ἐξπλοράτωρ³⁹ or σκουλκάτωρ⁴⁰) was responsible for monitoring the approach to the camp, cap-

³⁶ See for example: E.H. Freshfield, *Roman law in the Later Roman Empire. Military discipline of the Emperor Maurice c. A.D. 590 from the Strategikon*, Cambridge 1947; S. Stout, *Training Soldiers for the Roman Legion*, *The Classical Journal* 16/7 (1921), p. 423–431.

³⁷ Like in the Battle of Argentoratum, when the warriors of Chnodomarius attempted to draw a whole wing of the Roman army into an ambush using natural obstacles. Ammianus Marcellinus, *Res gestae*, 16.11–12.

³⁸ Χρή τὰ κατὰ τοὺς ἐχθροὺς σπουδάζειν πολυπραγμονῆσαι διὰ σκουλκῶν ἀκριβῶν καὶ συνεχῶν ἐκ διαστημάτων ἱκανῶν καὶ διὰ κατασκοπῶν ἥτοι ἐκσπλορατόρων τὴν τε κίνησιν τό τε ποσὸν τοῦ πλήθους αὐτῶν καὶ τὴν τάξιν, καὶ οὕτως ἀρμόζεσθαι εἰς τὸ μὴ αἰφνιδιασθῆναι παρ' αὐτῶν *Strat.* 7A.3.

³⁹ Ἐξπλοράτωρ is the equivalent of the Latin *eksplorator*, meaning a scout.

⁴⁰ The word is also of Latin etymology. It most likely stems from *sculca*, and although some linguists claim that it also has some German influences (*skulk*) this theory is indefensible in the opinion of Marichal: R. Marichal, *Les Ostraca de Bu Njem*, *Libya Antiqua Supplementum* 1992, vol. 7, p. 68–70. after: P. Rance, *The fulcum...*, footnote+ 88. Vegetius uses the term *exculcatores*, which did not, however, refer to scouting units, but rather light infantry. *Veg.* 2.15. Simocatta use the same term to refer to sentries, or to be more precise, the lack thereof: τοίνυν οἱ Ῥωμαῖοι φρονηματισθέντες ἐπὶ τοῖς συγκυρήσασιν πρὸς τρυφὴν κατεκλίνοντο, εἴτα τῇ μέθῃ συρράπτονται, καὶ τῇ παροινίᾳ τὰς εὐπραξίας νοθεύσαντες τῆς διαφρουρᾶς κατημέλησαν, ἣν σκούλκαν σύνηθες τῇ πατρίῳ φωνῇ Ῥωμαίοις ἀποκαλεῖν. *Sym.* 6.9. 14. Simocatta clearly indicates that the word *sculca* is derived from Latin. It is worth noting that the term *exculcatorias* (or, in the opinion of Rance – *sculcatorias*: P. Rance, *The fulcum...* footnote 88.) appeared in the work of Cassiodorus: Th. Mommsen, *Cassiodori Senatoris Variarum*, *Monumenta Germaniae Historica* vol. XII, Berolini 1894, II. 20. and referred to scouting ships (*atque ideo praesenti decernimus iussione, ut quantas in Ravennati urbe exculcatorias potueris reperire, frumentis fiscalibus oneratas ad nos usque perducas, quatenus alimonia publica tali provisione relevata necessitatem inopiae non debeant sustinere.*), although it is believed by J. Rougé that Cassiodorus used it to describe transport ships, J. Rougé, *Sur un*

turing deserters and gathering intelligence. Scouts were lightly armed, mounted on swift horses, and operated in larger units that could hold their own against the enemy's reconnaissance parties⁴¹. However, it bears remembering that the author of *Strategikon* distinguished between conducting reconnaissance before a battle and in the course of a campaign. While an army was on the march, scouting activities were done by *explorators*, who often also served as the rear-guard, whereas before a battle the terrain was inspected by *mandators*, more experienced with this type of work.

Once the reconnaissance was carried out and the *strategos* was provided with the necessary information, a council was held. It brought together all the *merarchs*, i.e. commanders who were afforded tactical freedom during battle (officers leading the two army wings, the center, the defensive units and the commander of the ambushing *drungos*). The purpose was to make plans for the coming battle, particularly to agree on where to engage the enemy and assign objectives to respective *meros*⁴². This way, the lay of the land and the locations of any unexpected obstacles were known not only to the leading *strategos*, but to all high-ranking commanders, whose decisions would affect the correct execution of the battle plan.

If the *mandators* carrying out the reconnaissance discovered any difficult ground between the two armies, the author of *Strategikon* suggested the following:

If any are identified, our army should hold its position and allow the enemy to pass through them, then engage once they are back on open ground⁴³.

By adopting this strategy, the enemy was forced to negotiate the obstacle and begin the engagement suffering from fatigue. Meanwhile, the Romans avoided the exhausting march. Also, the opposing force would start the battle in an area they had not examined as closely. Furthermore, if the conditions were favorable, this stratagem allowed the Romans to launch an attack on the enemy while they were still crossing the difficult ground and were therefore in loose formation. In this manner the obstacle gave an advantage to the army that adopted a defensive stance. The importance of proper reconnaissance cannot be overstated here. Only if the whole battlefield had been inspected beforehand was it possible

mot de Cassiodore: Exculcatoriae–Sculcatoriae–Sulcatoriae, Latomus 1962, vol. 21, p. 384–390. The fact that Cassiodorus explains why the ships were filled with grain and tributes may suggest that these were actually scouting ships used in an unusual fashion rather than transport ships.

⁴¹ Strat. 9.5.

⁴² Strat. 7A. 8.

⁴³ Strat. 7B. 16.

to draw up a plan of action that made use of the available terrain features and watercourses.

Another factor to be taken into account was where the enemy was from:

We should pick the battlefield accounting not only for the types of arms that we possess, but also for the place of origin of our enemies. Parthians and Gauls operate effectively on open plains, Iberians and Ligures fight better in the mountains and hills, whereas the Britons – in forests, and warriors from Germania feel most at home in marshlands⁴⁴.

This piece of advice is clearly a relic of the past and was most likely first written down during the decline of the Republic or the beginning of the Principate⁴⁵. In the 6th century most of these peoples were already extinct or found themselves outside of the scope of political or military interests of the Empire. But it is notable that Roman commanders were aware how certain enemies preferred to fight in specific terrain. This is evidenced by book XI of *Strategikon*, in which the author considers ways of battling different peoples. The book points out that the Persians feel most at home in open plains⁴⁶, that nomads should be engaged on difficult ground⁴⁷, and that the Slavs and Antes were experts in fighting in woodlands and marshes⁴⁸.

When choosing a battlefield the commander also had to account for the opposing army's equipment and armament. When attacking cavalry, the Romans were to do so in areas filled with natural obstacles, whereas if the enemy had mostly archers at his disposal, the solution was to engage them in open plains and close into melee range as quickly as possible⁴⁹. Once the council had considered all the crucial information and decided on where the battle will be fought, this information was to be passed on to all the soldiers. As specified in *Strategikon*:

Whichever area is chosen by the strategos for the battle, it should be communicated to his subordinates. This will allow them to avoid obstacles and

⁴⁴ Strat. 8. 2. 88.

⁴⁵ Although it is impossible to identify its original source.

⁴⁶ Strat. 11. 1.

⁴⁷ Strat. 11. 2.

⁴⁸ Strat. 11. 4. Consequently, Slavs should be fought against in Winter, because it would be easier to identify their tracks in the snow and the trees would not provide sufficient cover to the defenders. However, an order given by Emperor Maurice about waging war in the Balkans in Winter led to the army's rebellion and the end of the dynasty. Sym. 8. 6. 2–8.

⁴⁹ Strat. 7A. pr. Compare with Veg. 3. 13.

by knowing the lay of the land they will engage the enemy with increased confidence⁵⁰.

This was useful advice, especially for an army that decided to advance towards the enemy, and for any cavalry units. If the officers leading the mounted formations had prior knowledge about any possible obstacles, they could operate more efficiently, without the fear of getting ambushed or bogged down on difficult ground. This was particularly important for the flanking force, the archons of which were afforded a large degree of tactical independence once the battle had begun. On a final note, familiarizing the soldiers with the surrounding area would surely boost their morale, allowing them to get accustomed to the idea of fighting in that particular place.

Conclusions

The above examples paint a clear image of the authors' theoretical knowledge about the choice of the battlefield and actual decisions made by Roman commanders in that regard. Vegetius completely disregards the possibility of the enemy having the initiative, assuming *a priori* that they will accept battle under conditions dictated by the Romans. In reality, it was the goal of both the Roman and the barbarian commanders to ensure the highest possible advantage over the enemy, and if the opposing side occupied a favorable position, a battle was normally avoided. The author of *Strategikon* approached this problem from a much more practical perspective. The choice of the battlefield was still seen as an opportunity to gain the upper hand; this much is evident from how much the treatise focuses on the importance of scouting ahead and deciding where to fight. Reconnaissance was carried out by the most competent soldiers available, and any intelligence brought back was then analyzed by a council of all the high-ranking officers in command. The final say in this decision still belonged to the supreme commander – the *strategos*. Nevertheless, all officers included in the council had the opportunity to familiarize themselves with the area of engagement, learn about any existing natural obstacles and how to use the terrain features to their advantage. Equipped with this knowledge, the archons returned to their units and communicated all they had learned. This allowed the whole army to be prepared for the upcoming clash.

⁵⁰ Strat. 8. 2. 89.

Though the author of *Strategikon* demonstrates a different attitude towards choosing the field of battle than Vegetius, both works support the idea that if a reasonable choice was made that accounted for all the crucial factors, it would all but guarantee victory. Battles in the Antiquity carried with themselves a high degree of risk, and the task of the commander, which holds true to this day, was to minimize the threat of defeat. Deciding on a suitable battlefield was one of the ways to ensure success in the bloody contest of war.

Summary

The purpose of the piece *How to choose the best field of battle – according to the authors of Roman military treatises* is to present the ways of choosing a suitable location to fight a battle during late antiquity. The analysis covered mostly fragments of Vegetius' work, *Strategikon* and passages from Syrianus Magister. The results clearly indicate that treatise authors knew well the significance of choosing a suitable location to fight a battle. Though the author of *Strategikon* demonstrates a different attitude towards choosing the field of battle than Vegetius, both works support the idea that if a reasonable choice was made that accounted for all the crucial factors, it would all but guarantee victory. Battles in the Antiquity carried with themselves a high degree of risk, and the task of the commander, which holds true to this day, was to minimize the threat of defeat. Deciding on a suitable battlefield was one of the ways to ensure success in the bloody contest of war.

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Itinerary of the Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen (1407–1410)

Travelling was exploited by rulers as one of the main mechanisms of exercising power in a medieval state. In this regard, such a ruler was often referred to as *rex ambulans* – the itinerant king. Travels over subordinate territories combined two important elements of comprehending power in the Middle Ages – sacral and practical (administrative and fiscal) qualities¹.

As for the sacral dimension, rulers were seen as messengers of God that maintain order in the world. Medieval people felt more secure in the presence of authorities, perceiving it as a guarantee of durable peace. Subordinates saw their ruler as their guardian, a leader in the fight against evil and a symbol of unity in the reality familiar to them. The figure of the monarch was a certain incarnation of the supreme (transcendental) guarantee of the existence of a community. For this reason, the ruler himself was also interested in strengthening such a perception of authority held among subordinates².

In addition to the sacral nature of travelling, rulers recognised the importance of the administrative and fiscal dimension. The king controlled subordinate officials, served as a judge, made decisions of economic nature (bestowals, privileges, immunities), collected tributes and taxes. The monarch met with representatives of elites as well as ordinary citizens, supporting them both spiritually and materially. On his visits on borderline areas, the ruler controlled the defence system

¹ D. Szweda, *Objazdy pogranicznych ziem pruskich przez wielkiego mistrza Ulryka von Jungingen (do wybuchu wojny z Królestwem Polskim)*, [in:] *Mniejszość i większość. Relacje kulturowe na pograniczach*, vol. 1, ed. P. Pietnoczka, M. Radoch, D. Szweda, Olsztyn 2016, p. 149.

² J. Sawicka, *Teologia polityczna i średniowieczna figura króla*, „IDEA – Studia nad strukturą i rozwojem pojęć filozoficznych”, vol. 26, 2014, p. 265.

of his frontier (border ramparts, fortresses). While on travel, he could acquaint himself with the condition of tracts, roads and waterways³.

A similar residential-itinerant character of ruling was exercised in the Teutonic Order in Prussia. However, in the case of Grand Masters of the Order we are dealing with an overlay of two competences – a head of a religious corporation and a state ruler.

As the supreme head of the Order, a Grand Master had to control the spiritual life and maintain the unity of the entire corporation, so the very basis of its functioning. The custom of travelling was not codified in writing up to the second half of 14th century; regulations in this area appeared during the rule of Winrich von Kniprode (1352–1382)⁴.

Over time, each superior of the Teutonic Order became also the ruler of the Teutonic State. Therefore, changes were introduced to the scope of his tasks and competences since the manner of exerting authority started to resemble that of secular rulers. A Grand Master also became a travelling ruler and, while on the road, carried out the tasks arising from seizing secular power. After the election, he received a tribute from his subjects, added new privileges or confirmed the previous ones, decided on the construction of defence facilities. He was addressed to as the supreme judge, handled territorial and Order-related management duties. In addition, a Grand Master was often present when changes in the regional offices were implemented so as to collect the income generated by the person leaving a specific office or position. While travelling, the ruler also made sure to gather all taxes, tributes and rents due⁵.

To date, Klaus Neitmann developed itineraries of the following Grand Masters: Winrich von Kniprode (1352–1382), Konrad Zöllner von Rotenstein (1382–1390),

³ A. Gąsiorowski, *Podróże panującego w średniowiecznej Polsce*, „Czasopismo Prawno-Historyczne”, vol. 25 (1973), no. 2, p. 41–42, 48–49, 54–55, 63–64; A. Rutkowski, *Objazdy i system rządzenia państwem przez Kazimierza Wielkiego*, „Kwartalnik Historyczny”, yr 85 (1978), no. 3, p. 613.

⁴ *Die Statuten des Deutschen Ordens nach den ältesten Handschriften*, hrsg. v. M. Perlbach, Halle, 1890, p. 156; *Visitationem im Deutschen Orden im Mittelalter*, Tl. 1: 1236–1430, hrsg. v. M. Biskup, I. Janosz-Biskupowa, Marburg 2002, p. 18–19; K. Militzer, *Visitationem und Visitationberichte im Deutschen Orden*, [in:] *Kancelarie krzyżackie. Stan badań i perspektywy badawcze. Materiały z międzynarodowej konferencji naukowej Malbork 18–19 X 2001*, ed. J. Trupinda, Malbork 2002, p. 177–180.

⁵ S. Józwiak, *Urząd wielkiego mistrza w państwie zakonu krzyżackiego w Prusach do 1410 r.*, „Kwartalnik Prawa Publicznego”, r. 2, No. 1–2 (2002), p. 222; K. Neitmann, *Der Hochmeister des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen – ein Residenzherrscher unterwegs. Untersuchungen zu den Hochmeisteritineraren im 14 und 15 Jahrhundert*, Köln-Wien 1990, p. 11; J. Sarnowsky, *Die Wirtschaftsführung des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen (1382–1454)*, Köln-Wien 1993, p. 358–364.

Konrad von Jungingen (1393–1407), Michael Küchmeister (1414–1422), Paul von Rusdorf (1422–1441), Konrad von Erlichshausen (1441–1449)⁶. The researcher skipped the period of Ulrich von Jungingen's rule (1407–1410), although the source base for this period makes it possible to create such an itinerary.

Within three years of his reign, this Grand Master of the Teutonic Order visited the majority of administrative centres of the Teutonic State. During his travels, he controlled the lands as the ruler of the State, and inspected Teutonic convents as the commander-in-chief of this religious corporation. Von Jungingen familiarised himself with the condition of the premises, economic situation and standards of spiritual life in the commandry, *pfleger's* area or *aldermanship*.

In addition, the head of the Order met with more significant dignitaries of a given administrative area. When it came to distinguished knights, he paid damages for losses incurred in military expeditions or benefits preceding future *reysas* (for example, before the campaign of the Grand Duke Vytautas of Lithuania or the expedition to the Dobrzyń land in 1409).

A Malbork treasurer recorded the expenses incurred by Grand Masters during their travels. Information about the financial support for churches, chapels, hospitals or leprosariums may be found among withdrawals. Moreover, the medieval concept of a good ruler was implemented by giving money to the poor, the lepers, the ill, widows and fire victims.

Visit in rural manors, particularly those in Żuławy, were associated with paying remunerations for stooges and officials working there. During such visits, Teutonic officials delivered taxes or tributes due.

In the first year of his rule, the Grand Master went to some of the main towns – Chełmno, Elbląg, Gdańsk and Toruń. Respecting the custom, he took tribute from city councilmen and citizens in the course of such visits. It was also an opportunity to organise pompous celebrations and special feasts in honour of the new ruler. One of such feasts took place on 24 November in the city of Toruń; there are no accurate accounts concerning other Prussian towns (except Elbląg accounts without a date).

In early 1408, on the commemoration of the Epiphany, Ulrich von Jungingen was the first and last time outside his country before the Teutonic-Polish war, namely in Kowno. The city witnessed a meeting of the Grand Master with king Jogaila and the Lithuanian Duke Vytautas. The Lithuanian Prince was a judge in a dispute about Drezdenko and Santok.

The Order superior also left his capital in emergencies. One took place at the turn of January and February 1408, when The Vistula river caused serious

⁶ K. Neitmann, *op. cit.*

damage to the Vistula Spit. The Grand Master went there to investigate the level of devastation. The treasurer's book noted some expenses for repairs and construction, probably ordered by the ruler.

Before the start of the great war in August 1409, Ulrich von Jungingen, visited Lower Prussia, Pomerania and Chełmno land three times. Visits to Lower Prussia were particularly associated with the development of castles in Tilsit and Ragnit as well as delivering supplies to the new administration of Samogitia.

During his reign, this high dignitary of the Order did not visit all subordinate centres of administration in the Teutonic State. It is certain that he did not travel to Neumark and did not inspect the Samogitian aldermanship. In addition, we have no source evidence about his stay in the convents located in the territory of the Great Forests, including Elk, Pisz and Giżycko.

Teutonic bailiwicks in Germany, France, Austria and Bohemia also belonged to a Grand Master leading this religious corporation. To supervise such remote places, the Order superior sent inspectors, e.g. in 1409, he sent a knight and a priest on a visit to German bailiwicks.

With the outbreak of war with the Kingdom of Poland, Ulrich von Jungingen stopped travelling around the state. He primarily focused on military and diplomatic activities, whether leading troops or staying in the capital city of Malbork. Twice in 1409, he commanded the attacks on the Dobrzyń land and vicinity of Bydgoszcz. Next year, the Grand Master took his army to battle Polish and Lithuanian troops that had crossed his borders. In the battle of Grunwald, he was killed during the fight with the anti-Teutonic coalition; many other dignitaries of the Order fell alongside him.

Source database

The most important source for determining the locations of the Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen is the *Księga podskarbiego malborskiego*⁷. It recorded all withdrawals from the Order treasury, often showing the exact places and dates. This book covers almost the entire ruling period of the mentioned Grand Master, from June 1407 until the end of 1409. Records for the last months of his reign did not last to date, although they were surely entered by the treasurer,

⁷ *Das Marienburger Tresslerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409*, hrsg. v. E. Joachim, 1896 Königsberg.

Thomas von Merheim⁸. Similar references may also be found in other accounting or clerical books referring to the Teutonic State in Prussia⁹.

Correspondence found in the Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin-Dahlem, Ordensbriefarchiv¹⁰ section, is also helpful in determining the place von Jungingen stayed at. A portion of the incoming and outgoing correspondence is known thanks to Teutonic cartularies (Ordensfolianten), which may also be found in the archive mentioned above¹¹. A catalogue of Teutonic letters gathered in the State Archives in Toruń has been developed and published by Andrzej Radzimiński and Janusz Tandecki¹².

Other sources useful for establishing the whereabouts of Ulrich von Jungingen are the bestowals, privileges and various types of agreements published in diplomatic codes or collections of documents¹³. Some parchment documents

⁸ S. Ekdahl, *Grunwald 1410. Studia nad tradycją i źródłami*, Kraków 2010, p. 93.

⁹ *Das Ausgabebuch des Marienburger Hauskomturs für die Jahre 1410–1420*, hrsg. v. W. Ziesmer, Königsberg 1911; *Das grosse Ämterbuch des Deutschen Ordens*, hrsg. v. W. Ziesmer, Danzig 1916. *Nowa Księga Rachunkowa Starego Miasta Elbląga 1404–1414*, vol. 1: 1404–1410, ed. M. Pelech, Warszawa 1987.

¹⁰ Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz Berlin-Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensbriefarchiv.

¹¹ Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin-Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensfolianten.

¹² A. Radzimiński, J. Tandecki, *Katalog dokumentów i listów krzyżackich Archiwum Państwowego w Toruniu*, vol. 1: (1251–1454), Warszawa 1994.

¹³ *Acten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens*, hrsg. v. M. Toepfen, Bd. 1 (Die Jahre 1233–1435), Leipzig 1878; *Die Berichte der Generalprokuratoren des Deutschen Ordens an der Kurie. Zweiter Band: Peter von Wormditt (1403–1419)*, bearb. v. H. Koepfen, Göttingen 1960; *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis. Geschichte der geistlichen Stiftungen, der adlichen Familien, so wie der Städte und Burgen der Mark Brandenburg*, hrsg. v. A. F. Riedel, Bd. 19, Berlin 1860; *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi magni ducis Lithuaniae 1376–1430*, ed. A. Prochaska, [in:] *Monumenta medii aevi historica res gestas Poloniae illustrantia*, vol. 6, Kraków 1882; *Handfesten der Komturei Schlochau nebst einigen verwandten Urkunden*, bearb. v. P. Panske, Danzig 1921; *Hanserecesse*, hrsg. v. Verein für Hansische Geschichte, Abth. I: *Die Recesse und andere Akten der Hansetage von 1256–1430*, Bd. 5, Leipzig 1880; *Hansische Urkundenbuch*, Bd. 5, bearb. v. K. Kunze, Leipzig 1899; *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Litwy*, ed. E. Raczyński, Wrocław 1845; *Regesta Historiae Neomarchicae*, hrsg. v. K. Kletke, Berlin 1867; *Skarbiec dyplomatów papieżkich, cesarskich, królewskich, książęcych; uchwał narodowych, postanowień różnych władz i urzędów posługujących do krytycznego wyjaśnienia dziejów Litwy, Rusi Litewskiej i ościennych im krajów*, ed. I. Daniłowicz, vol. 1, Wilno 1860; *Die Staatsverträge des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 15. Jahrhundert*, hrsg. v. E. Weise, Bd. 1, Königsberg 1939 (1970); *Urkunden des Bisthums Culm, theil I: Das Bisthum Culm unter dem Deutschen Orden 1243–1466*, hrsg. v. T. Bertling, Danzig 1885.

of the Teutonic knights were published as registers developed by Erich Joachim, and then issued by Walter Hubatsch¹⁴.

Moreover, important information may be found in the chronicles written on the territory of the Teutonic State – *Roczniki toruńskie*¹⁵ and *Kronika ziemi pruskiej* by Jan von Posilge¹⁶. Both sources indicate a close relationships of their authors with the Teutonic Order. *Roczniki toruńskie* are held in higher esteem because of its chronological reliability. In turn, the work of the Pomezanian official (or rather his successor) is one of the main sources for research on the battle of Grunwald¹⁷. Another important chronicle is the work of Jan Długosz, particularly useful for finding places in which Ulrich von Jungingen stayed during the summer campaign of 1410¹⁸.

Recent research on the Great War of 1409–1411 was published in the book by Sławomir Józwiak, Krzysztof Kwiatkowski, Adam Szweda and Sobiesław Szybkowski entitled *Wojna Polski i Litwy z Zakonem Krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411*. The insight of K. Kwiatkowski on the places visited by Ulrich von Jungingen in June and July 1410 is particularly essential¹⁹.

List of abbreviations

Acten – *Acten der Ständetage Preussens unter der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens*, hrsg. v. M. Toeppen, Bd. 1 (Die Jahre 1233–1435).

AMH – *Das Ausgabebuch des Marienburger Hauskomturs für die Jahre 1410–1420*.

Annales – *Joannis Długossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*, lib. X–XI (1406–1413).

Berichte – *Die Berichte der Generalprokuratoren des Deutschen Ordens an der Kurie. Zweiter Band: Peter von Wormditt (1403–1419)*.

¹⁴ *Regesta historico-diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum 1198–1525*, bearb. E. Joachim, hrsg. v. W. Hubatsch, Pars 2, Getynga 1948.

¹⁵ *Franciscani Thorunensis Annales Prussici, 941–1410*, hrsg. v. E. Strehlke, [in:] *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum* (further: SRP), Bd. 3, Leipzig 1866.

¹⁶ *Johann's von Posilge, officialis von Pomesanien, Chronik des Landes Preussen*, hrsg. v. E. Strehlke, [in:], SRP, Bd. 3.

¹⁷ To read more about these sources, see S. Ekdahl, *Grunwald 1410...*, p. 189–192.

¹⁸ *Joannis Długossii Annales seu Cronicae incliti Regni Poloniae*, lib. X–XI (1406–1413), ed. K. Baczkowski et alii, Varsaviae 1997.

¹⁹ S. Józwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, *Wojna Polski i Litwy z Zakonem Krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411*, Malbork 2010.

- CDBr – *Codex diplomaticus Brandenburgensis. Geschichte der geistlichen Stiftungen, der adlichen Familien, so wie der Städte und Burgen der Mark Brandenburg*, Bd. 19.
- CEV – *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi magni ducis Lithuaniae 1376–1430*.
- Daniłowicz – *Skarbiec dyplomatów papieżkich, cesarskich, królewskich, książęcych; uchwał narodowych, postanowień różnych władz i urzędów posługujących do krytycznego wyjaśnienia dziejów Litwy, Rusi Litewskiej i ościennych im krajów*.
- FTAP – *Franciscani Thorunensis Annales Prussici*
- Hanserecense – *Hanserecense*, hrsg. v. Verein für Hansische Geschichte, Abth. I: *Die Recesse und andere Akten der Hansetage von 1256–1430*, Bd. 5.
- HUB – *Hansische Urkundenbuch*, Bd. 5.
- GAB – *Das grosse Ämterbuch des Deutschen Ordens*.
- Katalog listów – A. Radziwiński, J. Tandecki, *Katalog dokumentów i listów krzyżackich Archiwum Państwowego w Toruniu*, vol. 1: (1251–1454).
- KDL – *Kodeks Dyplomatyczny Litwy*.
- Kętrzyński – W. Kętrzyński, *O ludności polskiej w Prusiech niegdyś krzyżackich*.
- MTB – *Das Marienburger Tresslerbuch der Jahre 1399–1409*.
- Nowa Księga Rachunkowa – *Nowa Księga Rachunkowa Starego Miasta Elbląga 1404–1414*, vol. 1: 1404–1410.
- OBA – Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preußischer Kulturbesitz Berlin-Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensbriefarchiv.
- OF – Geheimes Staatsarchiv Preussischer Kulturbesitz Berlin-Dahlem, XX. Hauptabteilung, Ordensfolianten.
- Posilge – *Johann's von Posilge, officialis von Pomesanien, Chronik des Landes Preussen*.
- RHN – *Regesta Historiae Neomarchicae*.
- Regesta II – *Regesta historico-diplomatica Ordinis S. Mariae Theutonicorum 1198–1525*.
- Staatsverträge I – *Die Staatsvertrage des Deutschen Ordens in Preußen im 15. Jahrhundert*.
- Wojna Polski i Litwy – S. Józwiak, K. Kwiatkowski, A. Szweda, S. Szybkowski, *Wojna Polski i Litwy z Zakonem Krzyżackim w latach 1409–1411*.

1407			
26 June	Malbork ²⁰	Marienburg	FTAP, p. 285–286; Posilge, p. 285–286
27 Jun	Malbork	Marienburg	Acten, p. 108–109; Hanserecesse, p. 326–327
29 Jun	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 429
6 Jul	Malbork	Marienburg	HUB, p. 416
	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 436
	Pokarmin	Brandenburg	MTB, p. 436
	Królewiec	Königsberg	MTB, p. 436
		Wargen ²¹	MTB, p. 436
	Jerzmowo ²²	Germau	MTB, p. 436
		Pobethen ²³	MTB, p. 436
	Rudawa ²⁴	Rudau, Ruden	MTB, p. 436
15 Jul	Szaki ²⁵	Schaaken	Regesta II, no. 1584, p. 184
17 Jul	Szaki	Schaaken	Regesta II, no. 1594, p. 184; RHN, p. 35
18 Jul	Szaki	Schaaken	Hanserecesse, p. 325–326; MTB, p. 414
		Kaymen ²⁶	MTB, p. 436
		Waldau ²⁷	MTB, p. 436
	Labiawa	Labiau ²⁸	MTB, p. 436
	Nattangen bailiwick		MTB, p. 436
		Laukischken ²⁹	MTB, p. 436
	Wąsowo ³⁰	Wohnsdorff	MTB, p. 436
	Tapiawa ³¹	Tapiau	MTB, p. 436
	Królewiec	Königsberg	GAB, p. 10–13
	Pokarmin	Brandenburg	MTB, p. 436
	Honedą or Huntowo (near Świętomiejsce)	Huntenau	MTB, p. 436

²⁰ Names of cities and settlements after: *Słownik nazw miejscowych w Prusach*, ed. M. Arsyński, R. Czaja, [in:] *Zakon Krzyżacki w Prusach i Inflantach. Podziały administracyjne i kościelne w XIII–XVI wieku*, ed. R. Czaja, A. Radziński, Toruń 2013, p. 373–376, if not listed in the footnote.

²¹ Today Russ. Druzhnoye.

²² Today Russ. Russkoye.

²³ Today Russ. Romanovo.

²⁴ Today Russ. Melnikov is a town not far from today's Kaliningrad.

²⁵ Today Russ. Niekrasowo. J. Tandecki, *Podziały administracyjne państwa zakonnego w Prusach*, [in:] *Zakon krzyżacki w Prusach...*, p. 44.

²⁶ Today Russ. Zarechye.

²⁷ Today Russ. Nizove.

²⁸ Today Russ. Polesk.

²⁹ Today Russ. Saranskoye.

³⁰ Today Russ. Kurortnoe.

³¹ Today Russ. Gvardieysk.

	Cynty ³²	Zinten	MTB, p. 436
	Krzyżpork ³³	Kreuzburg	MTB, p. 436
		Knauten ³⁴	MTB, p. 436
	Itawa Pruska ³⁵	Preußisch Eylau	MTB, p. 436
	Woria		MTB, p. 436
	Domnowo ³⁶	Domnau	MTB, p. 436
	Gierdawy ³⁷	Gerdauen	MTB, p. 436
24 Jul	Barciany	Barten, Barthen	Regesta II, no. 1585, p. 184; W. Kętrzyński, p. 398
		Camencken	MTB, p. 436
	Kętrzyn	Rastenburg	MTB, p. 436
	Krzemity	Kremitten ³⁸	MTB, p. 436
	Sątoczno	Leunenburg	MTB, p. 436
	Bartoszyce	Bartenstein	MTB, p. 436
	Łukta	Locken ³⁹	MTB, p. 436
	Morąg	Mohrunen	MTB, p. 436
	Mitakowo	Liebstadt	MTB, p. 436
	Burdajny	Bordehnen ⁴⁰	MTB, p. 436
	Pastęk	Holland	MTB, p. 436
	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 436
13 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 414
16 Aug	Lasowice	Lesewitz	MTB, p. 430
17 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 326–327; OBA, no. 945
18 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 431
19 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	KDL, p. 93–94
26 Aug	Gdańsk	Danzig	OF no. 3, p. 329–330
2 Sep	Swornegacie	Schwornigatz	CEV, no. 370, p. 151–152; Danitowicz, no. 861, p. 356
8 Sep	Czarne	Hammerstein	Staatsverträge I, no. 56, p. 59–60
	Gdańsk	Danzig	MTB, p. 436–437; Posilge, p. 286
about 9 Oct	Bytów	Bütow	MTB, p. 434

³² Today Russ. Kornievo.

³³ Today Russ. Slavskoye.

³⁴ Today Russ. Prudki.

³⁵ Today Russ. Bagrationovsk.

³⁶ Russ. Domnowo.

³⁷ Today Russ. Zeleznodorozny.

³⁸ J. Tandecki, *Podziały administracyjne państwa zakonnego w Prusach*, p. 44.

³⁹ J. Tandecki, *Podziały administracyjne państwa zakonnego w Prusach*, p. 43.

⁴⁰ Ibidem.

14 Oct	Czarne	Hammerstein	OBA, no. 950; Staatsverträge I, no. 56, p. 59–60
	Cztuchów	Schlochau	MTB, p. 437
	Tuchola	Tuchel	MTB, p. 437
	Świecie	Schwetz	MTB, p. 437
	Starogród	Althausen	MTB, p. 437
	Lipienek	Lippinken	MTB, p. 437
	Papowo Biskupie	Papau Bisch.	MTB, p. 437
	Bierzgowo	Birgelau	MTB, p. 437
	Kowalewo Pomorskie	Schönsee	MTB, p. 437
	Golub-Dobrzyń	Golub	MTB, p. 437
	Radzyń Chetmiński	Rheden	MTB, p. 437; Posilge, p. 286
21 Oct	Pokrzywno	Engelsburg	GAB, p. 586–587; Posilge, s. 287
	Grudziądz	Graudenz	MTB, p. 437
	Nowe	Neuenburg	MTB, p. 437
	Tczew	Dirschau	MTB, p. 437
24 Oct	Lasowice	Lesewitz	MTB, p. 438
28 Oct	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 326
29 Oct	Malbork	Marienburg	CDBr, p. 308–309; RHN, p. 37; OF no. 3, p. 321, 327–328
3 Nov	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 440, 441
6 Nov	Dzierzgoń	Christburg	OF no. 3, p. 327
11 Nov	Ostróda	Osterrode	GAB, p. 321–322; Posilge, p. 287
	Olsztynek	Hohenstein	MTB, p. 438
	Wierzbica	Vierzighuben ⁴¹	MTB, p. 438–439
18 Nov	Lidzbark Welski	Lautenburg	Katalog listów, no. 113, p. 50 ⁴² ; MTB, p. 439
	Brodnica	Strasburg	MTB, p. 439
24 Nov	Toruń	Thorn	J. E. Wernicke, <i>Geschichte Thorns aus Urkunden, Dokumenten Und Handschriften</i> , Bd. 1, Thorn 1839, p. 128; J. H. Zerke, <i>Historiae Thorunensis Naufrage Tabulae, Oder Kern Der Thornischen Chronice</i> , Thorn 1711, p. 31–32; B. Herdzin, P. Oliński, <i>Rachunki z uczty wydanej na cześć wielkiego mistrza Ulryka von Jungingen w Toruniu w 1407 roku</i> , [in:] <i>Studia nad dziejami miast i mieszczaństwa w średniowieczu</i> , ed. R. Czaja, J. Tandecki, Toruń 1996, p. 295–301
	Brodnica	Strasburg	MTB, p. 447
	Książki near Jabłonowo Pom.		MTB, p. 439
	Pokrzywno	Engelsburg	MTB, p. 438

⁴¹ Cz. Baszyński, *Osadnictwo komturstwa ostródzkiego do połowy XV wieku*, „Zapiski Historyczne”, vol. 25 (1960), 2, p. 117.

⁴² The letter has no yearly date, but it is possible to assume that it was sent in 1407 because only then was Ulrich von Jungingen in the area around the day of St. Elizabeth, somewhat near Lidzbark Welski.

1 Dec	Rogoźno	Roghusen	Katalog listów, no. 112, p. 50; GAB, p. 539–540; Posilge, p. 287
3 Dec	Sztum	Sthum	OF no. 3, p. 327
7 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	HUB, p. 426; Hanserecesse, p. 387–388
8 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 389; HUB p. 426; OBA, no. 955
Before December 13	Lasowice	Lesewitz	MTB, p. 458
13 Dec	Laski, Warnów	Leske, Warnau	MTB, p. 458
15 Dec	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 458
18 Dec	Elbląg	Elbing	OBA, no. 957
	Królewiec	Königsberg	MTB, p. 458
	Taptawki ⁴³	Taplaken	MTB, p. 459
	Norkity ⁴⁴	Gut Norkitten	MTB, p. 459
	Ragneta ⁴⁵	Ragnit	Posilge, p. 287
1408			
6 – 8 January	Kowno		Annales, p. 24; FTAP, p. 289; Posilge p. 289
	Ragneta	Ragnit	MTB, p. 503
	Królewiec	Königsberg	MTB, p. 503–504
20 Jan	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 334
24 Jan	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 324; MTB, p. 462; RHN, p. 39
25 Jan	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 462, 463
26 Jan	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 462, 463; OBA, no. 973
29 Jan	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 462, 463
2 Feb	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 460
5 Feb	Nowa Wieś	Neuhoffe	MTB, p. 466–467
6 Feb	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 467
12 Feb	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 467
13 Feb	Benowo	Benhoff, Behenhoff	MTB, p. 468–469
14 Feb	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 326
until 28 February	Vistula Spit		MTB, p. 469
	Szkarpawa	Scharfau	MTB, p. 470
	Lasowice	Lesewitz	MTB, p. 470
	Warnów	Warnau	MTB, p. 470
	Laski	Leske	MTB, p. 470
2 Mar	Nowy Staw	Neuteich	MTB, p. 472
2 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	CEV, no. 374, p. 153–155

⁴³ Today Russ. Taplaki.

⁴⁴ Today Russ. Miezdurieczye.

⁴⁵ Today Russ. Neman.

3 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	RHN, p. 40; W. Kętrzyński, p. 332
	Pelplin		MTB, p. 472
	Starogard Gdański	Preußisch Stargard	MTB, p. 472
	Mątowny	Montau ⁴⁶	MTB, p. 472–473
	Międzytęż	Meselanz ⁴⁷	MTB, p. 472–473
13 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 329
15 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 471
22 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 184
26 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 331
27 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	Daniłowicz, p. 358
30 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 475;
1 Apr	Elbląg	Elbing	OF no. 3, p. 332, 333; CEV, no. 376, p. 155–156, no. 377, p. 156–157; Daniłowicz, no. 872, p. 359; MTB 475
5 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 334, 337
7 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	HUB, p. 433; Hanserecesse, p. 397–398; MTB, p. 452
9 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 338–339
10 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	RHN, p. 41
15 Apr	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 478
18 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	Oba, no. 982
19 Apr	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 457
4 May	Mątowny, Nowy Staw, Lasowice, Łaski, Szkarpawa	Montau, Neuteich, Lesewitz, Leske, Scharfau	MTB, p. 479–480
6 May	Malbork	Marienburg	Acten, p. 110–111; Hanserecesse, p. 406–407
7 May	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 339
8 May	Malbork	Marienburg	Berichte, p. 100
8 May	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 481
between 9 and 12 May	Benowo, Szaleniec, Krzyżanów, Nowy Dwór Gdański	Benhoff, Thörichthofen, Notzendorf, Nuenhoff	MTB p. 481–482, 483
14 May	Grabiny-Zameczek	Grebin	MTB, p. 484
Until 24 May	Gdańsk	Danzig	MTB, p. 484
20 May	Sobowidz	Sobbowitz	OF no. 3, p. 363; MTB, p. 484
21 May	Stara Kiszewa	Kischau	OF no. 3, p. 335; MTB, p. 485
24 May	Skarszewy	Schöneck	MTB, p. 483
	Garczyn	Garczin	MTB, p. 483
The beginning of June	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 486
	Tolkmicko	Tolkemit	MTB, p. 486–487
		Büsterwalde (Bystern)	MTB, p. 487

⁴⁶ J. Tandecki, *Podziały administracyjne państwa zakonnego w Prusach*, p. 43.

⁴⁷ Ibidem.

	Świętomijsce, Święta Siekierka	Heiligenbeil	MTB, p. 487
	Pokarmin	Brandenburg	MTB, p. 487
	Królewiec	Königsberg	MTB, p. 487
		Waldau	MTB, p. 487
	Szaki	Schaaken	MTB, p. 487
		Rossiten ⁴⁸	MTB, p. 487–488
		Memel ⁴⁹	MTB, p. 487
	Tylża ⁵⁰	Tilsit	MTB, p. 487
11 Jun	Ragneta	Ragnit	OF no. 3, p. 340; Danitowicz, no. 874, p. 359
	Labiawa	Labiau	MTB, p. 490
	Tapiawa	Tapiau	MTB, p. 490
		Waldau	MTB, p. 490
		Arnau ⁵¹	MTB, p. 490
18 Jun	Królewiec	Königsberg	OF no. 3, p. 341; Danitowicz, no. 874, p. 359
After 24 June	Pokarmin	Brandenburg	MTB, p. 490
	Świętomijsce, Święta Siekierka	Heiligenbeil	MTB, p. 490
	Braniewo	Frauenburg	MTB, p. 490
	Siedlisko (near Braniewo)	Einsedel ⁵²	MTB, p. 490
	Młynary	Mohlhusen	MTB, p. 491
	Pastęk	Holland	MTB, p. 491
	Dzierżgoń	Christburg	MTB, p. 491
28 Jun	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 342; CEV, no. 378, p. 157–158; Danitowicz, no. 875, p. 359
30 Jun	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 343
3 Jul	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 452
4 Jul	Malbork	Marienburg	Regesta II, no. 1607, p. 187
5 Jul	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 420; MTB, p. 494
7 Jul	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 422–423; HUB, p. 435–436
12 Jul	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 495
14 Jul	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 343–344; OBA, no. 995; MTB, p. 496
	Międzytęż	Meselanz	MTB, p. 498
	Starogard Gdański		MTB, p. 498

⁴⁸ Today Russ. Rybachy.

⁴⁹ Today Lith. Klaipėda.

⁵⁰ Today Russ. Sovetsk.

⁵¹ Today Russ. Marino, Marjino.

⁵² M. Radoch, *Walki Zakonu Krzyżackiego o Żmudź od połowy XIII wieku do 1411 roku*, Olsztyn 2011, p. 138.

25 Jul	Łęg	Schonhein	OF no. 3, p. 365; MTB, p. 498
26 Jul	Czarne	Hammerstein	MTB, p. 499–500
	Tuchola	Tuchel	MTB, p. 499
1 Aug	Człuchów	Schlochau	OF no. 3, p. 345–346, 349–350; CEV, no. 382–383, p. 160–162; Daniłowicz, no. 879–880, p. 360; RHN, p. 43–44
2 Aug	Tuchola	Tuchel	OBA, no. 1000;
3 Aug	Tuchola	Tuchel	OF no. 3, p. 347
	Drzycim	Drzeczen	MTB, p. 499
	Świecie	Schwetz	MTB, p. 499
	Nowe	Neuenburg	MTB, p. 499
	Gniew		MTB, p. 499
10 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	<i>Handfesten der Komturei Schlochau</i> , bearb. v. P. Panske, Danzig 1921, p. 167
14 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 500
15 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 460
16 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 452
19 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	Nowa Księga Rachunkowa, p. 126
21 Aug	Grabiny-Zameczek	Grebin	MAB, p. 28
28 Aug	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 453, 501–502; W. Kętrzyński, p. 332
29 Aug	Elbląg	Elbing	Hanserecesse, p. 428–429, 432
1 Sep	Nowy Staw, Malbork	Neuteich, Marienburg	MTB, p. 501, 502
	Przezmark	Pruschemarkt	MTB, p. 507
	Mitomłyn	Liebemühl	MTB, p. 507
	Szeląg (near Ostróda)	Schillig	MTB, p. 507
	Ostróda	Osterröde	MTB, p. 507
	Wierzbica	Vierzighuben	MTB, p. 507
	Itawa	Deutsch Eylau	MTB, p. 508
	Bratian	Brathian	MTB, p. 508
	Nowe Miasto Lubawskie	Neumarkt	MTB, p. 508
20 Sep	Partęczyny	Partschen, Parthaczyn ⁵³	Acten, p. 111–112
22 Sep	Brodnica	Strasburg	OF no. 3, p. 354–355; MTB, p. 508
	Golub-Dobrzyń	Golub	MTB, p. 508
	Kowalewo Pomorskie	Schönsee	MTB, p. 508
	Radzyń Chełmiński	Rheden	MTB, p. 508
	Lipienek	Lippinken	MTB, p. 508–509

⁵³ K. Grążawski, *Parthaczyn – przyczynek do badań nawodnych dworów myśliwskich w Prusach Krzyżackich*, „Kwartalnik Kultury Materialnej”, vol. 37, 1989, no. 3–4, p. 579–585; S. Józwiak, *Polowania wielkich mistrzów Zakonu Krzyżackiego w ówczesnym bractwie bractwańskim w XIV-początkach XV wieku*, „Zapiski Historyczne”, vol. 67 (2002), issue 2, p. 10.

	Toruń	Thorn	MTB, p. 509
	Nieszawa	Nessau	MTB, p. 509
5 Oct	Starogród	Althausen	<i>Urkunden des Bisthums Culm</i> , theil I: <i>Das Bisthum Culm unter dem Deutschen Orden 1243–1466</i> , hrsg. v. T. Bertling, Danzig 1885, p. 365–366
	Bierzgłowo	Birgelau	MTB, p. 509
	Pokrzywno	Engelsburg	MTB, p. 509
	Grudziądz	Graudenz	MTB, p. 509
	Rogoźno	Roghusen	MTB, p. 509
	Prabuty	Resenburg	MTB, p. 509
	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 509
20–23 October	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 348; MTB, p. 504; Nowa Księga Rachunkowa, p. 126; Posilge p. 293; Regesta II, no. 1614, p. 188
25 Oct	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 351–352; CEV, no. 384, p. 162–163; Danitowicz, no. 883, p. 361
28 Oct	Malbork	Marienburg	MAB, p. 8; MTB, p. 451, 517
31 Oct	Malbork	Marienburg	Regesta II no. 1614, p. 188
1 Nov	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 409; MTB, p. 460
approx. 19 Nov	Warnów	Warnau	MTB, p. 512
	Mątowy	Montau	MTB, p. 512
	Laski	Leske	MTB, p. 512
10 Nov	Grabiny-Zameczek	Grebin	OF no. 3, p. 352; MTB, p. 512
	Międzyłęż	Meselanz	MTB, p. 512
30 Nov	Elbląg	Elbing	Acten, p. 113–120; MTB, p. 513; Posilge, p. 294–297
5 Dec	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 514
10 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 514
13 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 520
24 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 519
25 Dec	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 524
26 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 524
27 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	RHN, p. 45
28 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 524
31 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	Katalog listów, no. 115, p. 51 ⁵⁴
1409			
1 Jan	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 525
5 Jan	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 352–353
After 8 Jan	Dzierzgoń	Christburg	MTB, p. 530
	Pastęk	Holland	MTB, p. 530

⁵⁴ The letter has no yearly date, but day and place of writing suggest that it could only be sent in 1408. At the turn of 1407 and 1408, Ulrich von Jungingen was on his way to a gathering in Kovno. In turn, on the last day of December 1409, the Grand Master attended a meeting with representatives of the city councils in Gdańsk.

	Mitakowo	Liebstadt	MTB, p. 530
	Morąg	Mohrungen	MTB, p. 530
	Łukta	Locken	MTB, p. 530
	Olsztynek	Hohenstein	MTB, p. 530
	Nidzica	Neidenburg	MTB, p. 530
	Działdowo	Soldau	MTB, p. 530
	Lidzbark Welski	Lautenburg	MTB, p. 530
	Bratian	Brathian	MTB, p. 530–531
	Partęczyny	Partschen, Parthaczyn	MTB, p. 530
	Itawa	Deutsch Eylau	MTB, p. 531
	Przezmark	Pruschemarkt	MTB, p. 531
	Dzierzgoń	Christburg	MTB, p. 531
Around 25 Jan	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 530
1 Feb	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 519
5 Feb	Malbork	Marienburg	Berichte, p. 105–106
after 19 Feb	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 533
	Benowo	Benhoff, Behenhoff	MTB, p. 533
	Międzyłęż	Meselanz	MTB, p. 533
	Mątowny	Montau	MTB, p. 533
	Warnów	Warnau	MTB, p. 533
	Lasowice	Lesewitz	MTB, p. 533
	Laski	Leske	MTB, p. 534
	Grabiny-Zameczek	Grebin	MTB, p. 534
	Gdańsk	Danzig	MTB, p. 534
	Oliwa		MTB, p. 534
	Lębork	Lauenburg	MTB, p. 534
	Bytów	Bütow	MTB, p. 534
	Ugoszcz	Bernsdorff	MTB, p. 535
	Tuchola	Tuchel	MTB, p. 535
	Cztuchów	Schlochau	MTB, p. 535
	Strieczona near Cztuchów	Stretzien	MTB, p. 535
	Biskupnica	Bischoffswalde	MTB, p. 535
	Czarne	Hammerstein	MTB, p. 535
	Biały Bór	Baldenburg	MTB, p. 535
	Koczała	Flissenstein	MTB, p. 535
	Bytów	Bütow	MTB, p. 535
	Kosobudy	Kossobude	MTB, p. 535
	Stara Kiszewa	Kischau	MTB, p. 535
	Sobowidz	Sobbowitz	MTB, p. 535
	Tczew	Dirschau	MTB, p. 535
22 Mar	Elbląg	Elbing	Hanserecesse, p. 451–452

23 Mar	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 522
24 Mar	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 586
25 Mar	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 535
26 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 519
30 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	OF no. 3, p. 377
31 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	<i>Visitationen im Deutschen Orden im Mittelalter</i> , Teil I: 1236–1449, hrsg. v. M. Biskup, I. Janosz-Biskupowa, Marburg 2002, p. 59; Regesta II no. 1623, p. 189
4 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 537
6 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 519
11 Apr	Malbork, Sztum	Marienburg, Sthum	OF no. 3, p. 367, 369, 373; HUB, p. 449–450; Katalog listów, no. 117, p. 52
14 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 454; Nowa Księga Rachunkowa p. 165
	Warnów, Laski, Lasowice	Warnau, Leske, Lesewitz	MTB, p. 538
Until 19 Apr	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 539
21 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	Acten, p. 112; Hanserecesse, p. 456–458; MTB, p. 539; Nowa Księga Rachunkowa, p. 165
22 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 540, 544
5 May	Malbork	Marienburg	CEV no. 395, p. 171–172
	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 542–543
	Tolkmicko	Tolkemit	MTB, p. 543
	Frombork	Frauenburg	MTB, p. 543
		Büsterwalde ⁵⁵	MTB, p. 543
	Pokarmin	Brandenburg	MTB, p. 543
	Królewiec	Königsberg	MTB, p. 543
	Szaki	Schaaken	MTB, p. 543
		Rossiten	MTB, p. 548
		Memel	MTB, p. 548
	Ragneta	Ragnit	MTB, p. 548
	Wenkiszki	Wenkischken ⁵⁵	MTB, p. 548
	Labiawa	Labiau	MTB, p. 548
	Tapiawa	Tapiau	MTB, p. 548
	Wąsowo	Wohnsdorff	MTB, p. 549
	Gierdawy	Gerdaunen	MTB, p. 549
		Nordenburg ⁵⁶	MTB, p. 549
	Barciany	Barten, Barthen	MTB, p. 549

⁵⁵ Siedlisko near Świątomiejsce, does not exist since 1945.

⁵⁶ M. Radoch, *Wspieranie ubogich przez wielkich mistrzów krzyżackich w latach 1399–1409 (w świetle księgi podskarbiego malborskiego)*, „Komunikaty Mazursko-Warmińskie”, 2004, no. 1 (243), p. 84, footnote 199.

⁵⁷ Today Russ. Kryłovo.

	Srokowo	Drengfurth	MTB, p. 549
	Różanka near Kętrzyn	Rosengarten	MTB, p. 549
20 May	Kętrzyn	Rastenburg	MTB, p. 549; Regesta II no. 1624, p. 189
22 May	Sątoczno	Leunenburg	MTB, p. 549–550; Regesta II no. 1625, p. 189
	Bartoszyce	Bartenstein	MTB, p. 550
	Reszel	Resel	MTB, p. 550
	Itawa Pruska	Preußisch Eylau	MTB, p. 550
	Domnowo	Domnau	MTB, p. 550
	Krzyżpork	Kreuzburg	MTB, p. 550
	Pluty	Pellen	MTB, p. 550
	Pieniężno	Mehlsack	MTB, p. 550
	Paślęk	Holland	MTB, p. 550
9–10 June	Elbląg	Elbing	CEV, no. 407, p. 181
after 10 June	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 546;
13 Jun	Malbork	Marienburg	Daniłowicz, no. 894, p. 362; OBA, no. 1078
15 Jun	Malbork	Marienburg	CEV, no. 408, 409, p. 181–182; KDL p. 96–97; OBA, no. 1080
29 Jun	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 546
until 25 July	Lasowice	Lesewitz	MTB, p. 551
	Międzytęż	Meselanz	MTB, p. 551
	Subkowe	Czapkau ⁵⁸	MTB, p. 551
	Stargard Gdański	Preußisch Stargard	MTB, p. 551
	Szenajda	Schönheide	MTB, p. 551
	Chojnice	Konitz	MTB, p. 551
	Człuchów	Schlochau	MTB, p. 551–552
	Kosobudy	Kossobude	MTB, p. 552
	Sobowidz	Sobbowitz	MTB, p. 552
28 Jul	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 559; Regesta II no. 1630, p. 189; Staatsverträge I, no. 68, p. 70–71
1 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	Acten, p. 121–123; Annales, p. 36–37; CEV, Appendix 4, p. 986–987
2 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 520
6 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 560
7–9 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	K. Kwiatkowski, <i>Okoliczności wypowiedzenia wojny królowi polskiemu Władysławowi II Jagiello przez wielkiego mistrza Zakonu Niemieckiego Ulricha von Jungingen w sierpniu 1409 roku</i> , „Zapiski Historyczne”, vol. 74 (2009), no. 3, p. 31

⁵⁸ M. Radoch, *Tabliczki wotywnie wielkich mistrzów zakonu krzyżackiego Konrada i Ulryka von Jungingen dla kościołów w Prusach (w świetle księgi podskarbiego malborskiego z lat 1399–1409)*, [in:] *Mieszczanie, wasale, zakonnicy*, „Studia z dziejów średniowiecza”, no. 10, 2004, ed. B. Śliwiński, p. 171.

10 Aug	Malbork	Marienburg	J. Voigt, <i>Geschichte Preussens von den älteren Zeiten bis zum Untergange der Herrschaft des Deutschen Ordens</i> , Bd. 7: <i>Die Zeit vom Hochmeister Ulrich von Jungingen 1407 bis zum Tode Hochmeisters Paul von Russdorf 1441</i> , Königsberg 1836, p. 48–49.
	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 575
	Dachowo	Dakau ⁵⁹	MTB, p. 575
	Goryń	Goryn	MTB, p. 575
	Lipinek	Weykersdorf, Wykersdorf, Wikersdorf	MTB, p. 575
16 Aug	Brodnica	Strasburg	MTB, p. 575; Posilge, p. 301
	Rypin	Rippin	FTAP, p. 301; MTB, p. 575; Posilge, p. 301
	Lipno	Lipchen	FTAP, p. 301; Posilge, p. 301
20–28 Aug	Bobrowniki	Beberen	CEV, Appendix 4, p. 987–988; FTAP, p. 302; Danitowicz, no. 901, p. 365; OBA, no. 1112, 1116; Staatsverträge I, no. 70, p. 73
29 Aug–2 Sep	Złotoria	Zlotterie	FTAP, p. 302; Posilge, p. 301
after 2 Sep	Toruń	Thorn	CEV, Appendix 4, p. 988; MTB, p. 577
	Papowo	Papau Bisch.	MTB, p. 578
	Lipienek	Lippinken	MTB, p. 578
	Kowalewo Pomorskie	Schönsee	MTB, p. 578
	Radzyń Chełmiński	Rheden	MTB, p. 578
15 Sep	Grudziądz	Graudenz	CEV, Appendix 4, p. 988; MTB, p. 578; Staatsverträge I, no. 72, p. 73–74
	Radzyń Chełmiński	Rheden	MTB, p. 578
	Gruś	Frankenhayn	MTB, p. 576
	Rogoźno	Roghusen	MTB, p. 578–579
	Kwidzyn	Marienwerder	MTB, p. 576, 579
	Sztum	Sthum	MTB, p. 579
20 Sep	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 520
22 Sep	Malbork	Marienburg	RHN, p. 51
24 Sep	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 562
30 Sep	Malbork	Marienburg	Berichte, p. 114; MTB, p. 561
	Mątowy	Montau	MTB, p. 580
1 Oct	Gniew	Mewe	MTB, p. 580
	Piaseczno	Pesk	MTB, p. 580
2 Oct	Nowe	Neuenburg	MTB, p. 580
2 Oct	Świecie	Schwetz	CEV, no. 430, p. 202; Staatsverträge I, no. 73, p. 74
3 Oct	Świecie	Schwetz	OF no. 14, p. 310

⁵⁹ J. Powierski, *Żuława kwidzyńska i jej zaplecze osadniczo-własnościowe w Pomezanii na pojezierzu iławskim w średniowieczu (w świetle źródeł pisanych)*, [in:] *Osadnictwo nad Dolną Wisłą w Średniowieczu*, ed. S. Gierszewski, Warszawa 1989, p. 94.

4 Oct	Świecie	Schwetz	OF no. 14, p. 311; CEV, no. 431, p. 202
4–8 Oct	vicinity of Świecie	Schwetz	CEV, Appendix 4, p. 990; Posilge, p. 304
8 Oct	between Bydgoszcz and Świecie		Annales, p. 33–34; CEV, Appendix 4, p. 990–991; Daniłowicz, no. 904, p. 365–366; KDL, p. 104–107; Posilge, p. 305; Staatsverträge I, no. 74, 75, p. 74–77
21 Oct	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 561, 567
22 Oct	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 561
23 Oct	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 520
28 Oct	Bobrowniki	Beberen	OBA, no. 1164
31 Oct	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 520
1 Nov	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 529
12 Dec	Elbląg	Elbing	MTB, p. 591
13 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 520
14 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 592
15 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 592
18 Dec	Świecie	Schwetz	CEV, no. 435, p. 204
28 Dec	Malbork	Marienburg	MTB, p. 520
31 Dec	Gdańsk	Danzig	Hanserecesse, p. 506
1410			
8 Jan	Laski	Leske	AMH, p. 3
13 Jan	Malbork	Marienburg	AMH, p. 1
23 Feb	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 509–511
1 Feb	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 511–512
27 Feb	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 529–531
18 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	OBA, no. 1259, 1260
22 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	AMH, p. 1
28 Mar	Elbląg	Elbing	Acten, p. 123–124; AMH, p. 4; Hanserecesse, p. 540–542
29 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	Hanserecesse, p. 542
30 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	Posilge, p. 313
31 Mar	Malbork	Marienburg	Staatsverträge I, no. 78, p. 79;
19 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	AMH, p. 2
26 Apr	Malbork	Marienburg	Berichte p. 116–117; Regesta II, no. 1659, p. 192
9 May	Malbork	Marienburg	Acten, p. 124–125
11 May	Malbork	Marienburg	AMH, p. 5; OBA, no. 1276
13 May	Malbork	Marienburg	Daniłowicz, no. 921, p. 369; OBA, no. 1279
15 May	Malbork	Marienburg	<i>Zwölf Urkunden zu O. Stavenhagen: „Livland und die Schlacht bei Tannenberg”,</i> bearb. v. L. Arbusow, „Sitzungsberichte der Gesellschaft für Geschichte und Altertumskunde der Ostseeprovinzen Russlands”, 1911, H. 1–2, p. 269–270
20 May	Malbork	Marienburg	CEV, no. 440, p. 206–207; Daniłowicz, no. 923, p. 370; OBA, no. 1282
24 May	Sztum	Sthum	Berichte, p. 118
25 May	Sztum	Sthum	OBA, no. 1285

2–5 June	East of Malbork		OBA no. 1248, 1250, 1291; <i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 313.
8 Jun	Kwidzyn	Marienwerder	Posilge, p. 300
10 Jun	Pokrzywno	Engelsburg	OBA, no. 1299
11 Jun	Radzyń Chełmiński	Rheden	OBA, no. 1301; <i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 319.
15 Jun	Lipienek	Lippinken	OF no. 7, p. 131
24 Jun	Toruń	Thorn	<i>Annales</i> , p. 62
29 Jun	Toruń	Thorn	J. Voigt, <i>Geschichte Preussens...</i> , p. 75
3 Jul	Toruń	Thorn	<i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 335,
4 Jul	Brodnica	Strasburg	<i>Das Soldbuch des Deutschen Ordens 1410/1411. Die abrechnung für die Soldtruppen</i> , hrsg. v. S. Ekdahl, Veröffentlichungen aus den Archiven Preussischer Kulturbesitz, Bd. 23/I, Köln-Wien 1988, p. 37; <i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 335
	Itawa	Deutsch Eylau	OBA, no. 1324; <i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 335
5 Jul	around Itawa		OBA, no. 1327; <i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 337
6 Jul	Brodnica	Strasburg	<i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 348
7 Jul	Brodnica	Strasburg	<i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 348–349
8 Jul	from Brodnica to Kurzętnik		Posilge, p. 315
11 Jul	march towards Bratian		<i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 371–372
On the night 11/12 Jul	Bratian	Brathian	<i>Annales</i> , p. 81
14 Jul	Lubawa	Löbau	Posilge, p. 315; <i>Wojna Polski i Litwy...</i> , p. 372
15 Jul	Grunwald	Tannenberg	FTAP, p. 315; Posilge, p. 315–316

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Summary

In the Middle Ages, travelling across the country was one of the basic tools of exercising power exploited by emperors, kings, princes, etc. During such ventures, the ruler performed judicial duties, controlled subordinate officials, collected tributes and rents, verified the defence systems. Grand Masters of the Teutonic Order in Prussia also adopted this manner of state management. The above itinerary presents the locations visited by the Grand Master Ulrich von Jungingen during his reign in the years 1407–1410.

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The Teutonic Propaganda and the Activity of the Polish Diplomacy at the Beginning of the 15th century

The Middle Ages is the period of intensive development of the just war doctrine¹. Cicero is considered to be the creator of this theory. In his treaty, *On the Commonwealth*, he divided the wars into the just (justified, declared, fought according to the accepted principles) and the unjust ones (those undeclared or fought without a justified reason). Among the justified reasons he mentions self-defence, defence of allies, recuperation of the lost goods and land, necessity to punish the enemies². The Cicero's idea was used by the subsequent authors, including some Christian theologians. The *Decretum Gratiani* (ca. 1140) mentions the four conditions for a just war: the war must be declared by a lawful ruler, fought in order to defend a country or to recuperate the lost goods, without the clergymen, and the army should refrain from unlimited violence towards the enemy. Similar conditions are included in the Rufinus's treaty *Summa Decretorum*³.

In medieval Poland, it is only in the 15th century when some works treating about the armed conflicts appear. In this century, the issues of war were discussed

¹ The issue of a just war used to be a subject of reflection of the subsequent acknowledged authorities in the field of law. One of them was Alberico Gentili, called „father of international law”, the author of *De iure belli* (1598). G. Van Der Molen, *Alberico Gentili and the Development of International Law*, Leiden 1968.

² Cf. M. T. Cicero, *O państwie* [*On the Commonwealth*], [in:] id., *O państwie, o prawach* [*On the Commonwealth, On the Laws*], translated by I. Żółtowska, Kęty 1999, p. 72.

³ Cf. P. Contamine, *Wojna w średniowieczu* [*War in the Middle Ages*], Warsaw 1999, p. 291.

by Stanisław of Skarbimierz⁴ and by Paweł Włodkowic⁵. One of the reasons behind the creation of these works is the reflection on a long-term Polish-Teutonic conflict.

A sermon of the rector of the University of Cracow (Stanisław of Skarbimierz), *De bellis iustis* (*On Just Wars*), is the oldest Polish written work which refers to the issue of the law of war. It originates from 1410 or 1414. Therefore, it refers directly to the Great War 1409–1411. According to L. Ehrlich and other researchers⁶, it is also the first lecture on the law of war in the world literature⁷.

Teutonic propaganda, which preceded the Battle of Grunwald and was supposed to prevent the military action of Władysław Jagiełło in alliance with the Lithuanian, Russian and Tatar armies, was an impetus to create this

⁴ Cf. R. M. Zawadzki, *PSB* XLII, pp. 76–80 (ref.); id., *Stanisław ze Skarbimierza*, [entry in:] *Encyklopedia filozofii polskiej* [*The Encyclopaedia of Polish Philosophy*], vol. 2, Lublin 2011, pp. 596–599 (ref.).

⁵ S. Wielgus, *Paweł Włodkowic*, [entry in:] *Encyklopedia filozofii polskiej* [*The Encyclopaedia of Polish Philosophy*], vol. II, Lublin 2011, p. 306–311. (ref.)

⁶ According to P. Czartoryski, the sermon *De bellis iustis* is the first and fundamental expression of the laws of war doctrine, which was introduced into international law only in the middle of the 19th c. Cf. P. Czartoryski, *Nauki prawne* [*Legal Science*], [in:] *Historia nauki polskiej* [*The History of the Polish Science*], vol. 1, Wrocław 1970, p. 144.

⁷ L. Ehrlich, *Polski wykład prawa wojny XV wieku. Kazanie Stanisława ze Skarbimierza De bellis iustis*, [Polish Lecture on the Law of War in the 15th c. The Sermon of Stanisław of Skarbimierz *De bellis iustis*.] Warsaw 1955. The main theses and meaning for the international war doctrine were presented in the previous publication of L. Ehrlich: *Paweł Włodkowic i Stanisław ze Skarbimierza* [*Paweł Włodkowic and Stanisław of Skarbimierz*], Warsaw 1954, pp. 23–40. Cf. T. M. Nowak, *Z problematyki staropolskiego piśmiennictwa wojskowego* [*On the Issue of the Old Polish Military Literature*], „Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości” [*Studies and Materials on the History of Military Science*] 29 (1986), pp. 50–55. According to L. Ehrlich, the previous remarks concerning this issue could be defined as causes.

Before the treaties and works of the Polish scholars were drawn up, the issue of the law of war can be found in *Summa* of a Catalanian Dominican Raymond of Penafort (1180–1275), in the 13th-c. annotations to *Summa* of a French Dominican William of Rennes and in the second part of the *Summa Theologiae* of Thomas Aquinas written in 1269. A slightly broader scope of the law of war is present in the work *De bello, de represaliis et de duello* written in 1360 by John of Legnano. Cf. Giovanni da Legnano, *Tractatus de bello, de represaliis et de duello*, (ed.) Th. E. Holland, Washington 1917. This work was, as Th. Holland noticed, the first attempt at the holistic perspective of the rights and duties arising at the time of war. The treaty is devoted to i.a. the issues of who is entitled to fight wars and what are the main principles of the military discipline. Legnano, referring to *ius gentium* and drawing on the Augustinian just war theory, concluded that a war is just and good provided that it serves good and aims at restoring the violated order. Such a war must be declared and fought only by a sovereign ruler, it means by a king, prince or pope. All local skirmishes and conflicts in the name of private interests of the fighting parties are not legally valid and do not deserve to be called wars. Cf. M. Keen, *The Laws of War...*, p. 9.

work. Previous conflicts between the Poles and the Teutonic Knights undoubtedly consisted another suggestion⁸. Taking into account the Polish-Teutonic trials that took place in 1320/21 and in 1339, it is visible that the Teutonic Knights could skilfully avoid participating in them, constantly lodging appeals and protests against the unfavourable sentences, steering the issues in a different direction⁹.

The views of Stanisław of Skarbimierz were the basis of the sermon preached on 2 June 1410 in Czerwińsk by Jakub of Kurdwanów, the bishop of Płock. During one of the Holy Masses, the bishop delivered the sermon to the Polish Army, which was supposed to set off in the direction of Prussia:

⁸ Cf. H. Chłopocka, *Tradycja o Pomorzu Gdańskim w zeznaniach świadków na procesach polsko-krzyżackich w XIV i XV wieku* [*The Tradition about Gdańsk Pomerania in the Testimonies of Witnesses at the Polish-Teutonic Knights Trial in the 14th and 15th Centuries*], „Historical Annals” 25 (1959), no. 1, pp. 65–142; idem, *Dotychczasowe edycje „Lites ac res gestae” w świetle krytyki* [*The Previous Editions of “Lites ac res gestae” in the Light of Criticism*], „Studia Źródłoznawcze” [Source Studies], 11(1965), pp. 109–115; idem, *Losy wyroku wydanego na procesie polsko-krzyżackim w Inowrocławiu w 1321 roku* [*The Fate of the Sentence Delivered at the Polish-Teutonic Lawsuit in Inowrocław in 1321*], „Historical Annals” 31 (1965), pp. 153–182; idem, *Procesy Polski z Zakonem Krzyżackim w XIV wieku. Studium Źródłoznawcze* [*The Polish and Teutonic Order Lawsuits in the 14th Century. Source Studies*], Poznań 1967; A. Wojtkowski, *Tezy i argumenty polskie w sprawach terytorialnych z Krzyżakami, cz. 1 (1310–1454)* [*The Polish Theses and Arguments on the Territorial Issues with the Teutonic Order, vol. 1 (1310–1454)*], „Komunikaty Warmińsko-Mazurskie” [*The Warmian-Masurian Announcements*] 1 (1966), pp. 3–98; J. Bieniak, *Przebieg procesu polsko-krzyżackiego z 1339 roku* [*The Course of the Polish-Teutonic Lawsuit in 1339*], „Pamiętnik Biblioteki Kórnickiej” [*Journal of the Library at Kórnik*] 23 (1993), p. 21; W. Sieradzan, *Świadomość historyczna świadków w procesach polsko-krzyżackich w XIV-XV wieku* [*The Historical Awareness of the Witnesses in the Polish-Teutonic Lawsuits in the 14th–15th c.*], Toruń 1993, p. 16; H. Chłopocka, *O protokołach procesów polsko-krzyżackich w XIV i XV wieku* [*On the Records of the Polish-Teutonic Court Proceedings in the 14th and 15th c.*], [in:] *Venerabiles, nobiles et honesti. Studia z dziejów społeczeństwa Polski średniowiecznej. Prace ofiarowane Profesorowi Januszowi Bieniakowi w siedemdziesiątą rocznicę urodzin i czterdziestopięciolecie pracy naukowej* [*Venerabiles, nobiles et honesti. Studies on the History of the Polish Medieval Society. The Works Dedicated to Professor Janusz Bieniak on His 70th Birthday and 45th Anniversary of His Scientific Work*], eds. A. Radziwiński, A. Supruniuk, J. Wroniszewski, Toruń 1997, pp. 421–431; J. Karwasińska, *Proces polsko-krzyżacki w Warszawie przed sześciuset laty* [*The Polish-Teutonic Trial in Warsaw 600 Years Ago*], [in:] idem, *Kujawy i Mazowsze. Wybór pism* [*Kujawy and Mazovia. Review*], Warszawa 1997, pp. 11–28.

⁹ Cf. S. Zajęczkowski, *Polska a zakon krzyżacki w ostatnich latach Władysława Łokietka* [*Poland and the Teutonic Order in the Last Years of Władysław Łokietek*], Lvov 1929, pp. 14–31, 37–45; idem, *Studia nad procesami Polski i Litwy z Zakonem Krzyżackim w l. 1420–1423* [*Studies on the Trials of Poland and Lithuania against the Teutonic Order between 1420 and 1423*], Vilnius 1937, p. 319.

[...] Bishop Jakub [...] spoke to the entire army that gathered in great numbers in the church [...]. He discoursed at great length about a just and unjust war [...] using a lot of evidence he proved that the war fought by the king with the Teutonic Order is just. Using a strange gift of persuasion, he ignited the heart of all the knights to defend the Kingdom and the homeland and to bravely pick a fight against the enemy¹⁰.

Seemingly, this disquisition is a key evidence that among the people from the closest circle of Jagiełło, the terms of just and unjust war were considered and commented upon¹¹.

The theses claimed by Stanisław were also closely related with the anti-Teutonic propaganda spread on the international arena.

Jan Falkenberg, a Dominican, came to the Order's defence, probably because the Order asked about it. In his work *Tractatus doctoris cuiusdam de Prutenis contra Polonos et paganos de potestate papae et imperatoris respectu infidelium*, he condemned the actions of king Władysław Jagiełło which were aiming at a war with other Christians, using the pagan and the infidel¹². These theses overtly harmed the Polish interests:

[...] thou who contribute to the doom of the Poles and their king shall deserve the everlasting life, the world monarchs shall wipe out most of the Poles and their king; the princes and the gentry shall be hung and thou who miss the opportunity to wipe out the Poles and Jagiełło or who help them in the wars with the Christians, commit a mortal sin¹³.

¹⁰ Cf. J. Długosz, *Roczniki czyli Kroniki sławnego Królestwa Polskiego* [Annals, or Chronicles of the Famous Kingdom of Poland], vol. 10 and vol. 11, translated by J. Mrukówna, Warsaw 1982, p. 76:

„[...] biskup Jakub [...] miał do całego wojska, które w bardzo wielkiej liczbie zgromadziło się w świątyni [...]. Rozprawiając bardzo wiele na temat wojny sprawiedliwej i niesprawiedliwej [...] wieloma jasnymi dowodami wykazał, że wojna podjęta przez króla z Krzyżakami jest jak najbardziej słuszna. Dziwnym darem przekonywania zapalił serca wszystkich słuchających rycerzy do obrony Królestwa i ojczyzny i do podjęcia mężnie walki z wrogiem”.

¹¹ L. Ehrlich, *Polski wykład prawa wojny...* [A Polish Lecture on the Laws of War...], p. 13; idem, *Paweł Włodkowic i Stanisław ze Skarbimierza...* [Paweł Włodkowic and Stanisław of Skarbimierz...], p. 52.

¹² H. Boockmann, *Johannes Falkenberg, der Deutsche Orden und die polnische Politik, Veröffentlichungen des Max-Planck-Instituts für Geschichte*, Bd. 45, Göttingen 1975, pp. 155–179.

¹³ Cf. L. Ehrlich, *Rektor Paweł Włodkowic rzecznik obrony przeciw Krzyżakom* [Rector Paweł Włodkowic, the Defence Advocate Against the Teutonic Knights] Cracow 1963, p. 28:

„[...] kto powstanie na zgubę Polaków i ich króla zasłuży na żywot wieczny, monarchowie świata powinni Polaków z ich królem czegoś brak a przynajmniej większość z nich wytępić, książąt

All these anti-Polish actions illustrated the need of defence of the Polish reason of state¹⁴ and became the fundamental element of the Polish international politics¹⁵.

As J. Nikodem rightly noticed:

In order to really feel as a winner in the war 1409–1411, and to hope that in the next few years it is possible to weaken the Teutonic Knights even more, Jagiełło had to additionally win a diplomatic and propaganda war on the European forum, simultaneously depriving the Order of allies or at least minimising positive action of the Teutonic allies. Otherwise, all the successes could be acknowledged only as temporary and uncertain¹⁶ [own translation – A.N.]

The attacks on the international area stood in opposition to the theses claimed by Stanisław, who expressed his certitude that one who fights a just war, even against the Christians, has a full right to benefit from the aid of the pagan and the heretics¹⁷.

i szlachtę powywieszać, a grzech śmiertelny popełniają ci, którzy mając sposobność ukroćć Polaków i Jagiełłę, nie czynią tego lub pomagają im w wojnach z chrześcijanami”.

¹⁴ Simon of Teramo was involved on behalf of Poland, especially against the views of Jan Falkenberg. Cf. K. Ożóg, *Szymon z Teramo adwokat polski w stolicy apostolskiej i na soborach w Konstancji i Bazylei* [Simon of Teramo, a Polish Defence Lawyer in the Holy See at the Council of Constance and Basel], „Nasza Przyszłość” [Our Past] 78 (1992), pp. 172–175.

¹⁵ M. Muszkat, *Teorie wojen sprawiedliwych i niesprawiedliwych w Polskiej myśli społecznej ubiegłych wieków* [The Theories of Just and Unjust Wars in the Polish Social Thought in the Past Centuries], „Myśl Wojskowa” [Military Thought] 11 (1951), pp. 14–27.

¹⁶ „Żeby rzeczywiście poczuć się zwycięzcą w wojnie z lat 1409–1411 i móc żywić nadzieję, że w kolejnych latach Krzyżaków da się jeszcze bardziej osłabić, Jagiełło musiał dodatkowo wygrać z nimi wojnę dyplomatyczną i propagandową na forum europejskim, pozbawiając tym samym zakon sprzymierzeńców albo przynajmniej zmniejszając korzystne dla Krzyżaków oddziaływanie tych sprzymierzeńców. W przeciwnym bowiem razie wszelkie sukcesy mogły być uznawane jedynie za sukcesy tymczasowe i wysoce niepewne”. Cf. J. Nikodem, *Witold. Wielkie Księzę Litewski* [Vytautas, the Grand Duchy of Lithuania] (1354 or 1355 – 27 October 1430), Cracow 2013, p. 296.

¹⁷ Stanisław of Skarbimierz, *De bellis iustis*, paragraph 29 and 47; Note: Revocatur in dubium a plerisque, an liceat serenissimo principi ... regi Poloniae pro defensione sui status uti favore haereticorum et eos secum in bello habere ad offensam christianorum, ed. L. Ehrlich, *Polski wykład prawa wojny...* [A Polish Lecture on the Law of War...], paragraph 119; L. Ehrlich, *Paweł Włodkowic...*, p. 28; The thesis was also put forward in the works of Paweł Włodkowic. Cf. T. Jasudowicz, *Śladami Ehrlicha: do Pawła Włodkowica po naukę o prawach człowieka* [In the Ehrlich's Footstep: from Paweł Włodkowic to Human Rights Science], Toruń 1995, pp. 149 and 159; K. Tymieniecki, *Moralność w stosunkach między państwami w poglądach Pawła Włodkowica* [Morality

In the context of the issue discussed, the legal results of a just war presented by Stanisław are highly important; mainly legitimacy of killing¹⁸, the issue of loot, plunder (where prisoners of war should be mentioned as well). What is highly important as far as an unjust war is concerned, is the matter of responsibility and of damages (compensation), which e.g. in the case of prisoners of war in captivity means that they are ransomed¹⁹.

The words of Stanisław of Skarbimierz can serve as a reference point in the issue of the responsibility to redress the damage when this type of war is fought :

[...] the person who starts an unjust war not only is responsible for all the damage caused to the enemy by themselves or their (lieges), but also will be responsible to their own people for the damage caused by the enemy. When such a person unfairly caused damage, they will not be redeemed if they do not provide compensation. Thou who create an opportunity to (cause) damage is also considered as a person who inflicted damage. That is why thou shall fear who fight without no reason against the kingdom or province. Every deviation shall be remedied and every unjustly inflicted damage shall be repaired; or, at least, under threat of a danger to a soul, one will have to compensate a person who is not compensated enough now²⁰.

in the Relations Between the Countries in the Views of Paweł Włodkowic], „Przegląd Historyczny” [Historical Review] 22 (1919–1920), p. 9.

¹⁸ Stanisław does not embark on a detailed discussion on taking or saving one's life during a war. This issue was further elaborated on by a theoretician of international law, Francisco de Vitoria, who claimed that during a fight it is permitted to kill all the enemies, after a victory – not all of them, but pro rata to culpability. Sometimes, one must kill all the winners, but rather the infidel than the Christians, also on the pro rata basis, and if they did not fight in good faith. Cf. Francisco de Vitoria, *De iure belli*, § 45. As cited in: L. Ehrlich, *Polski wykład prawa wojny...* [A Polish Lecture on the Law of War...], p. 64.

Si fuerit nocentes interfici possunt, servata aequitate. Sed quia in bello multa iure gentium constituta sunt, videtur receptum consuetudine et usu belli, ut captive parta Victoria nisi forte sint profugae et periculo transeunte non interficiantur, et servandum est ius gentium eo modo, quo inter bonos viros srvari consuetum est. Cf. L. Ehrlich, *Polski wykład prawa wojny...* [A Polish Lecture on the Law of War...], pp. 64–65.

¹⁹ On the issues addressed in the sermon of Stanisław of Skarbimierz cf. W. K. Roman, *Międzynarodowe prawo wojenne w piśmiennictwie historycznym, historyczno-wojskowym i publicystyce okresu staropolskiego* [International Law of War in the Historical and Military-Historical Literature and in the Journalism of the Old Polish Period], „Studia z dziejów polskiej historiografii wojskowej” [Studies on the History of Polish Military Historiography], vol. 9, Poznań 2005, pp. 11–13.

²⁰ L. Ehrlich, *Polski wykład prawa wojny...* [A Polish Lecture on the Law of War...], p. 113: „[...] wszczynający wojnę niesprawiedliwą nie tylko odpowiada za wszystkie szkody wyrządzone przeciwnikowi przez siebie lub swoich (poddanych), lecz także odpowiadać będzie wobec własnych

The message of a sermon of Stanisław of Skarbimierz was used in practice after the defeat at Grunwald. The damages required by the Polish side, in the form of the ransom paid for freeing prisoners of war, included the compensation treated as indemnity for the cost of war²¹. As W. K. Roman rightly noticed, the duty of compensation for the unjust war was a sheer novelty in the legislative solutions of the time, which were *nota bene* codified in the international relations only in the second half of the 19th century²².

Paweł Włodkowic²³ held a very similar view on a war doctrine and all the issues related to it. Both he and the author of *De bellis iustis* lived at the same time.

Paweł Włodkowic aimed at convincing the international opinion about the rightness of the activity of the Jagiellonian monarchy, and simultaneously he wanted to condemn the Teutonic policy of the time²⁴. At the Council

ludzi za szkody wyrządzone przez przeciwnika. Bo gdy taki niesprawiedliwie spowodował szkodę, w żaden sposób nie będzie zbawiony, jeżeli nie da zadośćuczynienia. Kto bowiem daje sposobność (powstania) szkody, uważany jest za takiego, który szkodę wyrządził. I dlatego wiele niech obawia się ten, kto walczy bezzasadnie przeciw królestwu czy prowincji. Trzeba bowiem właśnie, aby wszelkie skrzywienie było przywrócone do równości i aby wszelka szkoda niesprawiedliwie wyrządzona była naprawiona; albo przynajmniej, pod grozą niebezpieczeństwa dla duszy, aby w przyszłości zadośćuczyniono temu, komu w pełni nie uczyniono zadość już teraz”.

²¹ Cf. A. Niewiński, *Jenietwo wojenne w późnym średniowieczu. Studia nad problematyką zjawiska w Polsce w kontekście zachodnioeuropejskim* [*Prisoners of War in the Late Middle Ages. Studies on the Problematic Aspects in Poland in the Context of Western Europe*], Lublin 2015, pp. 240–246.

²² W. K. Roman, *Międzynarodowe prawo wojenne...* [*International Law of War...*], p. 13. Although the activity and the views held by Stanisław of Skarbimierz and Paweł Włodkowic were absolutely pioneering in the matter of the law of war, they were not appreciated enough neither at the time nor in the subsequent centuries. On the reasons of such a situation cf. S. Wielgus, *Polska średniowieczna doktryna ius gentium* [*The Medieval Polish Doctrine: Ius Gentium*], Lublin 1996, pp. 47–49. The sermon *De bellis iustis* was first published in print only in the second half of the 19th c. by L. Ehrlich.

However, it is amazing how the theses claimed by Stanisław of Skarbimierz and Paweł Włodkowic meet with lack of interest and are not used in the latest historiography. Cf. e.g. G. Minois, *Kościół i wojna. Od czasów Biblii do ery atomowej* [*Church and War. From the Biblical Times to the Nuclear Era*], Warsaw 1998, where the author wrote the entire chapter: *Od wojny świętej do wojny sprawiedliwej (XIII–XV wiek)* [*From the Holy to the Just War (13th – 15th c.)*] and did not make any reference to the views of Polish medieval scholars.

²³ His works heavily influenced writing activity of Jan Długosz. Cf. S. F. Belch, *Paweł Włodkowic jako historyk i jego wpływ na Długosza*, [*Paweł Włodkowic as a Historian and His Influence on Długosz*] „Teki Historyczne” [*Historical File*] 10 (1959), pp. 75–101.

²⁴ S. Wielgus, *Polska średniowieczna doktryna...* [*The Medieval Polish Doctrine...*], pp. 43–45.

of Constance²⁵, the scholar, among other participants of the Council, presented the work²⁶ whose title is derived from the first word of the text *Saevientibus*. In this work he indicated the genesis and historical outline of the Order in Prussia and its further history. According to Włodkowic the Teutonic Order:

violently attack the Poles, especially their donors, who have been Christians for a long time; they keep their donors prisoner, they treat disgracefully Christian dukes who endowed the Order, and they called for help of a huge crowd of the faithful to Christ, pretending as if it were against the infidel; although, enhancing appearances, they oppose the power against the Polish Catholic king, they invade with hostility the Kingdom of Poland, they destroy some towns and burn other to ashes, they sack and rape and many other vile things happen there, which are not to be put in writing here²⁷.

²⁵ At the Council of Constance, the Polish diplomacy brought not only the world-view issues (a just war), but also very specific matters, describing, among others, bestial approach of the Teutonic Order towards the captured opponent: "[...] Isti enim non tamen de isto principe [Korygiełło – completed A. N.] sed de aliis et notabilibus illustribus et ingenuis viris christianissimis similia patrauerunt, quoscumque in conflictu captos habere potuerunt nulli enim parcunt seu pepercerunt, quin omnes diversarum penarum martiriis ignominiose afficiunt, aliquos submergunt, aliquos membratim delacerant et alios penetratis tibiis in arboribus sursum levatis pedibus, capitibus vero deorsum missis suspendentes sagittis transfixos tamquam ericios (sic) iaculis repleverunt; et postea taliter affectos martirio truncabant capitibus et bestiis ad vescendum exponebant. Re vera, non est auditum a seculis, quod inter barbaros et paganos tanta vigeret crudelitas et inhumanitas tam horribilis et austera; quoscumque enim ad fidem propagandam utiliores sentiunt et senserunt, hos crudelius persequerentur et persequi non desistunt". Por. *Codex epistolaris Vitoldi*. Appendix, no. VI: *Z procesu polsko-krzyżackiego na soborze Konstancyeńskim 1416 r.* [*On the Polish-Teutonic Trial at the Council of Constance 1415*] a). A bill of indictment from the part of Poles, p. 1010. In the indictment, this inexorability, which did not correspond to the ethos of chivalry, Christian morality and to the traditional, fixed behavioural norms, was the main point of the complaint presented to the international society.

²⁶ On the activity of Włodkowic at the Council of Constance cf. S. F. Bełch, *Paulus Vladimiri and his doctrine concerning international law and politics*, vol. 1, London-Hague-Paris 1965, pp. 115–155.

²⁷ L. Ehrlich, *Pisma wybrane Pawła Włodkowica* [*Selected Writings of Paweł Włodkowic*], vol. 1, Warsaw 1968, pp. 4–5:

„którzy z dawna są chrześcijanami, zwłaszcza swych fundatorów, bardzo srodze napadają, więżą swych darczyńców, bardzo haniebnie postępują z książętami chrześcijańskimi, którzy uposażali ich zakon a wezwawszy sobie na pomoc liczny tłum wiernych Chrystusowi, przybierając pozory jak gdyby (to było) przeciw niewiernym, choć upiększywszy pozory, wystawiają potęgę przeciw katolickiemu królowi Polski, najeżdżają wrogo królestwo Polski, burzą grody, inne obracają w perzynę, łupią, gwałcą i dzieje się tam wiele innych niegodziwych rzeczy, które pióro z trudnością mogłoby wyrazić”.

Moreover, after Lithuania adopted Christianity and formed the union with Poland

[...] the Teutonic Knights [...] were concerned that they lost an opportunity to occupy the property and countries of the said (people), with greater doggedness they invade a number of times and, one by one, as usual, cruelly kill the converted, clergymen, and others [...] they burn their new churches and commit innumerable things that will not be mentioned for the sake of honesty.²⁸

Paweł Włodkowic also acted against the theses claimed by Falkenberg in his treaty *Quoniam error*²⁹. He made a reference to the arrangements of Stanisław of Skarbimierz, indicating the errors in the Teutonic policy, which lied in fighting consistent unjust wars. The crux of the matter was forceful Christianising the countries considered as barbarian. In this case, violence stands for stubborn sticking to evil and requires strong opposition from the Christian society. According to Włodkowic, it is prohibited to torment the pagan with war or to invade them, unconditionally and directly occupy their countries to spread faith³⁰. This thesis was explicitly in opposition to the main aim of the Order, which was the war with the pagan on the Prussian lands, on which the Holy See expressly consented, as it was supported with the argument of defence of Christianity on the occupied areas³¹. The brethren of the German Order considered themselves to be *milites*

²⁸ Ibid, p. 4:

„[...] krzyżacy [...] zmartwieni, że przepadła im w ten sposób okazja zajmowania posiadłości i państw rzeczonych (ludzi), z większą zawziętością najeżdżają wielokrotnie i raz po raz zwykłym zwyczajem wspomnianych nawróconych i tak kapłanów jak również innych [...] okrutnie zabijają, palą ich nowiutkie kościoły i popełniają niezliczone rzeczy, o których uczciwość każe zamilczeć”.

²⁹ Ibid, vol. 2, pp. 216–409.

³⁰ L. Ehrlich, *Pisma wybrane Pawła Włodkowica* [Selected Writings of Paweł Włodkowic], vol. 2, Warsaw 1966, p. 303.

³¹ Cf. *Preussisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 1, part 1, no. 75, pp. 55–56; no. 88, p. 67; no. 89, p. 69; no. 95, p. 71; no. 98, p. 73; no. 101, p. 75; *Preussisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 1, part 2, Königsberg 1909, no. 18, p. 12; no. 83, p. 75; no. 109, p. 98; no. 201, p. 156; no. 270, p. 192; no. 510, p. 320; no. 655, p. 414; no. 715, p. 446. To see more on this topic cf.. K. Kwiatkowski, *Wzorzec krucjaty „litewskiej” w piśmiennictwie kręgu zakonu krzyżackiego i jego przemiany w XIV wieku* [The Model of the “Lithuanian” Crusade in the Teutonic Order Literature and its Transformations in the 14th c.], [in:] *Pierwsze polsko-czeskie forum młodych mediewistów. Materiały z konferencji naukowej Gniezno 27–29 września 2005 roku* [The First Polish and Czech Forum of Young Mediaevalists. Materials from the Scientific Conference, Gniezno 27–29 September, 2005], eds. J. Dobosz, J. Kujawiński, M. Matla-Kozłowska, Poznań 2007, p. 245 and note 9 and 115.

*Christi*³². According to Włodkowic, “neither pope nor tsar hold right to authorise the Order to wage wars, whenever they want or confer power or ownership to what used to belong to the pagan”³³.

Moreover, Paweł Włodkowic claimed that a side that is wrongfully attacked is allowed to ask the pagan and the infidel for help. Additionally, when the pagan live in peace, it is forbidden to display any aggression towards them, and if they are assaulted unfairly, they have the full right to defence. An eminent lawyer, Andrzej Łaskarz, got involved in defence of the pagan against military aggression. He proved that nobody shall be converted by force³⁴. All those who support unjust wars waged for these reasons shall be condemned. “Those” obviously referred to all the knights from Western Europe who arrived in Prussia and helped the Teutonic Knights³⁵. Thriving propaganda spread in Western Europe, which highlighted religious motivation, including the defence of Christianity

³² Cf. *Preussisches Urkundenbuch*, vol. 1, part 1, no. 77, p. 57, letter dated 17 March 1230: „Quia religiosam vitam eligentibus congrua consideratione prospiciendum est et providendum, ne umquam a dei servicio et devotine per illicitas controversias abstrahantur, et maxime militibus Christi, qui personas suas pro Christi amore periculo supponere non formidant: ideo nos zelum dei habentes, ad honorem et commodum sancte ecclesie dei, milites Christi, scilicet fratres de domo Teuthonicorum Jerosolimitana, qui inimicis Christi audacter resistunt et eos etiam fortiter impugnant...”

³³ L. Ehrlich, *Pisma wybrane Pawła Włodkowica* [*Selected Writings of Paweł Włodkowic*], vol. 1, p. 56.

³⁴ J. Tazbir, *Tolerancja – wiek XV-XVI* [*Tolerance – 15th–16th c.*], [in:] *Uniwersalizm i swoistość kultury polskiej* [*Universalism and Specificity of the Polish Culture*], ed. J. Kłoczowski, Lublin 1989, p. 136. On the activity of Andrzej Łaskarz cf. K. Ożóg, *Udział Andrzeja Łaskarza w sprawach i sporach polsko-krzyżackich do soboru w Konstancji* [*Participation of Adam Łaskarzyc in the Polish-Teutonic Matters and Disputes until the Council of Constance*] [in:] *Polska i jej sąsiedzi w późnym średniowieczu* [*Poland and its Neighbours in the Late Middle Ages*], Cracow 2000, pp. 159–186.

³⁵ K. Tymieniecki, *Moralność w stosunkach między państwami w poglądach Pawła Włodkowica* [*Morality in the Relations Among the Countries According to the views of Paweł Włodkowic*], „Przegląd Historyczny” [*Historical Review*] 22 (1919–1920), pp. 1–27. However, one should remember that also the Polish knights in the 14th c. still supported the Teutonic Order in this type of military activity. Cf. Zob. K. Górski, *Udział Polaków w krzyżackich rejsach na Litwę w latach 40. i 80. XIV w.* [*Participation of the Poles in the Teutonic Plundering Raids on Lithuania in the 40's and 80's of the 14th c.*], „Zapiski Historyczne” [*Historical Records*] 52 (1987), cf. 3, pp. 39–58; A. Supruniuk, *U kresu wypraw krzyżowych. Udział rycerzy i stronników mazowieckich w krzyżackich rejsach na Litwę na podstawie XIV-wiecznych herbarzy* [*At the End of the Teutonic Expeditions. Participation of the Knights and Mazovian Supporters in the Teutonic Plundering Raids on Lithuania on the Basis of the 14th – c. Armorial*], „Teki Historyczne” [*Historical File*] 21 (1994–1995), pp. 52–83; idem, *O wyprawach do Prus rycerzy Polskich i wojnie domowej w Koronie w latach 1382–1385* [*On the Expeditions of the Polish Knights to Prussia and on the Civil War in the Crown between 1382–1385*], „Zapiski Historyczne” [*Historical Records*] 65 (2000), no. 2, pp. 31–54.

against the infidel, caused the influx of the knights from the West to Prussia³⁶. It was reputed to participate in the war with the pagan³⁷ to be up in arms against Christian Poland. Włodkowic clearly indicated that the armed forces of Jagiełło became a tool in the God's hands to defend justice and freedom and that at the battle of Grunwald God won using the Poles³⁸.

His stance was respected by other Italian lawyers³⁹, where worth mentioning is e.g. Simon of Teramo⁴⁰. It is noted that some of theologians and thinkers insistently supported the side of the Teutonic Order e.g. the Frenchman, Pierre

³⁶ This rhetoric was used from the very beginning of the Order's activity in Prussia. Cf. T. Jurkowlaniec, *Europejskie znaczenie wypraw do Prus [European Meaning of the Expeditions to Prussia]*, „Komunikaty Warmińsko-Mazurskie” [The Warmian-Masurian Announcements] 1992, no. 1, pp. 65–69.

³⁷ The question of the pagan occupied the central place in the propaganda of the Order. In order to use the analogy to the era of crusade, the pagans, with whom the Teutonic Knights fight, as the enemy of the Order are called the Turks, the Lithuanians are called the Saracens and Witold is described as the king of Saracens. Cf. *Aus französischen Chroniken: Chronique du religieux de Saint-Denys*, [in:] SRP, p. 3, p. 453: „Mense eciam sequenti christianorum casum lamentabilem et procul dubio dolendum et, qualiter in Prussia christini infauste dimicaverunt contra Turcos, missus a religiosis regi eciam nunciavit [...]. Nuper rex Cracovie christianus, fratris suis regis Sarraceni vallidis victus precibus, bladorum copiam per Prusciam mittere disposuerat et infra loricas et instrumenta bellica abscondi fecerat, unde trecenti viri armari poterant. Quod cum ad noticiam dominorum Pruscie pervenisset, attendentes id fore illicitum christianis, quod armis muniant Sarracenos...”. No wonder that even after the battle at Grunwald, a Burgundian aristocrat that arrives in Prussia, Gilbert de Lannoy, calls the pagan „the Saracens”. Cf. *Aus niederlandischen Quellen: Aus den Voyages de Guillebert de Lannoy 1412*, [in:] ibid, p. 445. On the same topic cf. A. Niewiński, *Podróżnik i król. Gilbert de Lannoy na dworze króla Władysława Jagiełły [A Traveller and a King. Gilbert de Lannoy at Władysław Jagiełło's Court]*, „Roczniki Humanistyczne” [Historical Annals] 61 (2013), no. 2, pp. 25–39.

³⁸ Jagiełło, writing the letter to Queen Anna from the battlefield on 16 July, invokes divine driving force (cf. *Scriptores Rerum Prussicarum*, vol. 3, eds. T. Hirsch, M. Töppen, E. Strehle, Leipzig 1866, pp. 425–426). Jagiełło sent a letter in a similar vein to the archbishop of Gniezno, Mikołaj Kurowski (cf. E. Schnippel, *Vom Streitplatz zum Tannenberge*, „Prussia” 31 (1935) Anhang, pp. 65–67). As it was rightly noted, it was dated 16 July, although it includes information about what happened two days later, i.e. 18 July. The same happened in the case of the letter to the bishop of Poznań, Wojciech Jastrzębiec (cf. *Dopełnienie Szamotulskie [Supplement of Szamotuły]*, [in:] *Monumenta Poloniae Historica*, ed. A. Bielowski, vol. 2, Warsaw 1961, pp. 866–867) also written on that day. Cf. S. Ekdahl, *Grunwald 1410. Studia nad tradycją i źródłami [Grunwald 1410. Studies on Tradition and Sources]*, translated by M. Dorna, Cracow 2010, pp. 132–134, note 89–95.

³⁹ K. Ożóg, *Współpraca prawników włoskich z Pawłem Włodkowicem w procesie polsko-krzyżackim w Rzymie w latach 1420–1421 [Cooperation of the Italian Lawyers with Paweł Włodkowic in the Polish-Teutonic Lawsuit in Rome between 1420 and 1421]*, „Nasza Przyszłość” [Our Past] 76 (1991), pp. 83–105. This cooperation developed in the subsequent years.

⁴⁰ He participated in the Council of Constance and Basel. Cf. K. Ożóg, *Szymon z Teramo adwokat polski... [Simon of Teramo, a Polish Defence Lawyer...]*, pp. 169–185.

d'Ailly⁴¹, encouraged the knights from Flanders and France to defend the idea of spreading Christianity by the Teutonic Order and called the knights to participate in crusades against Poland⁴².

The fight for respect of the Polish reason of state, which was to prove the rightness of the Polish issue confronted with the Order, had its followers and continuators. The issue of the just war was brought by Benedykt Hesse⁴³, one of the most eminent Polish medieval theologians and philosophers. In his work *Commentum in Evangelium s. Matthaei*, he describes the issue of *Utrum iustum fuerit bellum inter eum Christum et diabolum*, where he mentions the necessary conditions to declare a just war⁴⁴. One of the conditions is a claim that the aim of the war is striving for justice and compensation for the damage inflicted by the enemy⁴⁵.

Paweł Włodkowic and Stanisław of Skarbimierz had to be knowledgeable about the extent of immoral acts and damage inflicted to the Polish people by the Teutonic Knights, who already at the time of Władysław Łokietek organised the military forays on Poland and very often cruelly treated the prisoners of war⁴⁶ and the civilian population, committed robberies and caused damage. A legal consequence of these events were Polish-Teutonic trials⁴⁷. They were not mean-

⁴¹ Z. Kałuża, *Ailly Piotr d'*, [entry in:] *Powszechna encyklopedia filozofii* [*The Universal Encyclopaedia of Philosophy*], Lublin 2000, pp. 87–90 (ref.).

⁴² K. Górski, *Zakon Krzyżacki a powstanie państwa pruskiego* [*The Teutonic Order and Creation of Prussia*], Wrocław 1977, pp. 122–123.

⁴³ S. Wielgus, *Benedykt Hesse*, [entry in:] *Encyklopedia Katolicka* [*Catholic Encyclopaedia*], vol. 6, joint publication, Lublin 1993, column 812–814.

⁴⁴ These are, among others, the days when its forbidden to conduct any military activity, the issue of war and peace, the issue of retaliation.

⁴⁵ „...quia etiam contra Saracenos et barbaras gentes volentes nobiscum quiete agere et iura nostra non auferre, bellum committere non debemus, ut notat quaedam”. As cited in: S. Wielgus, *Polska średniowieczna doktryna...* [*The Medieval Polish Doctrine...*], p. 56, note 123.

⁴⁶ On this topic cf. A. Niewiński, *Problematyka militarnej niewoli w okresie zmagania polsko-krzyżackich (1327–1332)* [*The Issue of the Military Captivity at the Time of the Polish-Teutonic Struggle (1327–1332)*], “Roczniki Humanistyczne” [Historical Annals] 60 (2012), pp. 5–21.

⁴⁷ Violence and invasion of the Teutonic Knights on the Polish territory, which stands in opposition to the law, naturally resulted in the condemnation of the Order and, as a consequence, in demand for justice and compensation. During the Warsaw lawsuit in 1339, the Polish party demanded i.a. financial compensation from the Order. It was a result of the Teutonic aggression, occupation of Kujawy and Dobrzyń Land, massive destruction in Greater Poland, Sieradz Land and Łęczyca Land between 1329–1332.

In the sources, we can find specific sums due to the Church and to the Polish king. As a result of takeover of the territories occupied by the Teutonic Knights (Chełm, Michałów, Inowrocław, Brzesko and Dobrzyńska Land), the compensation for the Polish king was supposed to amount to 194 500 grzywna polska [*the Polish currency at the time- TN*], for the archbishop of Gniezno 10 800 grzywna, and for the bishop of Poznań 8 200 grzywna. Cf. *Lites* I, pp. 82–84; *Kodeks*

ingful because these Polish-Teutonic disputes were effectively torpedoed and even spectacularly boycotted by the Order⁴⁸.

The activity of Włodkowic, Stanisław of Skarbimierz and other eminent Poles on the international area, although undoubtedly essential from the diplomatic point of view, were not sufficient. The subsequent trials with the Teutonic Order were equally unsatisfactory⁴⁹. That is why Władysław Jagiełło, also by his own activity, tried to show the Christian world the examples of the respect toward the international law. The confirmation of this behaviour was expressed by the signs of humanitarian behaviour towards the captured Teutonic prisoners of war in the military actions, especially in 1410. We should remember that at that time, the participants of the wars with Poland were mostly mercenary

dypłomatyczny Wielkopolski [Diplomatic Code of Greater Poland], eds. I. Zakrzewski, F. Piekosiński, vol. 2, no. 1192. Additionally, destruction caused on the territory that was not occupied by the Teutonic Knights triggered loss amounting to 115 000 grzywna polska. Cf. Lites I, pp. 94–98. Cf. J. Bieniak, *Przebieg procesu polsko krzyżackiego z 1339 roku [The Course of the Polish-Teutonic Lawsuit in 1339]*, „Pamiętnik Biblioteki Kórnickiej” [Journal of the Library at Kórnik] 23 (1993), pp. 15–16. Włodkowic was perfectly familiar with the claims from the Polish party at that time. He wrote: “...the issue of the damage caused several times by the Teutonic Knights to the Kingdom of Poland and to the kings at different times, and this damage is so extensive, substantial and almost infinite that it is impossible to correctly estimate it”. Cf. L. Ehrlich, *Pisma wybrane Pawła Włodkowica [Selected Writings of Paweł Włodkowic]*, vol. 3, Warsaw 1969, p. 2. During the trials between Poland and the Order in the years 1420–1423, in the final list of the claims, the Polish party i.a. demanded the condemnation of the wars declared by the Teutonic Knights against Poland and of the invasions of the Polish territory and demanded that they should pay 80.000 grzywna srebra by way of war reparation or the same sum by way of the costs incurred by Poland for the defence against the Teutonic forays. Cf. S. Zajączkowski, *Studia nad procesami Polski i Litwy z Zakonem Krzyżackim...* [Studies on the Poland's and Lithuanian's Trials against the Teutonic Order..], p. 392.

⁴⁸ The Order ignored the Polish claims, especially demands for the financial compensation. For instance, in the Polish-Teutonic lawsuit in 1339, when the verdict was being announced on 15 September in the St. John's Church in Warsaw, a Teutonic Procurator was absent. He appeared only when the verdict was read out, which was a purposeful demonstration. The Grand Master also avoided appearing (despite the personal summon) even in the Roman Curia, in order to continue a lawsuit in Avignon. Cf. J. Bieniak, *Przebieg procesu polsko krzyżackiego...* [The Course of the Polish-Teutonic Lawsuit..], pp. 18–19. As H. Chłopocka accurately noticed, the Teutonic party did not call any witnesses in 1339, which is a proof of disrespect towards the trial by the Order, which questioned the subject matter of the dispute, while a Teutonic Procurator informed that he does not care neither about a record of court proceedings nor about a diploma including a closing sentence. Cf. H. Chłopocka, *Świadkowie procesu polsko-krzyżackiego w 1339 r. [The Witnesses of the Polish-Teutonic Lawsuit in 1339]*, „Pamiętnik Biblioteki Kórnickiej” [Journal of the Library at Kórnik] 23 (1993), pp. 31–32.

⁴⁹ The trials with the Teutonic Order that started in the middle of the 14th c., continued in the 15th c. As S. Zajączkowski claimed: “...Poland has never attained its goals by way of law-suits”. Cf. S. Zajączkowski, *Studia nad procesami Polski i Litwy z Zakonem Krzyżackim [Studies on the Poland's and Lithuanian's Trials against the Teutonic Order]*, pp. 3 and 401.

knights, so-called guests of the Order. Undoubtedly, behaviour towards them was an element of conscious foreign policy and was consistent with the theses formulated by Stanisław of Skarbimierz and his followers⁵⁰. It is proved by the speech to the knights, the guests of the Order, who were captured near Koronowo. The speech was mentined by Długosz. The king

[...] proved how his claims are explicitly and highly justified and fair and how Teutonic acts are full of vileness and injustice. When he accused them that they did not act rightly, and that they take up arms in the unjust matter, he got an answer from the prisoners of war that if they had had a possibility to recognize the vileness of the Order and the rightness of the king's issue, they would have never joined this unfortunate war and would not have taken up arms against the king in defence of the Order⁵¹.

The need of Jagiełło's propaganda activity towards the prisoners of war is proved by the fact that the Teutonic Order even after the defeat at Grunwald was able to revive in the military aspect. The Teutonic invasion of Poland in 1431 may serve as an example here. The results of this invasion were visible not only on the plane of the military and political relations during the war in 1435, but also in the social sphere – the invasion was a significant shock for the society of the Northern Crown. It made them realize that a threat from the side of the Order was still considerable and dangerous. It also made them think that it still has a treacherous attitude towards Poland⁵². This awareness is visible in the letter from 1432 of Paweł Włodkowic, who came from Dobrzyń Land,

⁵⁰ Cf. A. Niewiński, *Bezpieczeństwo dzięki wojnie i dyplomacji. Przykład polityki Władysława Jagiełły* [Security Thanks to the War and Diplomacy. The example of Władysław Jagiełło's Policy], [in:] *Polska w euroatlantyckiej strefie bezpieczeństwa* [Poland in the Euroatlantic Safety Zone], eds. Z. Trejnis, R. Radziejowski, Warsaw 2014, pp. 241–252.

⁵¹ Długosz, *Roczniki...* [Annals...], vol. 10 and vol. 11, 1406–1412, Warsaw 1982, pp. 180–181: „[...] dowodził, jak wielką, rzucającą się w oczy sprawiedliwością i słusnością odznaczają się jego pretensje, a jaką niegodziwością i niesprawiedliwością są przepełnione czyny krzyżackie. Kiedy im potem zarzucił, że nie postąpili słusznie, że chwycili za broń w niesłusznej sprawie, otrzymał od jeńców odpowiedź, że gdyby mieli możność poznania niegodziwości Zakonu i słusności sprawy króla, nigdy by się nie przyłączyli do tej nieszczęsnej wojny i nie chwycili za broń przeciw królowi w obronie Zakonu”.

⁵² On this invasion cf. M. Biskup, *Najazd krzyżacki na Polskę i bitwa pod Dąbkami 1431 r.* [The Teutonic Invasion of Poland and the Battle of Dąbki in 1431], [in:] *Studia historyczne. Stanisławowi Herbstowi na sześćdziesięciolecie urodzin* [Historical Studies. In Honour of Stanisław Herbst for His Sixtieth Birthday], Warsaw, 1967, p. 27.

to bishop Zbigniew Oleśnicki⁵³. In the letter, the author expressed his regret over the destruction of Dobrzyń and Kujawy Land. He also condemned hypocrisy and duplicity of the Order.

Summary

In the context of the issues discussed, it is possible to notice that the stance of the Polish party in the disputes with the Teutonic Knights, which was created with the utmost effort and despite the lawsuits and involvement of many eminent, learned lawyers, did not make possible to settle the current and long-standing disputes in favour of the Polish party. However, subsequent, consistent activity in the diplomatic and military area was necessary.

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⁵³ K. Górski, „Ostatnie słowo” Pawła Włodkowica o Zakonie Krzyżackim z roku 1432 [„Final Word” of Paweł Włodkowic about the Teutonic Order], „Zapiski Historyczne” [Historical Records] 29 (1964), no. 2, pp. 161–162.

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The Polish-Moldavian conflict (1506)

The feuds on the Polish-Moldavian borderland lasted ceaselessly until the end of Casimir Jagiellon rule. The essential sources of conflict was Pokuttya – Ruthenian lands abutted Moldavian territories. Moldavian aspiration for sovereign principality, line of succession to the Suceava throne and the conception of alliance between the Crown of the Kingdom of Poland and the Principality also triggered tensions. The alliance was supposed to be set through the marriage between Princess Elżbieta of Jagiellons and the ruler of Moldavia, which Queen Mother Elżbieta Habsburg decisively withstood.

The obstacle of her opposition unexpectedly faded away during the parley in Suceava on August 30th, 1505 when Queen Mother died. Hospodar Bogdan III The One-Eyed, immediately notified about the death of the Queen¹, considered his potential marriage certain and began preparations for the wedding ceremonies².

Meanwhile, the vast majority of the Crown's nobility (after Bogdan III reimbursed Pokuttya) regarded foregoing marriage as an act of perilous provocation toward Turkey and even Hungary, inasmuch Władysław II Jagiellon also remonstrated on the sister's marriage³. Noblemen considered maintaining friendship with Hospodar necessary, but excluded completing the condition of marriage (this attitude was represented inter alia by Primate Boryszewski, Spytek of Jarosław the Castellan of Cracow and Cracovian Voivode Jan Feliks of Tarnow)⁴. A part of Lesser Poland's (especially Ruthenian) highborns, led by Chodecki family, expressed a bold idea that it is sensible to wait for a suitable moment and incorporate Moldavia. Subsequently they were distinctly opposing the princess'

¹ [...] *natychmiast o śmierci królowej wiadomym uczyniony*. [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska Marcina Kromera biskupa warmińskiego ksiąg XXX*, transl. M. Błażowski, Sanok 1857, p. 1369.

² Z. Spieralski *Kampania obertyńska 1531 roku*, Warszawa 1962, p. 75.

³ Z. Spieralski, *Awantury mołdawskie*, Warszawa 1967, p. 68.

⁴ Z. Spieralski, *Kampania obertyńska*, p. 76; Z. Spieralski, *Awantury mołdawskie*, p. 68.

marriage with six years older Hospodar as a base of strengthening his position on the throne. Some time earlier, Stanisław of Chodecz, member of mentioned family, tried to convince Bogdan to peacefully solve the feuds. Feeling of being misused and deceived might be the cause of Bogdan's private hatred to Chodecki family all the more that he attached great importance to attain affinity with the Jagiellons, and with Habsburgs by implication⁵.

Despite increasing misunderstandings and unclear situations during sejm in Lublin (January–March 18th 1506) the opinion of King Aleksander tipped the balance⁶. On January 16th 1506 preliminary wedding agreement with Moldavian deputies – Chancellor (*logofet*) Tautul, Treasurer (*wisternik*) Izaak and Authorising Officer (*pitar*) Iwanek- was reached⁷. By virtue of this contract Bogdan was obliged to pay homage to polish kings, found a Roman Catholic diocese in his state and to send Pope a declaration that his marriage was bound for the sake of the Church⁸. Aleksander promised Moldavian Hospodar to send legates to Suceava till June 29th (Bernard Wilczek Bishop of Lviv, Stanisław of Chodecz and Mikołaj Firlej were deputed)⁹. Simultaneously another deputies – a Royal Courtman, Armenian Iwaszko Tichnowicz¹⁰ and Stanisław Szafraniec¹¹ – were sent to Turkish Sultan. One should agree with Zdzisław Spieralski, who defines not only subjugating Crimean Tatars, but also obtaining Bayezid's approval for the royal marriage as the objectives of their mission¹².

Nevertheless, King's illness and his imminent death at 19th August put the kibosh on the plans of marriage and gave the Crown's noblemen, who disallowed Bogdan to espouse Elżbieta, conclusive position¹³. The greatest beneficiary in this course of action was The Princess herself, who omitted Hospodar's advances under

⁵ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich. Sprawa pokucka do wstąpienia na tron Zygmunta I*, „Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości”, vol. 11, cz. 2, Warszawa 1965, p. 109–110; Z. Spieralski, *Kampania obertyńska*, p. 76; Z. Spieralski, *Awantury mołdawskie*, p. 68.

⁶ *Chronologia sejmów polskich 1493–1793*, ed. W. Konopczyński (Archiwum Komisji Historycznej, seria 2, vol. 4, no. 3), Kraków 1948, p. 133.

⁷ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 110.

⁸ Z. Wdowiszewski, *Elżbieta Jagiellonka*, Polski Słownik Biograficzny, vol. 6, Kraków 1948, p. 264 (further PSB).

⁹ *Acta Aleksandra króla polskiego, wielkiego księcia litewskiego itd. (1501–1506)*, ed. F. Papée (Wydawnictwa Komisji Historycznej Polskiej Akademii Umiejętności, no. 79), Kraków 1927, no. 317 (further AA).

¹⁰ *Matricularum Regni Poloniae Summaria*, ed. T. Wierzbowski, vol. III: *Alexandri regis tempora complecens (1501–1506)*, Warszawa 1908, no. 2675 (further MRPS). Por. Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 110.

¹¹ AA, no. 317.

¹² Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 110.

¹³ Z. Spieralski, *Kampania obertyńska*, p. 76.

the pretext of mourning her mother and brother and threatened to go to devote herself to monastic life instead of marrying a „one-eyed barbarian”¹⁴.

Bogdan III The Blind was probably making conjectures about the reason of cooling the dealings with Poland all the more that the legation announced for June did not appear in Moldavian capital within due time. In spite of reimbursing Pokuttya he did not propitiate situation with the Poles, and his demeanor was becoming more and more disdaining for Turkey and Hungary. Hospodar did not continue formerly espoused way of obtaining the Jagiellonians. In act of retaliation he begun invasion of Pokuttya and Podolia at the end of August 1506¹⁵. The governors (*perkułabowie*) with their troops dispatched by Hospodar reached the environs of Kamianets-Podilskyi and Skala-Podilska thus a dozen or so kilometers inwards Polish borders. Eventually till September 8th Moldavian troops accumulated with the Tatars and the Turks gained control over Pokuttya once again and raided environs of Kamianets. In Kromer's depiction we can find a quaint information about the defense of Pokuttya. Bogdan “steamed with wrath with army plundering to Pokuttya he forced his way, where strongholds sparingly were situated and fewest men skilled in siege craft were, major difficulty notwithstanding, under his power he grasped all”¹⁶. Bernard Wapowski validates information about the weakness of Polish fortress' crews¹⁷. The Hospodar drafted his governors (*perkułab*) on occupied territory and filled the positions on the strongholds with his own crew.

There is no information preserved about Polish defense of Pokuttya. Perhaps the Current Defense¹⁸ expected Moldavians to attack in surrounding region of Kamianets. It is also possible that the Moldavian assault was not anticipated. Nonetheless it is advisable to assume that during the first decade of September the area on the distributary of Dniester and Bystrytsia ranging Yezupil (*Czesybiesy*) near Halych got into the Hospodar Bogdan's hands. The Wapowski's Chronicle mentioned about reclaiming Yezupil, Kolomyia and Sniatyn by Kamienniecki and thereby gives as evidence to foregoing assumption¹⁹. In Poland the opinion is spreaded that renewed Moldavian occupation of Pokuttya was

¹⁴ [...] *jednookiego barbarzyńce*: Z. Spieralski, *Awantury moldawskie*, p. 68.

¹⁵ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-moldawskich*, p. 111–112.


¹⁶ [...] *gniewem przejęty z wojskiem plondrującem na Pokucie wtargnął był, gdzie iż najmniej ludzi warunkowych ani też miast mocnych nie było, krom wielkiej trudności pod moc swoją wszystko zagarnął*. [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1369.

¹⁷ *Kroniki B. Wapowskiego z Radochowiec część ostatnia, czasy podługoszowskie obejmująca (1480–1535)*, ed. J. Szujski (*Scriptores rerum polonicarum*, vol. 2), Kraków 1874, p. 63.

¹⁸ *Obrona potoczna* – also known as: General Defense or Permanent Defence.

¹⁹ *Ibidem*, p. 63.

a result of endorsement and inspiration of The Hungarian, who found the alliance of their neighbour with Poland cumbersome²⁰. Yet King Władysław's support for Bogdan III feels like an unconvincing assumption considering the fact that he did not try to counteract when the Moldavian troops were displaced later on. It could have been also a symbolic gesture of endorsement toward The Crown's noblemen and the future King – Sigismund²¹.



Map. 1. Moldavian invasions on Poland in 1506

Only just during the sejm in Lublin in 1506 a series of by-laws were given to shut out Tatar aggression on Borderlands. Early on, on March 2nd the noblemen established a provisory wartime law for Lesser Poland and Ruthenia²². Likewise, the ruler drafted two Hetmans (military commanders): Great Crown Hetman

²⁰ *Acta Tomiciana*, vol. 1, ed. T. Działyński i L. Koenig, Poznań 1858, no. 1, 3; L. Finkel, *W sprawie udziału lenników w elekcyach jagiellońskich*, Lwów 1913, p. 158–159; Z. Spieralski, *Awatury mołdawskie*, p. 69.

²¹ L. Finkel, *W sprawie udziału lenników*, p. 187.

²² *Polskie ustawy i artykuły wojskowe od XV do XVIII wieku*, ed. P. Kutrzeba (Archiwum Komisji Historii Wojskowej, vol. 3), Kraków 1937, no. 6; AA, no. 312; Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 114.

Mikołaj Kamieniecki²³ and Field Crown Hetman Stanisław of Chodecz with their assigned advisors – Mikołaj Firlej, Stanisław Lanckoroński, Mikołaj Kreza and a Czech, Bohumil Czynrin²⁴. On March 18th The King sent Royal Intendant Spytek of Jarosław with osiers (*wici*)²⁵ to organize mass levy (*pospolite ruszenie*) with Hetmans in Lesser Poland and Ruthenia²⁶.

On the basis Kamieniecki's acconunts²⁷ and *litterae inscriptionis stipendii* from March 17th 1506 for the commanders (*rotmistrz*) of Current Defense²⁸ it is possible to determine the exact quantity of Current Defense at the end of March.

The cavalry consisted of troops (banners) led by following commanders:

1. Przedbor Rudzki – 200 horsemen²⁹,
2. Feliks Brzeski – 200 horsemen³⁰,
3. Jan Rzepecki – 188 horsemen³¹,
4. Piotr Kola – 180 Winged Hussars³²,
5. Piotr Chwała – 180 horsemen³³,
6. Jakub Struś – 180 horsemen³⁴,
7. Frederic of Fulsztyn – 100 horsemen³⁵,
8. Piotr Oleski – 100 horsemen³⁶,
9. Bartek Husarz – 100 horsemen³⁷,
10. Wacław Husarz – 70 Winged Hussars³⁸,
11. Leonard – 65 Racs³⁹,

²³ Mikołaj Kamieniecki held this office from 1503 to 1515. K. Niesiecki, *Herbarz polski*, ed. J. N. Bobrowicz, vol. 1–10, Lipsk 1839–1846, vol. 5, p. 22–23; B. Paprocki, *Herby rycerstwa polskiego*, ed. K. J. Turowski, Kraków 1858, p. 381–382.

²⁴ AA, no. 312; Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 114.

²⁵ *Wici* – a polish customary call of arms realized by sending a tuft of osier to the obligated.

²⁶ AA, no. 312, 315; Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 114.

²⁷ Archiwum Główne Akt Dawnych w Warszawie, *Akta Skarbowo-Wojskowe*, Oddział 86, *Rachunki z przychodów i wydatków na potrzeby wojska 1472–1794*, no. 6a, c. 6–16 (further AGAD).

²⁸ MRPS, III, no. 2870–2871.

²⁹ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 9r; MRPS, III, no. 2871.

³⁰ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 8v. In *Matricularum* enlisted only 180 horsemen. MRPS, III, no. 2871.

³¹ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 8r. In *Matricularum* 180 horsemen. MRPS, III, no. 2871.

³² AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 7r; MRPS, III, no. 2870.

³³ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 7v; MRPS, III, no. 2871.

³⁴ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 9v; MRPS, III, no. 2871; J. Byliński, *Struś Jakub z Komorowa*, PSB, vol. 44, Kraków 2006, p. 460.

³⁵ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 12v. In *Matricularum* 130 horsemen. MRPS, III, no. 2871.

³⁶ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 13r.

³⁷ MRPS, III, no. 2871.

³⁸ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 10r. In *Matricularum* – 100 horsemen. MRPS, III, no. 2871.

³⁹ *Rac* – literally Serb; polish light mercenary cavalry; AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 11v.

12. Feliks and Jerzy Struś – 50 horsemen⁴⁰,
13. Iwonia Barynowski – 60 Moldavians⁴¹.

There were also paid two large hetman's fellowships – 50 horsemen led by Mikołaj Kamieniecki⁴² and 35 – Stanisław Chodecki⁴³. Thus, 1758 cavalrymen were employed in the first quarter, only in light banners.

In infantry there were mercenary regiments hired per 3 quarters, led by:

1. Szymon Kulawy – 200 infantry and 6 Winged Hussars or Racs⁴⁴,
2. Jan Kałusz – 200 infantry and 7 horses⁴⁵.

They supported the unit of Jarosz (200 infantry and 4 horses), gathered in Kamińsk Podolski from September 30th 1505⁴⁶. In accordance with Spieralski we can reckon the amount of Polish infantry on Borderlands was around 600 *drabs*⁴⁷ and 17 horses, and the complete number of Current Defense soldiers was 2375.

In time some of the units were augmented. Piotr Oleski's banner reached the number of 200 horses during the second quarter⁴⁸. Wacław's banner in the second and third settlement period enlarged to 80 Winged Hussars⁴⁹. A small reinforcement, up to 70 horses, for another three months also received by Leonard's banner⁵⁰. In June the Chwał's, Rzepecki's, Kola's and Barynowski's units were dissolved, however all the commanders and their companions signed up again⁵¹. On the assumption that numerical strength of regiments did not change this would give 2490 soldiers (1873 light cavaliers within) in Ruthenia. Though this number seems to be over-exaggerated owing the fact that during the summer the number of Current Defense soldiers began to decline. Arguably it was an effect of relative tranquility and the fact that no tidings about the Tatar aggression were heard.

⁴⁰ Ibidem, c. 9v.

⁴¹ MRPS, III, no. 2871.

⁴² AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 6r.

⁴³ Ibidem, c. 6r.

⁴⁴ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 13v-14v; MRPS, III, no. 2871.

⁴⁵ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 15r-16r.

⁴⁶ MRPS, III, no. 2468.

⁴⁷ *Drab* – infantry soldier.

⁴⁸ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 13r.

⁴⁹ Ibidem, c. 10v-11r.

⁵⁰ Ibidem, c. 12r.

⁵¹ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 116.

Being aware of the threat posed by Moldavians on the southern frontier, The Great Crown Hetman Mikołaj Kamieniecki⁵² without any delay started subsequent conscription to the Current Defense, financially based on the incomes of the mint and taxes enacted during the sejm in Lublin⁵³. The finances were supervised by five State Treasury Ministers (*publiczni szafarze skarbu* – tax collectors) drafted during the Lesser Poland congress in New Town Korczyn⁵⁴. Hetman also assigned his deputy Stanisław Mielecki on Greater Poland congress in May in Koło. His assignment was to deal with raising funds from Greater Poland's nobility⁵⁵.

Not the *litterae inscriptionis stipendii*, but direct conscription of the companions formed the basis of Hetman's muster, therefore it is difficult to ascertain the army's division into particular troops. Still one can presume that it did not alter in comparison to foregoing calculations. Among the new recruits there were many equestrian courtiers of deceased King Aleksander I as well as commanders and companions from dissolved units. 120 new companions enlisted too. The group of bigger fellowships noteworthy in the new draft were led by:

- Iwan Prokyt – 60 horsemen⁵⁶,
- Stanisław Hynek – 60 horsemen⁵⁷,
- Wiśniowiecki – 50 horsemen,
- Michał Rac 50 horsemen,
- Jan Siemieński – 31 horsemen⁵⁸,
- Chodecki – 30 horsemen⁵⁹,
- Jan Kamieniecki – 25 horsemen⁶⁰,
- Stanisław Lanckoroński – 20 horsemen⁶¹,
- Piotr Kola – 20 horsemen⁶²,

⁵² About Hetman Kamieniecki see also: Sz. Starowolski, *Wojownicy sarmaccy*, transl. and ed. J. Starnawski, Warszawa 1978, p. 209–210.

⁵³ AA, no. 312, 318.

⁵⁴ Among them are Jan Tarnowski, Jakub Szydłowiecki, Andrzej Kościelecki, Cracow townspeople Jan Kizlink and Kasper Ber. Sixth minister, Mikołaj Lanckoroński, is also present – vol. [T. Lubomirski], *Trzy rozdziały z historii skarbowości w Polsce (1507–1532)*, Kraków 1868, p. 1–2.

⁵⁵ Z. Spieralski, *Mielecki Stanisław*, PSB, vol. 20, Kraków 1975, p. 768.

⁵⁶ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 46r.

⁵⁷ Ibidem, c. 45v.

⁵⁸ Ibidem, c. 32v.

⁵⁹ Ibidem, c. 18v.

⁶⁰ Ibidem, c. 16v.

⁶¹ Ibidem, c. 17v.

⁶² Ibidem, c. 45r.

- Jan Kola (Piotr's son) – 20 horsemen⁶³,
- Jan Struś – 20 horsemen⁶⁴,
- Mikołaj Kreza – 16 horsemen⁶⁵,
- Iwan Barynowski – 16 horsemen⁶⁶,
- Jan Boratyński – 16 horsemen⁶⁷,
- Jan Tworowski – 13 horsemen⁶⁸,
- the Iskrzycki brothers – 12 horsemen⁶⁹,
- Ambroży Siekierzyński referred to as Armenian (*Ormiańczyk*) – 10 horsemen⁷⁰.

Initial plan was to attain the number of 4000 soldiers, however the enrollment provided only 2500 cavaliers, 400 infantrymen and a few cannons sent from Lviv led by 30 drabs⁷¹. Hetman Kamieniecki took command of those forces. Current Defense unit of 60 horses under command of Field Guardian Stanisław Hynek was his covering force⁷². Stanisław Jarosz's unit consisting of 200 men formed the crew of the Kamianets stronghold, hence it could not take part in prospective warfare⁷³. Likewise, the 30 infantrymen from Lviv assigned to guard Rohatyn⁷⁴.

In Hetman Mikołaj Kamieniecki's army foreigners served alongside Poles. 16 out of 34 names of mentioned cavalry commanders were not Polish. On that list one can find 7 Polish and Lithuanian Ruthenians (i.a. Jakub, Jerzy, Feliks and Wacław of Struś family and Iwan Pokryt), 2 Serbians (Mikołaj and Michał of Iskrzycki family), 1 Moravian, 1 Armenian (Ambroży Ormiańczyk) and Moldavians⁷⁵.

⁶³ Ibidem, c. 47v; H. Kowalska, *Kola (Koło) Jan z Dalejowa*, PSB, vol. 13, Kraków 1967–1968, p. 286.

⁶⁴ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 19r.

⁶⁵ Ibidem, c. 19r.

⁶⁶ Ibidem, c. 20v. Spieralski counts 20 horses in Barynowski's fellowship. Z Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 116.

⁶⁷ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 29v.

⁶⁸ Ibidem, c. 28v.

⁶⁹ Ibidem, c. 42v.

⁷⁰ Ibidem, c. 23v; K. Stopka, *Siekierzyński Ambroży zw. Ormiańczykiem*, PSB, vol. 36, Kraków 1996, p. 75.

⁷¹ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 25r.

⁷² Ibidem, c. 45v; Por. Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 116.

⁷³ M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, 2nd ed., Warszawa 2008, p. 71.

⁷⁴ AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 53v.

⁷⁵ M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 71.

Aside from Iwonia Barynowski with his 60 horse unit the latter included the Vogt of Kolomyia with his fellowship of 8 men and several other Moldavians and fugitives from Pokuttya, who were obliged to serve as guides during the campaign⁷⁶.

Chroniclers do not mention the commander of the campaign by name, but certainly the supreme command was held by Grand Crown Hetman Mikołaj Kamieniecki, who was authorized to command on own motion. Moreover, he would not settle the accounts of the campaign without being in charge of it⁷⁷. The command of Current Defense was held by Stanisław of Chodecz, whom we might consider Kamieniecki's deputy commander. One should consider Kamiński's opinion, that „the glory of victory won over Wallachians belongs to Otto Chodecki, for he as a prefect (*starosta*) of Halicz and a castellan of Lviv rightfully shall command” not supported by evidence⁷⁸.

Polish reaction was instantaneous, which can be regarded as a result of long-lasting preparations for potential war against Moldavia and a proper insight into situation. The reconnaissance reports (i.a. from Marek Chomeński) which Hetman had at his disposal provided information about weakness of enemy forces in Pokuttya and dearth of preparations for war in Moldavia⁷⁹. Taking advantage of such situation, he acted quickly and by surprise. On September 29th 1506⁸⁰, three weeks after Moldavian seizure of Pokuttya Polish troops already crossed the Dniester River near Halych and within few days annihilated or cast out the Moldavian crews in number of ca. 600 men⁸¹.

The moderns of Grand Hetman Mikołaj Kamieniecki assessed his forces at 4000 „payed men by sejm's order to Ruthenia dispatched”⁸². Nevertheless, according to Hetman Kamieniecki's settlement of accounts preserved in the Central

⁷⁶ Ibidem, p. 72.

⁷⁷ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 117.

⁷⁸ [...] *chwała zwycięstwa nad Wołochami należy się Ottonowi Chodeckiemu, jemu bowiem jako staroście halickiemu i kasztelanowi lwowskiemu słuszenie należało się dowództwo*. J. Kamiński, *Otto z Chodcza*, Złoczów 1911, p. 9.

⁷⁹ In the above mentioned Kamieniecki settlement we find such items as: twice *Volos explorator* (2 florens) and *Chomeński in Moldavia missus* (7 florens). AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6a, c. 51v, 53r, 56r, 58r.

⁸⁰ This date is given by Miechowita. [Maciej z Miechowa], *Chronica Polonorum*, [Kraków 1521], c. 198.

⁸¹ [B. Wapowski], *Kroniki część ostatnia*, p. 63; [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370; M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 72; Z. Spieralski, *Awantury mołdawskie*, p. 69; Z. Spieralski, *Kampania obertyńska*, p. 76.

⁸² [...] „*ludzi pieneznych z nakazania sejmowego do Rusi wyprawionych*”. [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370.

Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, the latter historians cast doubt on this number as inflated. Zdzisław Spieralski reckons that Kamieniecki had not quite 3000 soldiers under his command, with predominance of cavalry in number of 2500 and 400 infantrymen with sparse artillery units from Lviv⁸³. Only Yezupil resisted to the Poles, therefore Kamieniecki left the infantry and cannons there⁸⁴ and entered Moldavia with the rest of his army⁸⁵. He led over 2000 cavaliers along the way from Kołaczyn (nowadays district of Sniatyn) to Szeppenice and further to Chernivtsi.

The borderline area of Chernihiv and Khotyn districts were defended ex officio by Moldavian commander Kopacz who according to Zdzisław Spieralski held the governor (*prekułab*) office. He mobilized his troops in a hurry. However his army consisted only of mass levy. Mostly the local peasants turned up (most of them by foot), complemented by boyars with their sparse troops they composed into a force of 2000–3000 men⁸⁶. Hospodar Bogdan III gathered select units of professional army (*curteni*) and mercenaries in the center of the country near Suceava⁸⁷.

As things stand one cannot suspect Kopacz of planning to fight a decisive battle against Poles. Moldavian Hetman decided to rely on well-trying tactics of lightning raids and set up an ambush west of Chernivtsi, near the furcation of the way from Halych and Lviv to Valya Kuzmina, Suceava, Tyrasowce and Hadir. The 55-horse banner of Jerzy and Feliks Struś were ambushed. Zdzisław Spieralski and Marek Plewczyński share an accordant opinion that the Struś brothers served as an advance-guard and wandered off too far giving Kopacz opportunity to surround and rout them⁸⁸. Having regard to the profile of the Struś brothers one could not agree less with their judgment. What we know about them is that they were very young, perhaps even adolescent as the historical sources describe them using the Latin term *adolescentes*⁸⁹. It is unlikely that experienced Hetman Mikołaj

⁸³ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 116; M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 71. The presence of artillery is confirmed by the bills made by Kamieniecki for their staff.

⁸⁴ Proof of this is the settlement of Kamieniecki from the expedition in which items are listed such as double payment of 3 florens to infantry *pro victualibus super Czesybiesy oppugnatis* and 3 florens for Marek Raca *in Czesybiesy missus*. AGAD, Oddz. 86, no. 6, c. 53r, 58r.

⁸⁵ M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 72.

⁸⁶ Zdzisław Spieralski summarizing the course of the campaign of 1506 recalls the breakdown of the Moldavian unit near Chernivtsi. Z. Spieralski, *Awantury mołdawskie*, p. 69.

⁸⁷ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 118–119; M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 72.

⁸⁸ Z. Spieralski, *Awantury mołdawskie*, p. 69; M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 73.

⁸⁹ [B. Wapowski], *Kroniki część ostatnia*, p. 63; J. Sondel, *Słownik łacińsko-polski dla prawników i historyków*, Kraków 1997, p. 30.

Kamieniecki entrusted young untrained commanders with such a serious responsibility. It is reasonable to agree with chronicler Maciej Strykowski's narration, that Struś brothers „split off and went up against Wallachians with a 50-horse group in search of a brawl”⁹⁰. Marcin Kromer also noted that “rushed ahead with a fellowship of 50 horsemen they fortuitously hit upon preponderating Wallachian cortege”⁹¹. Pursuing deep inside Moldavian territory with no proper recon and without regard to peril caused by their poor manpower would prove young brothers' recklessness. The reason of such behaviour is explained by Wapowski's narration. He points out that Jerzy and Feliks entered Moldavian lands, inflicted serious damage and were surrounded by predominant Moldavian forces while escaping with their spoils⁹². So did the Struś brothers expose themselves for the Moldavian ambush because of their greed? We cannot exclude such flow of events.

Disregarding their chance of escape Struś brothers fought back. It is possible that they even attacked the prepotent Moldavians. Kromer notes that „with a heart braver than needed they stroke, being trampled by the dense tempest of the foe at the end they perished”⁹³. Thus in view of preponderant Moldavian forces their fellowship has been broken down. Feliks was killed in a courageous fight during the battle. Jerzy had a slight chance to escape with the remains of his banner⁹⁴, but instead of retreat he tried to break through to his brother to save him. He chose death instead of derogatory cowardice „and that is how he prayed: Dear Lord don't let them slit my throat in front of my beloved brother”⁹⁵. He fought for a very long time until his horse struck by a spear or an arrow dropped dead with his cavalier. Jerzy was captured together with his eight soldiers⁹⁶. Summarizing the chroniclers' descriptions it is proper to conclude that the Chernihiv ambush put not only Jerzy and his eight companions to death, but also annihilated all Struś'

⁹⁰ [...] *odłączywszy się od wojska szli w kozactwo do Wołoch w pięćdziesiąt koni*. M. Strykowski, *Kronika polska*, p. 329

⁹¹ [...] *z poczem pięćdziesiąt koni opodal zagnawszy się, na nierówno większy orszak Wołochów trafunkiem wpadli*. [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370.

⁹² [B. Wapowski], *Kroniki część ostatnia*, p. 63.

⁹³ [...] *śmielszym sercem a niż było potrzeba uderzywszy się, na ostatek gęstych nieprzyjaciół nawałnością potłumieni zginęli*. [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370.


⁹⁴ Wapowski gave a premise to believe that he even broke through the lap, but came back after his brother's defeat. [B. Wapowski], *Kroniki część ostatnia*, p. 63.

⁹⁵ [...] *i tak modlił się do Boga: Boże tego nie daj, abych przy swym miłym bracie gardła nie dał*. [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370; M. Strykowski, *Kronika polska*, p. 329.

⁹⁶ [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370; M. Strykowski, *Kronika polska*, p. 329. Wapowski reports that seven of his nobles were imprisoned with Jerzy Strus: *cum septem aliis nobilibus*. [B. Wapowski], *Kroniki część ostatnia*, p. 63.

group. If the combat was under way in a complete encirclement it is possible that no one wriggled out of the ambush and everyone except the captives perished.

Jerzy Struś and his fellow prisoners were brought before Hospodar Bogdan III and beheaded or stabbed with a sword by his order in Suceava⁹⁷.



Map 2. Polish retaliatory campaign 1506

Kopacz wanted at the outset to sidestep the main Polish forces and he had plenty of time for that. However after succeeding in the clash with Struś brothers he started to believe in his preponderance and decided to expect Kamieniecki in an open battle in the Bukovinian Woods, near Chernivtsi, thus arguably at the place the Struś's were beaten. One cannot exclude that Kopacz hoped that Poles will withdraw being impressed by the calamity of the brothers⁹⁸.

Yet Polish Hetman did not waste time and assiduously strived for the battle, because he was afraid of leaving a significant Moldavian force in the rear. Furthermore having a limited manpower under his command he wanted to perform

⁹⁷ Ibidem, p. 63; [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370;

⁹⁸ M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 73.

a sudden raid to make organizing resistance and gathering serious forces impossible for his enemy⁹⁹. Well organized Moldavian troops could perpetually flank the Polish Army making use of advantageous landform¹⁰⁰. Surely surprised by the sudden emergence of a few thousand of Kopacz soldiers, at the drop of a hat Hetman made the correct decision. Another idea behind the Hetman's rush was a vision of gaining a few easy-going days after defeating the enemy in the beginning of the campaign¹⁰¹.

Only a day after the Struś's troops were smashed, another clash took place near Chernivtsi. This time Moldavians suffered defeat. No detailed reports on the battle that took place on the fore field of Chernihiv district were preserved. We can deduce from the Kromer's Chronicle that Hetman found out about annihilation of Struś's troops and started a pursuit of the enemy. „Villain gloating over fresh victory was gain on and a valiant stroke tainted him with a severe calamity”¹⁰². Strykowski mentions in his Chronicle about „benumbing” (*poraził*) two regiments of Moldavian boyars¹⁰³. It is difficult to estimate the amount of killed or wounded Poles and Moldavians. On account of the lack of information it only remains to speculate that if Kamieniecki's army plundered northern Moldavian districts unpunished then Kopacz's army probably came a cropper and scattered.

The governor (*perkułab*) of Khotyn was killed in the battle, and Kopacz “escaped running with fear”¹⁰⁴. Many of the Moldavian boyars from Khotyn and Chernivtsi districts were captured. After the victory Hetman sent Polish cavalry to plunder Moldavian region of Bukovina. The troops reached Botuceni at the distance of 40 km from Suceava, the capital city of Moldavia¹⁰⁵. Despite such a great menace Bogdan III the One-Eyed abandoned attempts to resist. Kamiieniecki returned to Poland in October crossing over the Dniester River probably near Halych or Koropets¹⁰⁶.

⁹⁹ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 119.

¹⁰⁰ M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 73.

¹⁰¹ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 119.

¹⁰² [...] *świeżo ze zwycięstwa tryumfujące nieprzyjaciół dogoniwszy i mężnem uderzeniem opadłszy naszy, srogą klęską zrazili*. [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370.


¹⁰³ M. Strykowski, *Kronika polska*, p. 329.

¹⁰⁴ [...] *łękliwym biegiem uskoczył*. [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370.

¹⁰⁵ M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 73.

¹⁰⁶ Zdzisław Spieralski and Marek Plewczyński agree on this fact. Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 120; M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 73. however, in the Wapowski Chronicle we have a record that the crossing took place in *Tagrip*. [B. Wapowski], *Kroniki część ostatnia*, p. 63.

In historiography the opinion occurred that after his return Hetman Kamiemiecki ordered to put 50 Moldavians captured in Chernivtsi to execution¹⁰⁷. It is still possible, as Strykowski suggests, that the execution took place right after the battle¹⁰⁸. Spieralski excludes such flow of events relying on Moldavian chronicler Grigore Ureche. Many arguments are raised. First of all extermination of boyars was to be a revenge for Struś and his companions. Yet if the Chronicles are right decapitation of Poles took place in Suceava, and the main battle was fought the day after Struś's defeat. In that case we can draw a conclusion that Polish soldiers had no chance to find out about the fate of the youngster before their return to Poland. Only then the Hetman ordered to execute the captives formerly sent to Kamianets Podolski¹⁰⁹. Second argument for Spieralski's point of view is a note in Wapowski's Chronicles entered into the description of the campaign: „this outsized homicide was not avenged”¹¹⁰.



Map 3. The rout of possible Polish retreat from Moldavia 1506

¹⁰⁷ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 120; M. Plewczyński, *Obertyn 1531*, p. 73.

¹⁰⁸ M. Strykowski, *Kronika polska*, p. 329.

¹⁰⁹ More about: Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 120.

¹¹⁰ [...] *to wielkie zabójstwo* [of Struś – A.G.] *nie zostało pomśczone*. [B. Wapowski], *Kroniki część ostatnia*, p. 63.

In the Stanisław Chodecki's biographical note published by Wacław Pociecha in Polish Biographical Dictionary we can find a statement that the described above battle with Kopacz took place not on the field of Chernivtsi but near Khotyn¹¹¹. There is no way to find arguments for this claim. The battle occurred right after chasing out Moldavians from Pokuttya so it was surely on the way from Kołaczyn to Szpienica and Chernivtsi, because Polish army had to move along that way. The route branches off only just in Chernivtsi. To accept the information passed by Pociecha means to believe that after plundering a small north western area of Moldavia Kamieniecki headed for Khotyn where Kopacz and his army awaited. As Zdzisław Spieralski states this is absolutely unacceptable. It is unlikely that Moldavian commander took position that opened Kamieniecki a way to the center of Moldavian territory. One should also exclude the possibility that Kamieniecki planned to cross the Dniester River near Khotyn, on the enemy's land, threatened by Kopacz's army. The only information from the sources linking Kamieniecki's battle with Khotyn is the fact that the governor (*perkulab*) of this city lost his life in this battle. However it is still not enough to change the localization of the battlefield from Chernivtsi to surroundings of Khotyn¹¹².

Miechowita, Wapowski and Bielski do not provide any information about the end of war and the peace treaties in their chronicles. Only Kromer (and Strykowski who relies on Kromer's narration) relates that a Polish-Moldavian alliance put an end to war. The alliance was supposedly evidenced by letters preserved in Cracow's Public Registers¹¹³.

Nevertheless, the Poles won the war. Only after three weeks of Moldavian occupation Pokuttya was regained. The retaliatory campaign despite the failure of the Struś brothers' troops brought final success measured not only by defeating Kopacz's army, but also by plundering considerable area of Bogdan's lands and a safe return to the northern bank of Dniester. The Council superseding the authority during the interregnum did not decide tough to undertake any severe military steps. After the retaliatory campaign there were no further army expeditions towards Moldavia.

Instead, Polish noblemen invoked to Hungarian King Władysław Jagiellon requesting him to „overmaster Bogdan's designs of aggression with his authority to let the election progress peacefully”¹¹⁴. Hungarian deputy Stefan

¹¹¹ W. Pociecha, *Chodecki Stanisław*, PSB, vol. 3, Kraków 1937, p. 353.

¹¹² Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 119–120.

¹¹³ [M. Kromer], *Kronika polska*, p. 1370; M. Strykowski, *Kronika polska*, p. 329.

¹¹⁴ [...] *władzę swoją powstrzymał Bohdana od dalszych najazdów, by spokojnie można było odbyć elekcyę. Sprawy wołoskie za Jagiellonów. Akta i listy*, wyd. A. Jabłonowski (Źródła dziejowe, t. 10), Warszawa 1878, p. LXXX, p. 42, no. 3.

Thököly arrived to the Coronation Assembly (*Sejm Koronacyjny*) in 1507 to discuss in detail the Moldavian issue¹¹⁵. Afterward he was sent as a Polish and Hungarian deputy to Suceava, with an assignment to lead to peace and alliance between Bogdan and King Sigismund¹¹⁶. However, there is no confirmation about forming an alliance with Moldavian Hospodar and such a momentous occasion would surely leave a mark in the historical sources. It is proper to assume that if Thököly's mission brought any positive result it was merely an armistice.

Poland succeeded to keep Pokuttya within its borders, but the feuds with Bogdan III the One-Eyed did not pass away. Just only the new King Sigismund I will deal with the problem of Poland Southern neighbour¹¹⁷.

Summary

The article presents military activities on the Polish-Moldavian border in 1506. Although this topic was already developed by historians, especially Zdzisław Spieralski and Marek Plewczyński, a number of new facts about the course of the Moldavian campaign in Pokuttya and a retaliatory expedition led by Hetman Mikołaj Kamieniecki have been made, with detailed calculations of Polish banners participating in the operation.

¹¹⁵ *Chronologia sejmów polskich*, p. 133.

¹¹⁶ Z. Spieralski, *Z dziejów wojen polsko-mołdawskich*, p. 121.

¹¹⁷ Zygmunt was proclaimed the Grand Duchy by the Lithuanian Council on October 20, 1506, the Polish Senate on December 8 chose him the King of Poland, and the coronation took place on January 24, 1507. M. Markiewicz, *Historia Polski 1492–1795*, 2nd ed., Kraków 2004, p. 324; [S. Pułaski], *Przyczynek do elekcji Zygmunta I-go w Litwie i w Polsce*, „Biblioteka Warszawska”, 1876, vol. 2, p. 305–316.

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Jan Ciemierzyński's *Comitiua*.

A preliminary study of the history of defence of the south-eastern borderland during the Poswole Expedition of Sigismund II Augustus (1557)

Sigismund II Augustus's military campaign started in 1557, called the Poswole Expedition, was the beginning of a long term military and diplomatic conflict concerning Livonia. No separate monograph has been written about it yet, mainly due to the limited source base¹. This expedition was nevertheless important since despite its rather sluggish military action and the relatively mediocre political effects, it managed to gather a quite impressive army. According to various estimations, it supposedly consisted of up to 70 thousand soldiers². This number was severely reduced by Anna Sucheni-Grabowska, who estimated the army to be approximately 20 thousand³. However, it is worth quoting the opinion of Andrzej Gładysz, who wrote: "[...] the army gathered by Sigismund Augustus for the Livonian purposes in 1557 probably consisted of more than 50 000 people, including 12 000 Prussian military and 20 000 mass conscription. It was equipped

¹ For more on this topic see: J. Jasnowski, *Mikołaj Czarny Radziwiłł (1515–1565). Kanclerz i marszałek Wielkiego Księstwa Litewskiego, wojewoda wileński*, Oświęcim 2014, p. 137 et seq.; H. Kotarski, *Wojsko polsko-litewskie podczas wojny inflanckiej 1576–1582. Sprawy organizacyjne*. Część I, „Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości”, vol. XVI, part II, 1970, p. 102 et seq.; M. Ferenc, *Mikołaj Radziwiłł „Rudy” (ca 1515–1584). Działalność polityczna i wojskowa*, Cracow 2008, p. 200 et seq.; A. Gładysz, *Wyprawa pozwolska Zygmunta Augusta w 1557 roku*, „Roczniki Humanistyczne”, vol. LVI, 2008, book 2, pp. 85–95.

² J. Jasnowski, op. cit., p. 137 et seq.

³ A. Sucheni-Grabowska, *Zygmunt August. Król Polski i Wielki Książę Litewski 1520–1562*, Warsaw 1996, p. 382.

with numerous artillery (68 cannons) and well supplied”⁴. After registering the army in Vilnius on 16th July 1557, it set off to the north, north-west towards the Upita-Onikszty area, under the command of the king, stopping on the way near Pieniany, where the sovereign gave out the supplies. After a little over 3 weeks (on 26th August), they reached Poswole and set up a camp there. The following 23 days (27th August – 18th September) were devoted to diplomatic activities and fairly symbolic military action. After not very long negotiations with the enemy (3rd–14th September) and reaching an agreement, Sigismund II Augustus dissolved the army on 18th September.

Mobilisation of such numerous military forces was bound to have an impact on the financial resources of the ruler and the state. These, seriously depleted, did not allow the remaining borders to be adequately protected. Taking into account the fairly complicated international situation of the time, a sudden attack over the southern or south-eastern borders might have come as a surprise. Hence, not only is it worth focusing on the main theatre of military operations of 1557, but also on other sections of the borderland.

Poor preservation of source materials does not facilitate the task but it was possible to determine that on 12th August 1557 in Brzeżany (Ruthenian Voivodeship), an infantry unit under the command of Jan Ciemierzyński was inspected, with the theoretical number of 100 soldiers. Rittmeister Ciemierzyński (Doliwa coat of arms) was recorded in sources in the years 1551–1574, during which period he served 6 times. He came from and lived in the Ruthenian Voivodeship⁵. It is thus perfectly reasonable that the unit was presented for inspection in this area, especially if it was Crown Ruthenia and Podolia which were the most “exposed” as regards the state’s security. Interestingly, having finished the first quarter of their service, Ciemierzyński’s unit was re-inspected and re-enlisted⁶. It is clearly stated by the following record: *In Comitua G. D. Joanis Cziemierzijski in locum Decimarij D. Markoczki ad Secundum quartuale conscriptus Decimarius Jan Liubiątkowski*. Since the first conscription started on 12th August, then a quarter (90 days) passed on 9th November, which was the last day of service. Thus, the conscription for the second quarter may have taken place on 10th November. Of course, it is only a simple calculation and the date of the second inspection may have been different. However, I consider this calculation to be

⁴ A. Gładysz, op. cit., p. 95.

⁵ M. Plewczyński, *Wojny i wojskowość polska XVI wieku*. vol. II: *Lata 1548–1575*, Zabrze 2012, p. 324.

⁶ The Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, Crown Treasury Archives, Division 85 (further referred to as D85, sign. 61, c. 77).

highly probable. This conclusion is based on the duration of service of other units inspected more or less at the same time, also for two quarters. The difference with the Ciemierzyński's unit was that in other cases, the exact date of inspection of both the first and the second enlistment is known. And so for example, the 200-horse unit under the command of Mikołaj Sieniawski was enlisted on 3rd August⁷, whereas the second inspection took place on the 1st November, that is exactly on the first day after the 90 days of service of the first quarter⁸.

The only modification introduced to the composition of Ciemierzyński's unit was the retinue of Tenmaster Lubiątkowski, to replace Stanisław Markocki, who served in the first quarter along with seven other soldiers. It can thus be assumed that if no second registering took place but only this change was recorded, the make-up of the unit remained unchanged. In other words, it finished the service after the first quarter in the same composition as it had started. It is difficult to judge whether Ciemierzyński's unit participated in any skirmishes, but apparently even if it did, the unit did not suffer any losses in men or weaponry. It does not seem very probable that 8 soldiers, who *nota bene* constituted a single squad, should die during an unspecified combat mission. It can thus be assumed that a total of 84 people and 2 horses served under the command of Ciemierzyński. The first 76 were enlisted for the first quarter, and in November, during the second enlistment, eight of them left to be replaced by the Lubiątkowski's retinue.

The inspection formation of the unit, that is the order in which the individual soldiers were inspected is quite interesting. The rittmeister's retinue consisted of two lancers, two banner men and one drummer. It was probably supplemented with the two horsemen mentioned at the end of the document. Of the remaining 8 tens, as many as 5 consisted of 8 soldiers in the following formation: 2 lancers and 6 shooters. Two other tens were numerous, for the conditions of 16th century crown enlistments, as they consisted of 11 combatants each. Particularly one of them (the third in the formation, exclusive of the rittmeister's retinue) was unusual, as the first to be inspected was a heavy armoured shooter and 3 lancers and only then 7 shooters with arquebuses. The last ten, commanded by Jarosz Kozłowski, consisted of 7 soldiers.

⁷ Ibid., c. 4–9v.

⁸ Ibid., c. 66–66v.

Social composition

The social composition of enlisted troops is important because with successful identification of a significant number of combatants, the contribution of each estate to the defensive effort as part of the analysed formation can be clearly outlined. Research into this issue has been conducted for many years and it allowed to prove that the plebeian character of enlisted infantry did not result from the large number of peasants serving in it, but rather from the number of burgesses. In the first half of the 16th century, the number reached 61% on average⁹. For the Ciemierzyński's troops, this phenomenon is illustrated in Table 1.

Table 1.

Estate background of soldiers from Jan Ciemierzyński's rotas 1557–1558

Estate	No. of soldiers	Percentage of soldiers
Peasantry	6	7.14
Bourgeoisie	37	44.05
Nobility	7	8.33
Unidentified	34	40.48
Total	84	100.00

Source: own calculations

The presented figures clearly confirm the numerical superiority of burgesses. Extrapolation of data obtained on the basis of unquestionable identification of social background would show that burgesses made up nearly 74% of Rittmeister Ciemierzyński's troops. Another interesting observation which could be made as part of this aspect of military service, is registering slightly more than 8% of noblemen¹⁰. It is a clear change in relation to the reign of Alexander and Sigismund I the Old (then, nobility constituted on average about 1%). As for the representatives of the third estate, the peasantry, they are noticeably less numerous in registers of 1557. Approximately 7% of peasants is over three times fewer than in the first half of the 16th century. It is worth mentioning that 5 burgesses were not identified on the basis of their registered place of origin, but

⁹ A. Böldyrew, *Piechota zaciężna w Polsce w pierwszej połowie XVI wieku*, Warsaw 2011, p. 152.

¹⁰ Identification was performed on the basis of names of soldiers included in an armorial by Bartosz Paprocki, see. B. Paprocki, *Herby rycerstwa polskiego przez [...]*, ed. K. J. Turowski, Cracow 1858.

rather on the basis of their nicknames. All of them (Mateusz *Igliarczik*, Abram *Slodownik*, Waszko *Garbarsz*, Wawrzyniec *Czieszielczik* and Mikołaj *Stricharczik*) served as shooters¹¹. Interestingly, as many as 3 of them apparently were not independent craftsmen or guild companions but rather journeymen: a needle-maker, a carpenter and a brickmaker.

Territorial origin

Territorial origin of soldiers from the Ciemierzyński's rota is somewhat problematic. During identification, it was only possible to determine it for 38 combatants (45.24%). Due to this fact, the data does not allow for drawing irrefutable conclusions. However, it is known that soldiers sent to the Poswole Expedition included those who were enlisted e.g. by the Zhytomyr starosta, Roman Sanguszka, and they were replaced by subsequently recruited troops. The question of defence of Ruthenia and Podolia was to remain in the hands of private armies and a few newly formed troops¹². Most probably, Ciemierzyński's rota was one of them. The first inspection (12th August 1557) took place in Brzeżany, which could imply that the human resources for the unit included soldiers coming from Ruthenian lands. Meanwhile, fragmentary findings based on the preserved register indicate that the most numerous group of soldiers were the inhabitants of Lesser Poland (15 people). Soldiers identified as coming from Ruthenian lands were the second largest group (12 people). In addition, another 3 soldiers were identified as Mazovians, 1 as an inhabitant of Greater Poland, and 7 as coming from the Grand Duchy of Lithuania¹³. However, it must be stressed that as many as 10 soldiers of Ruthenian origin came from the Ruthenian Voivodeship, which was the area where the inspection took place.

Owing to the difficulties with establishing the origins of a certain group of soldiers, including the burgesses, it is difficult to explicitly determine the character of the urban centres they came from. It was possible to assign a specific category to only 25 towns. And thus there were six soldiers registered who came from a town of category I (7.14%). As many as five of them came from Lviv. There were 8 combatants who came from towns of category II (9.52%), category III – 7 (8.33%) and 4 from towns of category IV (4.76%). A total of 25 soldiers made up nearly 30% of the rota. In another study, I wrote that recruits for the enlisted

¹¹ O85, sign. 61, c. 75v-76.

¹² A. Gładysz, op. cit., pp. 87–88.

¹³ O85, sign. 61, c. 74v et seq.

infantry “included primarily inhabitants of towns of category II and III”¹⁴ and this regularity is also true for the later period and the presented data.

Categories of men-at-arms and weaponry

2 horsemen were registered in Ciemierzyński's rota. Both were described as *gravioris armaturae*¹⁵. They rode destriers qualified as “good”. Their weaponry included lancer's armours, and it was also recorded that, apart from armour, the second horseman also had a shield and a pique¹⁶. If only these two elements of weaponry were taken into account, he might be considered as a winged hussar, but the quoted descriptions from the register exclude such a possibility. It must then be concluded that the rittmeister presented two heavily-armed mounted lancers, which is unusual to the extent that in the middle of the 16th century this type of armature was rather departed from.

In addition to the horsemen, there were 3 soldiers responsible for functions related to issuing commands and signals. The drummer had a *bąbnij miedziane* (*copper drum*), and was accompanied by two banner men¹⁷. Among the remaining combatants, 4 categories of men-at-arms can be distinguished: lancers, light lancers, shooters and heavy shooters. There were a total of 22 lancers, of whom only two can be described as light. This means that they did not have armour, like regular lancers, but carried pole weapons. Having no personal firearms at their disposal, such a soldier cannot be counted as a shooter equipped with a pique. Mikołaj of Vilnius and Jan Zmurth both had swords, as well as a halberd and a javelin, respectively¹⁸. Both belonged to the retinue commanded by Jan Lubiątkowski, who joined the rota only in the second quarter of its service.

Lancers had quite varied and rich weaponry. The 20 identified combatants could be divided into three basic groups. The first of them (9 soldiers: Zygmunt of Vilnius, Waszko of Piątek, Andrzej of Sanok, Jan of Strzyżów, Jan of Bełz, Piotr Świdorski, Mateusz Cholewicz, Jan Majkowski, Błażej Śmiałek) had lancer's armours and polearms¹⁹. It was mostly javelin (in 5 instances), 2 partisans, 1 spear and 1 halberd. Apart from Błażej Śmiałek, no other lancer of the analysed group carried a sword. The second group also had lancer's armours, which were always

¹⁴ A. Bołdyrew, op. cit., p. 150.

¹⁵ O85, sign. 61, c. 76v.

¹⁶ Ibid., c. 76v.

¹⁷ Ibid., c. 74v.

¹⁸ Ibid., c. 77.

¹⁹ Ibid., c. 74v, 75, 76, 76v.

registered using this term, but their helmets were clearly differentiated. And thus Mikołaj of Parczew, Jan of Przecław, Wojciech Kochowski and Franciszek Chmielicki had close helmets²⁰. Lobster-tailed pot helmets were registered with Stanisław Markocki, Jan Śmietanka and Tomasz Dubrawski²¹, whereas Jarosz Kozłowski and Jakub Turzowski had kettle hats²². Additionally, soldiers from this group carried swords (except for two of them), halberds or spears. The poorest group of lancers, as regards weaponry, was limited to two soldiers²³. Mateusz Markowski and Jan Lubiątkowski had lancer's armours, and Markowski also presented a lobster-tailed pot helmet. The fairly varied offensive and defensive equipment of lancers in a single rota is not a sufficient basis for drawing far-reaching conclusions, but this diversity is worth stressing. However, soldiers of the same military category usually carried much more unified weaponry.

This was the case for the group of shooters. Each of the 57 counted soldiers had their own long hand firearms (a matchlock gun or arquebus) and a sword. Only two members of this group owned lancer's armours (Mikołaj Wąsowicz and Stanisław Drop), and Drop had a lobster-tailed pot helmet in addition²⁴. The most frequently represented type of long personal gun in the rota was the matchlock gun. In spite of reservations formulated by historiography towards this type of gun, apparently it was still willingly used, regardless of its mediocre range, poor accuracy and not very convenient system of igniting the propellant charge. However, it is worthy noticing the presence of 21 arquebuses (20 pieces in the hands of the remaining shooters and one owned by the aforementioned Mikołaj Wąsowicz). This weapon certainly improved the possibilities of conducting fire combat by Ciemierzyński's rota significantly, both in the open field and during a siege or defence of a fortified point of resistance. The inspection formation of the unit shows that shooters equipped with arquebuses were grouped in the three first squads (exclusive of the rittmeister's retinue). It is difficult to evaluate whether this was the rittmeister's deliberate decision aimed at presenting soldiers with better and more modern equipment first, or it was sheer coincidence. Previous experience indicates that there was a tendency to place foot arquebusers "across" the formation and not "along" it, and in only one wing – the left one in this case. During the second inspection in November

²⁰ Ibid., c. 75, 75v.

²¹ Ibid., c. 75v, 76.

²² Ibid., c. 76, 76v.

²³ Ibid., c. 76, 77.

²⁴ Ibid., c. 75, 76.

1557, the fifth ten (counting the rittmeister's retinue as the first one) was replaced, which means that no arquebus was missing from the weaponry of the rota²⁵.

The question is: what was the character of Ciemieryński's rota service? It lasted two quarters so it may be assumed that it was considered to be essential for the security of the south-eastern border. The border, as is known, after a relatively peaceful period was finally attacked at the end of 1557²⁶. In the early 1558, Tartar troops raided the Ukrainian lands and Podolia. One of the ruined towns was Latyczów²⁷. According to the conscription book of 1566: "W tem miasteczku po zburzeniu tatarskiem in anno Domini 1558 już znowu osiadło ludzi [...] [In this town, after Tartar demolition of Anno Domini 1558, people have already settled again]"²⁸. The king received the news of this raid quite quickly, as he wrote on 24th January 1558 to the Zhytomyr starosta, Roman Sanguszką, that he should prepare for protecting the border because a Tartar raid was expected.²⁹ In his letter written four days later, the King informed that a large number of Tartars had appeared in the borderland of the Crown and Lithuania, in the area between Winnica and Chmielnik, which meant that they were heading for the Podolian town of Latyczów³⁰. In this way they had left Zhytomyr behind and the second royal letter ordered the starosta to join forces with those of the Kiev voivode. The threat reappeared in July. The king again appealed to starosta Roman Sanguszką for undertaking immediate war preparations in the Zhytomyr castle in the face of expected Tartar invasion of Volhynia³¹. Interestingly, the chroniclers do not mention these incidents. It seems that raids of this kind were treated as an inherent risk related to living in the south-eastern borderland, hence the Tartar raid in January (February?) and the expected summer invasion were not considered as worth noting by the historiographers.

It is also known that in 1557, two infantry rotas were stationed in Podolia³². No other data is available for verification of this claim than what is quoted by Jan Wimmer. The only information in it is that in 1557, the only inspected crown

²⁵ Ibid., c. 77.

²⁶ *Polnoe sobranie russkikh letopisej*, vol. 13, part 1, St Petersburg 1904, p. 289; A. M. Januszkevicz, *Vialikae Kniastva Litoyskai i Infianckaia vaina 1558–1570 gg.*, Minsk 2007, p. 23.

²⁷ S. Gołębiowski, *Czasy Zygmunta Augusta. Ustęp z przeszłości*, part I, Vilnius 1851, s. 120.

²⁸ *Polska XVI wieku pod względem geograficzno-statystycznym*, vol. VIII: *Ziemie ruskie, Wołyń i Podole*, ed. A. Jabłonowski, *Źródła dziejowe*, vol. XIX, Warsaw 1889, (Wykazy geograficzno-statystyczne) p. 205.

²⁹ *Archiwum xx. Sanguszków w Sławucie*, vol. VII: 1554–1572 Lvov 1910, No. 26.

³⁰ Ibid., No. 27.

³¹ Letter from Sigismund II Augustus to duke Roman Sanguszką of 14th July 1558, see. *Arch. xx. Sanguszków...*, No. 36

³² J. Wimmer, *Historia piechoty polskiej do 1864 r.*, Warsaw 1978, p. 98.

rota was the Ciemierzyński's unit, whereas its enlistment for the second quarter was treated by the author of *Historia piechoty...* as the registering of another rota. Thus, it can be assumed that there were not two rotas but only one, which served for two quarters³³. Such an interpretation seems to be relatively certain, especially as the parliament did not accept any new taxes for military purposes during that period, with a view to force the king to some compromise in execution of rights. The parliamentary deadlock continued, while the south-eastern borderland remained without appropriate protection³⁴.

It seems logical to connect the two threads and assume that the only infantry forces that guarded this section of the border was the Ciemierzyński's rota, which – analogically to previous years and previous infantry forces which were part of the General Defence – was most probably quartered in one of the borderland castles. The book in which the make-up of this unit was registered starts with a short inventory of contents (*Regestrum comitiuarum primum*). At its very end, the "comitiva" is mentioned: *G. D. Joannis Cziemierzijnskij in Bar, 100 pedites*³⁵. This record was written by the same hand, so there cannot be any doubts that it was the place where Ciemierzyński's rota was quartered³⁶. It is understandable as Bar was not only one of the most important fortified points of resistance in Podolia, but it also doubled as the seat of the starosta office (held by Bernard Pretwicz). The location of Bar in the eastern frontier of Podolia, at a certain distance from the border, guaranteed a relatively good supervision of this area.

One might suspect that the rota suffered no losses during the service, which means that it probably did not come into any contact with the enemy, although it was theoretically possible. Assuming that the rota's service in the second quarter finished in February 1558, and Sigismund II Augustus reported to duke Roman Sanguszka on the appearance of Tartars in the Winnica – Chmielnik – Międzybórz area as early as 28th January³⁷, then there was some chance that the unit would be moved out of Bar and used in combat. However, it did not happen despite the detected presence of the enemy in the borderland of the Ukrainian lands and Podolia. Besides, Latyczów must have been burnt down in the very period, which allows for the conclusion that Tartar troops moved around the area

³³ O85, sign. 61, c. 75v-76v (first quarter) and 77 (second quarter).

³⁴ J. Wimmer, op. cit., pp. 99–100; M. Plewczyński, *Liczebność wojska polskiego za ostatnich Jagiellonów (1506–1572)*, „Studia i Materiały do Historii Wojskowości”, vol. XXXI, 1988 (1989), p. 33.

³⁵ O85, sign. 61, c. 3.

³⁶ L. Kolankowski, *Roty koronne na Rusi i Podolu 1492–1572 r.*, „Ziemia Czerwieńska”, year I, 1935, book 2, p. 167.

³⁷ *Arch. xx. Sanguszków...*, No. 27.

in question fairly freely. Thus, it seems plausible to assume that Ciemierzyński was entrusted exclusive with guarding the castle in Bar. Despite a relatively short distance between Winnica, Chmielnik and Międzybórz and Bar, the delimitation zones were maintained and the crown rota focused on keeping guard of the determined location, whereas the Kiev and Bratslav voivodeships were supposed to be protected by the Lithuanian army. Perhaps the Tartar raid on Latyczów, which required the River Boh to be crossed, was treated as a raid on Podolia from the area where the main military action was taking place, hoping to capture the enemy upon retreat. However, other sources indicate that it was the south-eastern frontier of the Crown where Tartars inflicted the greatest damage, whereas they only crossed the southern frontier of the Grand Duchy of Lithuania, leaving it largely untouched³⁸.

There is one more, indirect piece of evidence to confirm the garrison character of the Ciemierzyński's rota. The equipment of this unit reminds that of Maciej Włodek's rota, which was enlisted in 1547³⁹. This rota was inspected on 25th July in Kamieniec Podolski and was quartered there as the castle garrison. A considerable part of shooters carried arquebuses and there were no pavisers (although they were not recruited yet at that time), whose function was filled by the second row of foot lancers. The same remarks (especially as regards the shooters) may be formulated with respect to the weaponry of Ciemierzyński's soldiers. They held a total of 21 arquebuses and, although arquebusers were not the majority in the group of shooters, it was still a relatively large number. It must also be kept in mind that these two units were formed only 10 years away, and some similarities are striking. This allows us to suspect that they were typical castle garrisons. Taking into account that both rotas were not big, and infantry was usually deployed in larger concentrations in open warfare, it is hardly possible that these troops could operate independently in the south-eastern theatre of military operations, without any support from other infantry formations.

To sum up, it is worth pointing out again some characteristic features of this rota to remind of them. Firstly, in the scale of events of 1557, Ciemierzyński's rota was the only infantry unit which did not participate in the Poswole Expedition. This fact alone suggests that it was designed for completely different tasks than those of the rest of the Crown army. It may have had a direct impact on the character of this rota, particularly on the weapons and armour carried by its combatants. But this is not the only noteworthy question. The registered soldiers included people nicknamed using such terms as *Igliarczik*, *Czieszielczik*

³⁸ J. Jasnowski, op. cit., p. 186, footnote 16.

³⁹ O85, sign. 51, c. 53–54.

and *Stricharczik*⁴⁰. I considered them to be not more than journeymen in the professions of needlemaker, carpenter and brickmaker, and their presence confirms to a degree the observation concerning the reasons why people whose salaries were lower than or equal to the pay of an infantryman in the middle of the 16th century chose to enlist into the army⁴¹. Becoming a soldier guaranteed a higher salary, let alone the possible spoils of war, as every soldier participated in their division. This is why I suspect that for a certain category of burgesses, military service was either an economic necessity or the possibility to add to the modest salary, even if it was the spoils of war.

Summary

Jan Ciemierzynski's mercenary unit was enlisted in 1557 to defend south-eastern borders of the Kingdom of Poland. This troop was a garrison in the Bar castle. Its military service documentation is kept in Central Archives of Historical Records in Warsaw, in Crown Treasury Archives Division. This article regarded the social structure, territorial origins and organisation of Ciemierzynski's unit.

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⁴⁰ O85, sign. 61, c. 75v-76.

⁴¹ A. Bołdyrew, *Między koniecznością a powinnością. Motywacje podejmowania służby w XVI-wiecznej zaciężnej armii koronnej*, [in:] *O powinnościach żołnierskich*, vol. I: *Na fundamencie historii i tradycji*, ed. A. Drzewiecki, Oświęcim 2016, p. 91.

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План польского наступления на Волыни в 1812 году в аспекте меморандума генерала Михала Сокольниковского

Франко-русский союз, подписанный в июле 1807 года в Тильзите, был, по словам польского историка, ген. Мариана Кукеля, *иллюзией, которая должна была раствориться под давлением фактов, силой подавляющей «природы вещей»*¹. Ввиду постепенно назревающего конфликта с Россией, для французского командования особое значение стала приобретать информация о топографии, расположении дорог, населенных пунктов и дислокации царских войск на бывших землях Речи Посполитой. Важным вопросом являлись также настроения поляков и литовцев, проживающих на территории, находящейся под властью царя.

Уже во время «Первой польской войны» были планы разжечь восстание на территориях, аннексированных Россией. Подготовку к нему начали вести не только в Литве, но и на Волыни и Подолье. Весной 1807 года Наполеон рассматривал план переброса, через мятежные юго-западные губернии царского государства, тридцатитысячного корпуса, который (взаимодействуя с французскими войсками из Далмации) должен был обезвредить российские войска, расположенные в Молдавии. Замыслы французского императора совпали по времени с подготовкой к восстанию поляков из Украины. Выразителем идей этой группы стал Анджей Хородыский, который в феврале 1807 года представил французам соответствующий меморандум. Заговорщики заявляли в нем о готовности начать восстание в течение 42 дней с момента получения приказа, предоставить 11-ти тысячную кавалерию и вести самостоятельные действия до момента прибытия наполеоновской

¹ M. Kukiel, *Wojna 1812 roku*, vol. I, Kraków 1937, p. 3.

армии. В конечном счете, эти планы не смогли осуществиться из-за подписания Тильзитского мира и заключения франко-русского союза².

Однако во время войны 1809 года Наполеон убедился, что нельзя рассчитывать на российского союзника. Несмотря на старания французского императора, расширение территории Варшавского герцогства явно ухудшило отношения Бонапарта с царем. К политическим вопросам присоединились экономические проблемы – после присоединения России к континентальной блокаде ее экономика потеряла огромные суммы денег. Позднее ситуация еще более накалилась из-за отторжения Александром I предложения о браке Наполеона с сестрой царя – великой княгиней Анной. С декабря 1810 года война казалась почти неизбежной. На это повлиял выход России из континентальной блокады, а также присоединение Ольденбургского герцогства к Франции³.

Непосредственную подготовку к вооруженному урегулированию конфликта Наполеон начал на рубеже 1810 и 1811 годов. Новый политический курс по отношению к России стал проявляться, в частности, в смене французского посла в Санкт-Петербурге (Армана де Коленкура сменил на посту Жак Лористон) и императорского резидента в Варшавском герцогстве (Жан Серра был перенесен в Штутгарт, а его пост занял энергичный Эдуард Биньон). С прибытием Биньона в Варшаву было связано оживление деятельности французской и польской служб разведки и контрразведки⁴.

В историографии укоренился взгляд об очень скудном понятии поляков и французов о ситуации в приграничных регионах России. Считалось, что «перед Биньоном» шпионская сеть, действующая за восточной границей Варшавского герцогства, практически не существовала, а польская военная разведка не могла похвастаться практически никакими успехами. Выдающийся исследователь той эпохи, Бронислав Павловский, в тексте, на который ссылались позже другие исследователи, утверждал, что:

в польской армии времен Варшавского герцогства разведывательные службы были организованы очень примитивно. (...) Только угроза вторжения России, слухи о котором начали появляться с начала 1811

² *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier publiée par ordre de l'empereur Napoléon III*, vol. XIV, Paris 2006, p. 400, 424; *Lettres inédites de Talleyrand à Napoléon 1800–1809*, ed. P. Bertrand, Paris 1889, p. 336–338, 348–349, 362–366; M. Loret, *Miedzy Jeną a Tylżą 1806–1807*, Warszawa 1902, p. 46–47; D. Nawrot, *Litwa i Napoleon w 1812 roku*, Katowice 2008, p. 17–50.

³ L. Margueron, *Campagne de Russie*, vol. I, Paris [1897], p. 40–41; M. Kukiel, *Wojna...*, vol. I, p. 18–19; J. Tulard, *Napoleon – mit zbawcy*, Warszawa 2003, p. 419–420.

⁴ M. Handelsman, *Rezydenci napoleońscy w Warszawie 1807–1813*, Kraków 1915, p. 149, 202.

года, принудила власти более внимательно заняться решением вопросов разведки и ее организацией (...). Поэтому только в апреле начато организовывать в Варшаве аппарат разведки⁵.

Еще дальше в своих суждениях шел проф. Ежи Сковронок, который писал:

До этого минимальную информацию из области военной разведки предоставляли небольшие группы, работающие в штабе армии Варшавского герцогства и французских войск, но, судя по записям, хранящимся в варшавских и парижских архивах, результаты их работы были незначительными.

По словам Сковронка, успех принесли именно усилия Биньона, а главным достижением было вовлечение в разведывательную деятельность князя Александра Сапег. Польский магнат, действуя с весны 1811 года, возглавил свою собственную сеть, которая *сыграла во французской системе разведки немалую роль*⁶. Действительно ли польская военная разведка была настолько плохо развита, что владела лишь незначительной информацией о россиянах, а ситуация изменилась только после прихода Биньона, который воспользовался, в частности, услугами Сапег? Противоречат этому источники и выводы, сделанные проф. Юлиушем Виллаумом еще до начала Второй мировой войны.

Из них следует, что польское командование предусматривало конфликт с Россией гораздо раньше. Интенсивное наблюдение за границей с Россией было предпринято после конфликта с Австрией. Сохранились копии отчетов ген. Домбровского с февраля 1810 года о российских силах на границе с герцогством. Домбровский составлял их на основе донесений генералов, командующих отдельными подразделениями. Польские офицеры обращали пристальное внимание на изменения в дислокации российских войск, их силу, настроения среди царских офицеров и появление новых складов⁷.

В конце мая 1810 года, во время визита Фредерика Августа в Варшавском герцогстве, генеральный инспектор артиллерии ген. Жан Пеллетье *разработал план подготовки к войне с Россией и возможной войны с Пруссией*. Пять

⁵ B. Pawłowski, *Polski wywiad przed kampanią 1812 roku*, w: Idem, *Od konfederacji barskiej do powstania styczniowego. Studia z historii wojskowości*, Warszawa 1962, p. 227, 229.

⁶ J. Skowronek, *Z magnackiego gniazda do napoleońskiego wywiadu. Aleksander Sapieha*, Warszawa 1992, p. 238, 243.

⁷ Archives du Ministère des Affaires Étrangères, La Courneve [AMAE], Saxe, vol. LXXIX, p. 56, 58, 68, 100–101.

месяцев спустя наполеоновский резидент в Дрездене отметил, что через город проехали офицеры польской артиллерии с двумя таинственными посылками, отправленные Пеллетье командиру немецкой армии – маршалу Даву – приказам которого подчинялись войска герцогства⁸.

Кроме того, весной 1810 года, через варшавского герцога (*чтобы обмануть российских шпионов*), Наполеон должен был передать Понятовскому инструкции, касающиеся укрепления фортов в случае нападения царских войск. С начала 1810 года в письмах Понятовского можно найти информацию о действиях российских войск. Он обращал внимание на укрепления вдоль линии Двины и изменения численности и дислокации войск в приграничных губерниях. Понятовский владел достаточно конкретной информацией о крупных российских единицах на уровне дивизии. А иногда в его письмах упоминается и о небольших подразделениях (напр. резервных батальонах). На донесения, предоставляемые поляками, ссылался маршал Даву в переписке с Наполеоном, сообщая, в частности, о точной дислокации российских войск в Украине в начале 1811 года. Это свидетельствует о довольно-таки эффективной работе польской разведки ещё до прихода Биньона и начала его сотрудничества с кн. Александром Сапегой. Чем ближе была война, тем лучше работали разведывательные службы герцогства, а их роль в подготовке военной кампании подчеркивают сегодня даже российские исследователи⁹.

Военная разведка Варшавского герцогства подчинялась приказам князя Юзефа Понятовского, как главнокомандующего. Кроме него ключевые роли были отведены генеральным инспекторам трех родов войск. О Пеллетье уже упоминалось. Остальные инспекторы – ген. Станислав Фишер (пехота) и ген. Александр Ружнецкий (конница) – должны были соответственно заниматься глубокой и поверхностной разведкой.

Вопросы, связанные с подготовкой будущей войны с Россией, оставались также в сфере интересов одного из самых талантливых польских генералов – Михала Сокольниковского. Он особо отличался в рядах польских

⁸ Ibidem, p. 431; J. Willaume, *Fryderyk August jako książę warszawski (1807–1815)*, Poznań 1939, p. 233.

⁹ AMAE, Saxe, vol. LXXIX, p. 472, 505–508; *Korespondencja księcia Józefa Poniatowskiego z Francją*, wyd. A. Skalkowski, vol. III, Poznań 1928, s. 49, 57–58, 95–96, 124–125, 179–181; L. Margueron, *Campagne...*, vol. I, p. 64; Ibidem, vol. II, p. 41–43; Безотосный В., *Разведка Французская*, в: *Отечественная Война 1812 года. Энциклопедия*, ред. Idem, Москва 2004, с. 606; J. Willaume, *Fryderyk August...*, p. 233, A. Nieuważny, *Rien de bien certain? Le service de renseignements français avant la campagne de Russie*, „Revue Historique des Armées”, (2012) n. 267, p. 47–50.

военачальников, как способный штабист, военный инженер, офицера с широким кругозором и богатым боевым опытом. Имел за собой участие в кампании 1792 года в Литве и восстании Костюшко. Отличился также во время службы в легионах. Военную службу умел сочетать со страстью к науке, плодами которой стали, в частности, предъявленные французам политические меморандумы, касающиеся польской проблематики. Среди недостатков Соколыницкого стоит назвать необузданную амбицию и сухость в отношениях с подчиненными. Трудный характер не облегчал ему общения с другими офицерами. Генерал вступал в многочисленные конфликты, которые негативно отражались на его карьере. Жена Станислава Фишера (с которым Соколыницкий также в свое время конфликтовал), написала, пожалуй, самую меткую характеристику:

он был по-рыцарски удалым человеком, знатоком военного искусства и ряда других областей, решительным и предприимчивым. Из него был хороший поляк, тщеславный более, чем корыстный, настоящий сорвиголова в бою и бесценный товарищ в самых тяжелых моментах¹⁰.

Особенным периодом в жизни Соколыницкого была война 1809 года, во время которой он несколько раз отличился. Генерал был тогда одним из самых активных старших офицеров Войска Польского. К сожалению, кампания вовлекла Соколыницкого в очередной конфликт, на этот раз с князем Юзефом Понятовским. Отношения между генералами продолжались ухудшаться, несмотря на назначение Соколыницкого военным губернатором Кракова, произведение в офицеры ордена Почетного легиона и признание звания командора ордена *Virtuti Militari*. После окончания войны с Австрией, бригада под командованием Соколыницкого была распределена по надбугским департаментам (люблинскому и седелецкому). Штаб-квартира генерала располагалась в Люблине (но много времени он проводил в Пулавах, на дворе князя Адама Казимира Чарторыйского. Кажется, что Соколыницкий искал там, прежде всего, отдыха после долгих усилий военной кампании, а также стабилизации в личной жизни (ему было 49 лет, а он все еще был холостым)¹¹.

¹⁰ W. Fiszerowa, *Dzieje moje własne i osób postronnych. Wiązanka spraw poważnych, ciekawych i błahych*, wyd. E. Raczyński, Londyn 1975, p. 333.

¹¹ L. Dębicki, *Puławy (1762–1830). Monografia z życia towarzyskiego, politycznego i literackiego na podstawie archiwum ks. Czartoryskich w Krakowie*, vol. II, Lwów 1887, p. 110–111, 117; K. Koźmian, *Pamiętniki... obejmujące wspomnienia od roku 1780 do roku 1815*, vol. II, Poznań 1858, p. 51–52. M. Baczkowski, *Sokolnicki Michał h. Nowina (1760–1816)*, Polski Słownik Biograficzny,

20 марта 1810 года Фридрих Август подписал решение о назначении его генералом дивизии и утвердил административные изменения в Войске Польском. Территория Варшавского герцогства была разделена на четыре военных округа. Отделение IV (радомский и краковский департаменты), со штаб-квартирой в городе Радом, доверено Сокольницкому. В аспекте донесений Прота Лелевеля, генерал изначально должен был получить III военный округ (люблинский и седлецкий департаменты), что было бы результатом естественного порядка вещей – Сокольницкий оставался бы на знакомой себе территории, на которой уже вел разведывательную деятельность. Однако реализации планов препятствовало расположение, которыми в главном штабе пользовался ген. Людвиг Каменецкий – один из членов компании главнокомандующего. По словам Лелевеля, именно такая ситуация в большей степени поспособствовала решению Сокольницкого покинуть страну¹².

Весну и начало лета 1810 года генерал провел еще в Пулавах. В июле он покинул герцогство, чтобы через Германию и Бельгию добраться до Парижа весной 1811 года. Сокольницкий совершил при этом грубое нарушение служебной дисциплины. Не только отправился в путь примерно за два месяца до даты начала отпуска, но и самовольно его продлил, что привело к неприятным последствиям. Начинания обиженного (и серьезно задолжавшего) генерала можно объяснить желанием перейти на французскую службу (или по крайней мере желанием получить отделение, которое не подчинялось бы приказам князя Юзефа).

Казалось, что время для этого благоприятное. Ведь страна готовилась к войне с Россией. Сокольницкий ранее служил во французской армии и мог считаться (а по крайней мере очень старался) знатоком российской проблематики. Полезными могли оказаться также научные интересы генерала и его опыт в подготовке различных проектов и меморандумов. Однако в некоторой степени проблемой стал приезд в Париж группы польских

vol. XL, z. 1, Warszawa-Kraków 2000–2001, p. 74–80; *Stan służby wojskowej tak w Polsce jako i zagranicą generała brygady Michała Sokolnickiego, członka Legionu Honorowego i wielu społeczeństw uczonych we Francji i we Włoszech*, w: B. Pawłowski, *Dziennik historyczny i korespondencja polowa generała Michała Sokolnickiego 1809 r.*, Kraków 1932, p. 6–10; А.М. Лукашевич, *Западный пограничный регион в военно-стратегических планах Российской империи (конец XVIII в. – 1812 г.): в 3 кн., кн I: Политическая ситуация по данным служб разведки и контрразведки*, Минск 2012, p. 346–347.

¹² P. Lelewel, *Pamiętniki i diariusz domu naszego*, wyd. I. Lelewel-Friemanowa, Wrocław-Warszawa-Kraków 1966, s. 131; B. Gembarzewski, *Wojsko Polskie. Księstwo Warszawskie 1807–1815*, Warszawa 1905, p. 22–23.

офицеров во главе с князем Понятовским. Под предлогом участия в крещении короля Рима, князь приехал в столицу Империи, чтобы принять участие в совещании на тему будущей войны. Это обстоятельство ставило Сокольниковского в неловкое положение и отодвигало его фигуру на задний план. В пользу генерала говорило мнение польского командного состава относительно того, как вести войну с Россией. Понятовский пытался убедить Наполеона принять решительные меры на Волыни, сторонником чего был также и Сокольниковский¹³.

Здесь очевидно влияние опыта, накопленного до сих пор поляками в предыдущих вооруженных конфликтах с Россией, а также знаний потенциала, предлагаемого бывшими землями Речи Посполитой. Виридианна Фишера писала:

По Российской Империи можно нанести удар только с юга. Ее северная часть будет автоматически побеждена, когда юг прекратит давать ей все то, что является залогом ее вооруженной силы. (...) Южные провинции России, а ранее польские, стольким обязаны природе, что они не могут обойтись без вклада человеческого мастерства. Их плодovitость необыкновенна (...). Зерновые рождаются почти без возделывания, поля пересекают большие реки; стада рогатого скота, дикие лошади великих мастей пасутся (...) на бескрайних лугах. (...) Если бы вывоз оттуда был разрешен, лошадей хватило бы на все европейские кавалерии¹⁴.

Кажется, что автор дневника (кроме некоторых преувеличений в описаниях) метко отразила мнения, господствующие в польских военных кругах. Для полноты картины можно добавить описание обеда, на котором князь Юзеф Понятовский принимал офицеров 20 марта 1811 года (то есть незадолго до поездки в Париж). Военный министр

пригласил на это пиршество депутацию почетных солдат и произнес тост за здоровье каждого из них, рассказывая при этом о ходе компании, за которую был награжден. Офицеры ответили на это

¹³ A. Ostrowski, *Żywot Tomasza Ostrowskiego, ministra Rzeczypospolitej później prezesa Senatu Księstwa Warszawskiego i Królestwa Polskiego oraz rys wypadków krajowych od 1763 roku do 1817*, vol. II, Paryż 1840, p. 94; R. Sołtyk, *Napoléon en 1812. Mémoires historiques et militaires sur la campagne de Russie*, Paris 1836, p. 27; M. Sokolnicki, *Generał Michał Sokolnicki 1760–1815*, Kraków–Warszawa 1912, p. 62–65.

¹⁴ W. Fiszerowa, *Dzieje moje...*, p. 369–370.

восклицаниями в честь князя и в порыве энтузиазма подскочили к столу, подняли его на руки, крича: «За то, чтобы мы могли понести тебя так аж до Киева!»¹⁵.

В пользу выбора юго-восточной сцены для театра военных действий говорили отношение местного населения и тот факт, что некоторые офицеры (в том числе Понятовский) уже участвовали в боях на территории Волыни во время кампании 1792 года. Ожидалось, что благодаря этому можно будет повторить успех военной кампании, проведенной в Галиции в 1809 году.

Осенью 1811 года Сокольницкий вернулся на несколько месяцев в Пулавы. Он по-прежнему отказывался исполнять свои обязанности, в результате чего 10 декабря был вычеркнут из списка активных генералов Войска Польского, а шесть дней спустя вынужден уйти в отставку. В этой ситуации, еще перед окончанием года он снова выехал во Францию, чтобы «искать счастья» на стороне Наполеона. 16 июня 1812 года он был назначен в императорский состав «Военного двора» (*Maison Militaire de l'Empereur*) в качестве переводчика и вестового офицера. Из бюджета «Военного двора» в течение года получал зарплату французского генерала дивизии¹⁶.

В результате, Сокольницкому было поручено ответственное задание командовать разведывательной ячейкой, заданием которой во время войны 1812 года было передавать Наполеону ежедневную информацию о топографии территории и маневрах и силе русской армии. Несмотря на усилия генерала, его несомненное трудолюбие и рвение, эффект оставался далеким от ожиданий Наполеона. Мариан Кукель оценил активность Сокольницкого во время кампании 1812 года по-солдатски (*он тратил впустую свои истинные таланты на мелкие услуги для главного штаба*)¹⁷.

Стоит задуматься, как, враждующему со своими начальниками, генералу удалось завоевать доверие императорского штаба. Кроме давнишних заслуг, существенную роль сыграла активность Сокольницкого в теоретическом плане. С осени 1811 по февраль 1812 года он засыпал императорский штаб серией меморандумов, которые, согласно намерениям автора, должны были

¹⁵ Ibidem, p. 364.

¹⁶ G. Six, *Dictionnaire biographique des généraux & amiraux français de la Révolution et de l'Empire (1792–1814)*, vol. II, Paris 1934, p. 460–461.

¹⁷ L. Senfft, *Mémoires du comte de...*, Leipzig 1863, p. 178; N. Gotteri, *Le Lorgne d'Ideville et le service de renseignements du ministère des Relations extérieures pendant la campagne de Russie [juin 1813–mars 1813]*, „Revue d'histoire diplomatique”, 103 (1989), p. 119, 124; M. Kukiel, *Wojna...*, vol. I, p. 168.

показать, каким образом можно надолго ослабить Россию. Историки оценили их отрицательно. В настоящее время рукописи меморандумов хранятся в центральных французских архивах. 14 лет назад они дождались перевода и печати... в Беларуси¹⁸.

Знакомясь с политическими и экономическими анализами, касающимися России, трудно удивляться мнению Кукеля. Но, однако, нельзя забывать, что Сокольниковский в первую очередь был офицером. Это заметно в содержании меморандумов – военные вопросы, планы будущей кампании, разные, предлагаемые для рассмотрения варианты, доказывают, что готовил их настоящий профессионал. Поэтому общая оценка предложений генерала кажется мне слишком суровой. Чисто военные вопросы, даже в случае недостатка информации, выглядят довольно интересно.

Сокольниковский рассмотрел разные возможности поведения армии Варшавского герцогства в случае российского упреждающего удара. Как известно, эта проблема рассматривалась польскими военачальниками в 1811 году. Генерал предложил сосредоточить Войско Польское на линии крепостей, охранявших реку Вислу. Независимо от варианта, ключевую роль должен был сыграть Модлин. В ожидании помощи Великой армии, Сокольниковский планировал создать сильную дивизию в Замостье. В связи с ожидаемым вовлечением россиян в действия на линии Вислы (или в связи с угрозой пересечения ими реки), он предложил произвести диверсионный удар со стороны Замостья по Волыни, а – при возможности – также по Подолью¹⁹.

Эта тема является одной из самых интересных во всем собрании меморандумов. Генерал неоднократно возвращается к ней, но наиболее полно он развивает ее в последней части своей работы – приложении, представленном французам 10 февраля 1812 года. В связи с изменением стратегической ситуации (уменьшилась вероятность нападения России на Варшавское герцогство), наступление на Волыни становится в планах Сокольниковского вспомогательным и защитным ударом в контексте действий Великой армии в Литве и Беларуси.

* * *

¹⁸ М. Сокольниковский, *„Исполнено по высочайшему повелению...“ Рапорт, поданный Наполеону начальником его контрразведки, полковником Михалом Сокольниковским, с рекомендациями „о способах избавления Европы от России...“*, ред. В.А. Яновский, Минск 2003.

¹⁹ M. Sokolnicki M., *General Michał...*, p. 209–210.

Меморандум (*Suplément. Coup d'oeil sur la Wolhynie, donnant par aperçu l'Itinéraire d'un marche qui purroit exécuter un Corps d'armée à travers cette province, pour se rendre de Zamość ou de Rubieszow dur le Bug, à Kiow sur le Dniester*)²⁰ содержит подробный пятиэтапный план нападения в направлении Киева. Это задание должен был выполнить примерно 20-тысячный корпус, сформированный из солдат и офицеров Войска Польского. В качестве поля маневров была выбрана территория Варшавского герцогства, а именно – окрестности Хрубешова. План предусматривал форсирование пяти рек, пересекающих дорогу в Киев, и возбуждение антироссийского восстания в юго-западных губерниях государства Александра I.

Для разработки плана наступления нужна была точная информация. Однако автор меморандума признается, что не все полученные сообщения считал достоверными, и некоторые предположения основывал на спекуляциях. Несмотря на это, нет никаких сомнений в том, что подготовка документа не была бы возможной без донесений компетентных информаторов, действующих на территории Волыни. Некоторые сообщения передавали эмиссары, а также офицеры, которые отправлялись «в командировку» на российскую территорию. Чтобы получить полную картину ситуации на территории проведения будущих военных действий, необходим был «источник», хорошо знающий географические условия и настроения людей, и в то же время владеющий основательными военными знаниями. Кажется, что польская сторона располагала информаторами (или их группой), отвечающими всем перечисленным требованиям. Вацлав Токаж вспоминал о польских военных, *которых в трех южных губерниях якобы было 20 тысяч*²¹.

На момент основания Варшавского герцогства на Волыни проживало трое бывших генералов Войска Польского – Михал Игнатий Каменский, Кишиштоф Карвицкий и Кароль Князевич²².

Двое старших офицеров окончательно закончило активную военную службу. В феврале 1808 года в армию Варшавского герцогства в звании генерала бригады вступил Каменский, а четыре года спустя в военные ряды вернулся Князевич. Бывший командир Наддунайского легиона безусловно пользовался самым большим авторитетом среди упомянутых

²⁰ Service Historique de la Défense, Vincennes, 1 M 1490, p. 97–115; AMAE, MD Pologne, vol. XXVIII, p. 195–209. Копия в: Biblioteka Książąt Czartoryskich w Krakowie, Rkps 5218 IV, Pisma polityczne różne 1810, vol. V, 1810. *Memoire par le Général Roźniecki [sic! – M.B.] présente à Napoléon pendant le séjour des Français à Varsovie.*

²¹ W. Tokarz, *Ostatnie lata Hugona Kołłątaja (1794–1812)*, vol. I, Kraków 1905, p. 273.

²² J. Czubyty, *Wodzowie i politycy. Generalicja polska 1806–1815*, Warszawa 1995, p. 105, 270, 279.

офицеров. После ухода из Легиона, в 1801 году он занялся сельским хозяйством в арендованных у Сангушков Зеленьцах. Пользовался уважением среди многих разбросанных по Волыни бывших офицеров польской армии²³. Иногда он бывал и в Варшаве, поддерживая связи с польскими военными. Его даже хотели назначить командиром восстания, планируемого на Волыни в 1807 году. С другой стороны, сотрудничество Князевичу, при создании польских воинских частей на российской службе, предлагал Александр I, от чего генерал отказался. Неоднократно казалось, что Князевич начнет службу в армии герцогства (1807, 1808, 1810). В конце концов, он принял участие в войне 1812 года, во время которой был ранен²⁴.

На Князевича (или группу, сосредоточенных вокруг него бывших военных), как на источник информации, указывают фрагменты меморандума со ссылкой на кампанию 1792 года. Значительной остается фраза из меморандума: *Помилованные судьбой, старые солдаты заботятся там [на территории давнишних сражений, Волыни – М.Б.] о печальных душах своих товарищей по оружию. Следят за настроениями населения и ждут своего Освободителя*, что, пожалуй, окончательно решает спор о связях автора меморандума с польскими военными, проживающими на Волыни.

* * *

Меморандум начинается с утверждения, что в случае войны с Россией Наполеон может захотеть отправить корпус в направлении Киева *с целью проведения серьезной диверсии, которая в случае успеха может иметь решающее значение для хода кампании*. Сразу после этого следует характеристика дороги, ведущей от Хрубешова через Буг (переправа в Устилуге), Владимир-Волыньский, Луцк, Дубно, Острог, Звягель (Новоград-Волынский), Житомир и Радомысль до Киева.

Длина всего маршрута рассчитана на 517,5 верст, что составляло чуть больше 550 км. Расчет этот на удивление точен и соответствует фактическому состоянию.

Еще одну проблему, имеющую ключевое значение, создавали реки. Корпус, наступающий на Киев, должен был переправиться через Буг, а затем

²³ Biblioteka Narodowa w Warszawie, Rkps III 6438, Szczepan Turno: *Zapiski historyczno-polityczne z lat 1811–1817*; W. Tokarz, *Ostatnie lata...*, vol. I, p. 251.

²⁴ S. Kieniewicz, *Kniażewicz Karol Otto h. własnego (1762–1842)*, w: *Polski Słownik Biograficzny*, vol. XIII, z. 1, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1967–1969, p. 118–119.

Стырь, Горынь, Случь и, наконец, Тетерев. Необходимость преодоления этих водных преград определяла следующие этапы плана.

Далее следует характеристика районов, расположенных к северу и югу от установленного маршрута наступления. Территория Полесья (слева от дороги) была представлена как бедный район, малонаселенный, болотистый, с зыбучими песками и *непроходимыми лесами*. Сокольницкий обратил также внимание на огромные трудности с возможным снабжением армии.

Меморандум содержит интересную характеристику жителей этой негостеприимной земли. А именно, в беспорядочно разбросанных поселениях, по мнению автора, можно было найти отличных стрелков, людей умных, верных и смелых, прекрасно подходящих для работы в качестве проводников. Советовалось даже провести вербовку около тысячи мужчин из Полесья и сформировать из них отряд разведчиков или элитарный батальон стрелков.

Совершенно по-другому описана территория на правом фланге, которая оценивалась как отлично подходящая для маневрирования войск (хорошая дорожная сеть, легкость заполучения транспортных средств), гораздо лучше населенная, и, таким образом, способная обеспечить припасами 50–60 тыс. солдат. Это вдвое увеличивало численность предусматриваемого исходного состояния сил, предназначенных для выполнения задания. Автор меморандума подчеркнул также преданность делу восстановления родины среди населения и отсутствие необходимости брать с собой большие запасы (за Бугом ни в чем не будет недостатка), понтонный парк (реки мелкие, а вокруг обилие деревьев) и слишком большой артиллерийский парк (боеприпасы можно будет восполнить попутно).

После описания основных вопросов, связанных с территорией будущих сражений, автор меморандума переходит к рассмотрению ситуации населения. Он составляет краткую характеристику административной структуры, обращая внимание на деятельность некоторых учреждений, оставшихся со времен Речи Посполитой. Далее обсуждаются настроения магнатов и мелкого дворянства. Причем последнему, по словам Сокольницкого, достаточно было бросить призыв к бою. В свою очередь группа набогатейших была охарактеризована, как легко поддающаяся переменным настроениям и прихотям. В этой ситуации генерал советовал соответствующим образом мотивировать ее. Обращение французского императора непосредственно к магнатам, по мнению Сокольницкого, удовлетворила бы их амбиции и дала гарантию поддержки для дела. Много внимания уделено описанию стремлений российских властей, направленных на усиление конфликтов между поляками и русинами и возбуждение неприязни по отношению

к французам. Ключевой была игра религиозными чувствами, которую умело использовало православное духовенство, уже в 1807 году назвав Наполеона *Антихристом* и *Демоном*. Сокольницкий утверждал, что поддержку нижних слоев населения можно будет, несмотря ни на что, завоевать, при условии провозглашения религиозной терпимости (с особой заботой о униатах) и введения Кодекса Наполеона.

В общем, ситуация среди жителей Волыни оценивалась как очень благоприятная для проведения военной операции. В тексте меморандума заметно полное убеждение в преданности дворянства идее восстановления родины. Об этом свидетельствовали приведенные примеры празднования на Волыни побед, одерживаемых Наполеоном в 1809 году. Автор оценивает, что в провинции можно будет завербовать 40–50 тыс. солдат (в том числе 1/3 конницы). Это позволило бы увеличить силу марширующих на Киев до 50–60 тыс., одновременно оставляя за собой примерно 10 тыс. для обороны путей сообщения. Не без значения оставалась также перспектива финансовой помощи со стороны польского магнатства. Ее примеры были хорошо видны во время предыдущей кампании. Сокольницкий оценивал, что в случае Волыни ситуация может выглядеть похожим образом, и самые богатые семьи согласятся финансировать контингент из 5–6 полков.

Состав и структура корпуса

В состав сил, предназначенных для похода на Киев, должны были войти отряды из штатных военных. Основу корпуса в планах составляло бы 20 до 24 пехотных батальонов, поддерживаемых таким же количеством эскадронов конных полков, 4 артиллерийские роты (в том числе одна конная) и вспомогательные войска (саперная рота, рота сопровождения поездов).

Сокольницкий предлагал разделить пехоту на три группы, включающие, соответственно: объединенные гренадерские роты, объединенные вольтижерские роты и фузилерные батальоны (После отделения вольтижерской и гренадерской рот в батальоне оставалось бы только 4 центральные роты). Автор меморандума объяснял, что таким образом батальоны смогут достичь большей мобильности. Аналогичные решения поляки успешно применяли во время кампании 1809 года, выделяя из первичных батальонов гренадеров или вольтижеров и формируя выборные роты в более крупные отряды на время выполнения конкретных заданий.

Планируемое распределение, состав и дислокация корпуса, предназначенного к походу на Киев, должны были выглядеть следующим образом:

Авангард (Хородло)

2 батальона пехоты

8 вольтижерских рот

4 эскадрона уланов

4 конные пушки (2 шестифунтовые пушки и 2 гаубицы)

Основные силы (Хрубешув)

20 батальонов пехоты (в двух перебросах)

10 пушек (4 четырехфунтовые пушки, 4 шестифунтовые пушки, 2 гаубицы)

все кессоны

Запас (Дубенка)

все гренадерские роты

все артиллеристы без пушек

саперы

2 двенадцатифунтовые пушки, артиллерийский парк

батальон пехоты (рота сопровождения поездов с вооружением и техникой)

Аррьергард (Дубенка)

батальон пехоты

6 вольтижерских рот

4 эскадрона конных стрелков

2 четырехфунтовые пушки

Правая колонна (Крылов)

12 конных эскадронов

2 четырехфунтовые конные пушки

Левая колонна

6 вольтижерских рот (Дрогичин)

4 вольтижерские роты (Сьверже)

4 эскадрона конных стрелков (Седлище)

После подсчета подразделений по численности, мы получим приблизительно следующий боевой состав отдельных групп:

Авангард – ок. 3 тыс.

Основные силы – ок. 11 тыс.

Запас – ок. 2,2 тыс.

Аррьергард – ок. 4 тыс.

Правая колонна – ок. 2,5 тыс.

Левая колонна – ок. 2,2 тыс.

Это в общей сложности давало около 25 тыс. готовых к бою, в том числе почти 20 тыс. в пехоте, почти 5 тыс. в легкой кавалерии и около 500 артиллеристов и саперов. К этой цифре следовало бы еще добавить небоевые отряды – состав артиллерийского парка.

Исходные позиции для отдельных групп были выбраны неслучайно. В окрестностях Дубенки и Хрубешова находились удобные переправы в Уханьке и Устилуге, а в Свержах реку можно было перейти вброд. В последнем пункте, почти у самой реки, стоял дворец Руликовских, с которыми Сокольницкий мог познакомиться, находясь в Люблине или на приеме в Пулавах. В Хородле переправу облегчал, возвышающийся над Бугом, замковый холм. Аналогично выглядела ситуация в Крылове – пункт переправы через реку должен был находиться поблизости, расположенных на острове, руин замка Остророгов, которые и по сей день дают представление об обогрительных преимуществах этого места.

Отряды, размещенные на оси Крылов-Хрубешув-Хородло-Дубенка, должны были быть расположены относительно близко друг к другу (расстояние между отдельными местностями составляет от 20 до 30 км). Потому могли бы помогать друг другу и в то же время снизить риск загорождения дороги.

Я представляю только основные предположения отдельных этапов планируемого наступления.

Этап 1.

- переправа через Буг
- ложные действия левой колонны (создать видимость, что целью является Брест-Литовский)
- завоевание Ковеля
- переправа через Стырь
- захват Луцка
- завоевание Дубна
- разведка путей доступа к Кременьцу и Тарнополю

Этап 2.

- переправа через Горынь
- завоевание Острога
- захват Славуты с конюшнями князей Сангушков

Этап 3.

- завоевание Полонного (использование пушек, захваченных в арсенал, с целью вооружения артиллерийского отряда без пушек, который должен был входить в состав корпуса)
- переправа через Случь

Этап 4.

- завоевание Житомира
- разведка направления Мозырь и Киев

Этап 5.

- обход российских оборонительных позиций в Василькове и Бялогрудке
- остановка на линии польско-российской границы с 1772 г.
- возможное предпринятие дальнейших действий, в зависимости от ситуации на юге.

* * *

Сыграла ли Волынь какую-либо роль во французских приготовлениях к войне? Оказывается, что да, но, к сожалению, совсем иную, чем предполагал автор меморандума. По мнению Сокольниковского, диверсия на Волыни должна была быть связана с действиями Великой армии на северной сцене войны. Он считал, что тесное сотрудничество основных сил и войск, наступающих на Киев, приведет к нанесению по России решающего удара. Но французы пришли к несколько иным выводам. Хотя министерство иностранных дел империи требовало от Биньона информации о Волыни и болотах Полесья, Подолья, Украины, Ливонии и Курляндии, а даже Молдавии, но основное внимание сосредотачивалось на Литве²⁵.

Интерес к Литве был связан с французским видением будущей военной кампании. Наполеон считал, что именно на севере било сердце России, и потому там должны были быть предприняты шаги, решающие об исходе военных действий. План войны был создан на основании модели до сих пор существующих мгновенных кампаний, которые, однако, проводились в совершенно других условиях, на территории Западной и Центральной Европы. Казалось очевидным, что россияне попытаются основными силами защитить направления, ведущие к Москве и Санкт-Петербургу. Поэтому нападение на Литву теоретически дало бы Наполеону возможность

²⁵ *Instrukcje i depesze rezydentów francuskich w Warszawie 1807–1813*, wyd. M. Handelsman, vol. I, Kraków 1914, p. 267–268, 281–282, 297, 332, 345, 349; A. Ostrowski, *Żywot...*, vol. I, p. 199–200, 215; W. Tokarz, *Ostatnie lata...*, vol. I, p. 252, 346.

уничтожить живую силу противника, создать угрозу для его столицы и обеспечить быстрое подписание перемирия. Чтобы увеличить шансы на успех мероприятия, Бонапарт пытался принудить россиян разделить силы, что гарантировало бы ему подавляющее численное превосходство в главном направлении действий. Он стремился к этому, пытаясь ввести противника в заблуждение, что он якобы заинтересован в нападении на юго-западные провинции России. Маршал Даву, командир самого сильного французского корпуса, весной 1812 года должен был занять позиции на реке Лаве, а затем *объявиться в Варшаве*. По мнению Анри Бонналя, нужно было *убедить россиян, что корпус I [Даву] будет маршировать из Торуня в Варшаву, и что его действия по-прежнему будут сосредоточены на Волыни, самой урожайной провинции России*²⁶.

Предложения близкие сердцу поляков шли вразрез с планами императора французов, который посчитал Волынское направление второстепенным. С точки зрения временной перспективы можно утверждать, что Наполеон сделал ошибку. Хотя русская армия на момент начала кампании была разделена, но в конечном счете отрядам Барклая де Толли и Багратиона удалось объединиться под Смоленском. Против оставшейся на Волыни третьей армии Тормасова Бонапарт направил саксонский и австрийский корпуса, которые получили, прежде всего, оборонительные задания²⁷. Кроме того, своим жестоким поведением они быстро вызвали неприязнь среди местного населения.

Тем временем силы Войска Польского таяли, действуя в рамках основных групп Великой Армии. Еще в Смоленске князь Юзеф умолял Наполеона направить польские отряды *на Волынь и Украину, чтобы повторить галисийскую акцию с 1809 г., только с еще большим размахом. Он указал на большую роль этого фланга в защите основных сил и улучшении снабжения*²⁸. Как мы знаем, Понятовский не получил согласия на подобные действия. Прот Лелевель, офицер дивизии Домбровского, получивший приказ блокировать Бобруйскую крепость, вздыхал:

почему же Наполеон не Шварценберга с Ренне и саксами сюда поставил, а нас не послал на Киев, мы бы чудеса творили, как с пруссаками в 1807 г., австрийцами в 1809 г. Мы выгнали бы противника за Днепр,

²⁶ H. Bonnal, *Manewr Wileński. Zarys strategii Napoleona i jego psychologii wojskowej (styczeń 1811–lipiec 1812)*, Oświęcim 2010, p. 37.

²⁷ *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier...*, vol XXIV, p. 50–51.

²⁸ J. Skowronek, *Książe Józef Poniatowski*, Wrocław–Warszawa–Kraków 1984, p. 218.

за Днестр, а сколько бы мы сформировали нового, готового к бою войска²⁹.

На более позднем этапе кампании с отрядами Тормасова объединится, марширующая из Молдавии, Дунайская армия адмирала Чичагова. И именно со стороны Волыни российской армией будет нанесен сильный удар, который поставит под угрозу пути сообщения французской армии и почти приведет к уничтожению Великой армии на Березине. К концепции действий на Волыни Наполеон вернулся только в первые дни декабря 1812 года, когда кампания была уже проиграна³⁰.

The plan of the Polish offensive in Volhynia in 1812 in the aspect of the memorial by general Michał Sokolnicki

Summary

The article concerns functioning of the Polish intelligence service before the Russian campaign in 1812. One of the important concepts of Polish staff was the plan of the assault through Volhynia – strategically important area. Thirty-thousand corps and the help of the polish people could lead to liberation of Volhynia from the Russian reign. Michał Sokolnicki, one of the most talented polish generals, prepared the memorial on this issue.

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²⁹ P. Lelewel, *Pamiętniki...*, p. 170.

³⁰ *Correspondance de Napoléon Ier...*, vol XXIV, p. 334.

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Engagement at Brandy Station (August 20, 1862)

The name of Brandy Station is, in most cases, associated by historians of the Civil War with a battle that took place on June 9, 1863. In the vicinity of this small Virginian community 9,500 Confederates led by Maj. Gen. Jeb Stuart clashed with numbering 11,000 Union forces under the command of Maj. Gen. Alfred Pleasonton. It was the largest cavalry battle of that conflict, and simultaneously the largest cavalry battle fought on American continent. Yet, hardly anybody is aware of the fact that less than year before, practically in the same place, it came to another cavalry engagement. Admittedly, it differ from later battle, for example in scale, but it does not make it any less important. Let us have a look at events, that led to the first engagement at Brandy Station.

Strategic situation on Eastern Theatre (July-August, 1862)

As the result of the Seven Days Battles (June 25-July 1, 1862) Union Army of the Potomac (commanded by Maj. Gen. George B. McClellan) was pushed back from Richmond by Confederate Army of Northern Virginia (commanded by Gen. Robert E. Lee) and stuck at Harrison's Landing, Virginia. About the same time, on June 26, President Abraham Lincoln ordered that forces under Major Generals John C. Frémont, Nathaniel P. Banks, Irvin McDowell, including troops under Brigadier General Samuel D. Sturgis, would be consolidated and form one army – Army of Virginia, under the command of Maj. Gen. John Pope. Primary task given to that army was to protect national capital. It should also “threaten

the enemy in the direction of Charlottesville, and render the most effective aid to relieve General McClellan and capture Richmond.”¹

Meanwhile, Confederates, willing to shift military operations on to Union territory, moved to the North. Lee separated from his army forces of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. “Stonewall” Jackson (25,000 men), with a task to outflank the Army of Virginia and cut off its communication lines with Washington, D.C. At the same time Pope received an order to make a demonstration in the direction of Gordonsville, to draw Lee’s attention, so to enable evacuation of McClellan’s army from the Peninsula. Soon both sides clashed in the first battle of that campaign. On August 9, 1862, Federal Second Corps, under the command of Maj. Gen. Banks encountered Confederate forces in the vicinity of Cedar Mountain. After short and fierce fighting Confederates won a victory. Jackson unsure of the location of the rest of Pope’s army called off the pursuit. He maintain on the battlefield for next two days, and finally, receiving news that the entire Army of Virginia had arrived at Culpeper Court House, on the night of August 11 he fell back behind the Rapidan river, on Gordonsville.²

Soon Union forces reoccupied the Rapidan river line. Brigadier General George D. Bayard’s brigade composed of four regiments of cavalry (the First New Jersey³, First Pennsylvania, First Rhode Island, and the First Maine) guarded the center

¹ A. Lincoln to Gens. Banks, Frémont, and McDowell (June 26, 1862), *The War of the Rebellion: A Compilation of the Official Records of the Union and Confederate Armies* (hereafter cited as OR), ser. I, vol. XII, part III, Washington 1885, p. 435.

² No. 28. Reports of Maj. Gen. Thomas J. Jackson, C. S. Army, commanding Valley District, with congratulations from General R. E. Lee, OR, ser. I, vol. XII, part II, Washington 1885, p. 185; R. K. Krick, *Stonewall Jackson at Cedar Mountain*, Chapel Hill–London 1990, p. 351.

³ This regiment was commanded at that time by a Pole, Lt. Col. Joseph Kargé. He is, along with Władimir Krzyżanowski, one of the most known and recognizable Polish officers in the Civil War. He was born on July 4, 1823 in Olędry Terespolskie, near Opalenica (Grand Duchy of Posen). During the Spring of the Nations he deserted from the Prussian army and joined forces of Ludwik Mierosławski. He was captured and sentenced to death, but he managed to escape, and through Hamburg he went to London, and from there, further to New York (1851). When the Civil War broke out he volunteered to the army, and by the decision of Governor Charles S. Olden he was assigned to the First New Jersey Cavalry in the rank of Lieutenant Colonel. After the first commander of the regiment – William Halsted, was dismissed from the army (Feb. 1862), and again when the second commander – sir Percy Wyndham, was captured (June 1862), temporary command of the First New Jersey devolved to Joseph Kargé. F. C. Kajencki, *Star on Many a Battlefield. Brevet Brigadier General Joseph Kargé in the American Civil War*, Rutherford–Madison–Teaneck 1980, pp. 23, 37–38; W. A. Packard, *Joseph Kargé. A Memorial Sketch*, New York 1893, p. 6 (*Civil War Units Histories, Part 3 – New Jersey*, microfiche 1203, R. W. Woodruff Library, Emory University, Atlanta); H. R. Pyne, *The History of the First New Jersey Cavalry (Sixteenth Regiment, New Jersey Volunteers)*, Trenton 1871, pp. 52–56.

of the Federal army, aligned with Rapidan Station. His pickets extended from the Robertson River on the west to Somerville Ford on the east.⁴

Lee mapped another bold scheme to strike Pope's army. Jeb Stuart's cavalry was to play a key role in it. He was supposed to cross the Rapidan river and move toward the Rappahannock, where he should destroy a bridge at Rappahannock Station, thus cutting off Federal's army route of retreat. Consequently the main Confederate forces, massed behind Clark's Mountain, ca. 16 km from Cedar Mountain, were to attack the left flank and rear of the Army of Virginia, rolling it up from east to west. Lee hoped that he would be able to destroy Union forces entirely before Pope could be effectively reinforced by the Army of the Potomac, arriving at Acquia Creek.⁵

During a scouting mission in the vicinity of Louisa Court House, the First Michigan Cavalry Regiment seized Major Norman Fitzhugh, carrying Lee's letter of instructions. Pope gained an unexpected advantage. Aware of enemy's plans he immediately ordered hasty withdrawal beyond the Rappahannock river.⁶

Preliminary moves (August 18–20, 1862)

On August 18, 1862 Bayard received orders to cover the withdrawal of the Army of Virginia from the vicinity of Cedar Mountain. His brigade, at that time, consisted of five regiments of cavalry, as it had been recently expanded with

⁴ S. J. Bayard, *The life of George Dashiell Bayard, late Captain, U. S. A., and Brigadier-General of Volunteers, killed in the battle of Fredericksburg, Dec. 1862*, New York 1874, pp. 229–230; F. C. Kajencki, *op. cit.*, p. 75; [W. P. Lloyd], *History of the First Reg't Pennsylvania Reserve Cavalry, from its organization, August, 1861, to September, 1864, with list of names of all officers and enlisted men who have ever belonged to the regiment, and remarks attached to each name, nothing change, &c.*, Philadelphia 1864, p. 28; E. G. Longacre, *Jersey Cavaliers. A History of the First New Jersey Volunteer Cavalry, 1861–1865*, Highstown 1992, pp. 87–88.

⁵ *Ibid.*, p. 88; F. C. Kajencki, *op. cit.*, p. 75; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, pp. 91–92; No. 193. *Reports of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army, commanding cavalry of the Army of Northern Virginia, of operations August 16–September 2*, OR, ser. I, vol. XII, part II, pp. 725–726.

⁶ No. 2. *Reports of Maj. Gen. John Pope, U. S. Army, of the operations of the Army of Virginia June 26–September 2, with orders and correspondence*, *ibid.*, p. 29; J. Pope to H. W. Halleck (August 18, 1862 – 1.30 p.m.; received 2 p.m.), *ibid.*, part III, p. 591; J. Pope to H. W. Halleck (August 18, 1862; received 3.30 p.m.), *ibid.*; H. W. Halleck to J. Pope (August 18, 1862), *ibid.*; S. J. Bayard, *op. cit.*, p. 231; F. C. Kajencki, *op. cit.*, p. 75; E. G. Longacre, *op. cit.*, p. 88; J. S. Lyon, *War sketches. From Cedar Mountain to Bull Run. Consisting of Personal and Historical Incidents of the Campaign under Major General Pope in the Summer of 1862*, Buffalo 1882, p. 13.

the addition of the Second New York Cavalry commanded by Lt. Col. Judson Kilpatrick.⁷ The cavalry maintained a protective screen, and waited the entire night of 18th and most of the following day until the army's trains passed safely with Maj. Gen. Franz Sigel's Corps closing the column. Bayard moved his troops and reached Culpeper at 10 p.m. After a short rest he continued his march to the east, and reached Brandy Station about midnight. There his brigade halted for the night.⁸

Early in the morning (August 20), Bayard's men had barely time to prepare a hasty breakfast of coffee, broken biscuits and corn gathered from a nearby field, before they were again in the saddle. General sent out detachments to reconnoitre the area. One of them (a squadron of the First Maine), moving south on the Raccoon Ford road, encountered Confederate vanguard, the Seventh Virginia Cavalry (Col. William E. Jones⁹) from Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson's brigade¹⁰.

Rebel cavalry, in accordance with Gen. Lee's order, spent the entire day (August 19) resting and preparing for further operations. About 4 a.m. in the morning on August 20 Confederates moved across the Rapidan at two adjacent fords and pushed briskly forward. Brig. Gen. Fitzhugh Lee's brigade moved by Madden's in the direction of Kelly's and Ellis' Fords, on the Rappahannock (it would not take part in the engagement at Brandy Station). The second brigade (Brig. Gen. Beverly Robertson), accompanied personally by Jeb Stuart, took a road via Stevensburg toward Brandy Station. The immense dust raised by Confederates made their movement impossible to conceal. In the vicinity of Mountain Run leading regiment (7th Virginia Cavalry) encountered Union reconnaissance. Col. Jones having decisively superior forces began to gradually push back Federals. Maine cavalymen slowly retreated, falling back toward positions of the Second New York Cavalry (Lt. Col. Kilpatrick). New Yorkers kept Confederates at bay until all

⁷ S. J. Bayard, *op. cit.*, p. 231; F. C. KAJENCKI, *op. cit.*, p. 75; E. G. Longacre, *op. cit.*, p. 88; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, p. 92; No. 3. *Reports of Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard, U. S. Army, of operations July 21-September 2, OR*, ser. I, vol. XII, part II, p. 89.

⁸ *Ibid.*; F. C. KAJENCKI, *op. cit.*, pp. 75-76; [W. P. Lloyd], *op. cit.*, p. 28; E. G. Longacre, *op. cit.*, pp. 88-89; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, pp. 92-93.

⁹ William Edmondson Jones, also known as "Grumble" Jones. Commander of the First, then Seventh Virginia Cavalry. Promoted to the rank of Brigadier General on September 19, 1862. Took part also in the "second" battle of Brandy Station (June 9, 1863). Killed one year later in the battle of Piedmont (June 5, 1864). E. J. Warner, *Generals in Grey. Lives of the Confederate Commanders*, Baton Rouge 1970, pp. 166-167.

¹⁰ No. 3. *Reports of Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard, U. S. Army...*, p. 89; No. 193. *Reports of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army...*, p. 726; No. 194. *Reports of Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson, C. S. Army, commanding Cavalry Brigade, of operations August 20-30, OR*, ser. I, vol. XII, part II, p. 745; S. J. Bayard, *op. cit.*, p. 231; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, p. 93.

the reconnoitring parties returned¹¹. In the heavy skirmish the Second New York lost several men, who were wounded. Bayard, who had strict orders not to cause general engagement, ordered further slow withdrawal on the line of the Rappahannock river. The First Maine and First Rhode Island took the lead and made their way in good order toward the Rappahannock fords. Remaining regiments were to follow as soon as they were able to turn their backs to the enemy¹².

The engagement – initial phase

Willing to discourage Confederates from continuing their pursuit, Bayard deployed his regiments in the proximity of Brandy Station. The Second New York Cavalry (Lt. Col. Kilpatrick) took position beyond a strip of timber that separated the river from the open ground to the south. To the right of Kilpatrick's and some 550 meters in rear Bayard placed First New Jersey Cavalry (Lt. Col. Kargé). On Kilpatrick's left, to the south of the railroad and just beyond the timber, Bayard formed as a reserve the First Pennsylvania (Col. Owen Jones)¹³.

Soon Confederates renewed their offensive against Union forces. Advance of Col. "Grumble" Jones' and his Seventh Virginia Cavalry was checked once again, this time by a strong line of dismounted skirmishers, that Kargé had pushed forward. Using greater range of their carbines¹⁴ they effectively fired at

¹¹ H. R. Pyne gives some of the credit to Lt. Col. Kargé and his dismounted cavalymen, whose flanking fire supposedly forced rebels to retreat. Longacre, relying on Bayard's report, claims that this success of Poles' skirmishers took place a bit later, already during the main phase of the engagement. See: *Ibid.*, pp. 93–94; E. Longacre, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–90; No. 3. *Reports of Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard, U. S. Army...*, p. 90.

¹² *Ibid.*, p. 89; No. 193. *Reports of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army...*, p. 726; No. 194. *Reports of Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson, C. S. Army...*, p. 745; F. C. Kajencki, *op. cit.*, pp. 76–77; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, pp. 93–94; E. W. Sheppard, *The Campaign in Virginia and Maryland, June 26th to Sept. 20th, 1862, Cedar Run, Manassas, and Sharpsburg*, London–New York 1911, pp. 70–71.

¹³ Pyne give an information that another regiment formed on Kilpatrick's left – Tenth New York Cavalry. However this information is not confirmed by sources. What is more, this regiment never belonged to Bayard's brigade. See: [W. P. Lloyd], *op. cit.*, p. 28; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, pp. 92, 94–95; No. 3. *Reports of Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard, U. S. Army...*, p. 89.

¹⁴ Soldiers of the First New Jersey Cavalry were, at that time, armed with Burnside single-shot breach-loading carbines (designed and patented by Ambrose Burnside). Their main asset was an ejector, which bumped the empty case loose from the bottom of the chamber. However this mechanism often proved to be fallible. Great number of these carbines ended in Confederate hands (at least seven rebel cavalry regiments were partially armed with that weapon). See: J. G. Bilby, *Civil War Firearms. Their Historical Background, Tactical Use and Modern Collecting and Shooting*, [Pennsylvania] 1996, pp. 140–142; P. Derengowski, *Między nowożytnością a współczesnością. Broń*

approaching Southerners, even forcing them to fall back. *But* – as General Bayard wrote in his report – *this was but a temporary success*¹⁵.

The engagement – main phase

Confederates quickly reformed their ranks, and now being sure that the enemy forces in front of them consisted solely of cavalry, they prepared more determined attack on positions held by Union troops. Federals knew that the attack was inevitable, as dust clouds marked approaching rebel cavalry. General Robertson sent Twelfth Virginia (Col. A. W. Harman) directly against the Second New York. Sixth and Seventh were directed more to the left, with an intent to outflank the Federal defensive position¹⁶. The Virginians attacked New Yorkers just as they were executing of a maneuver, and had their backs to the enemy. The ferocious charge and the yells of the rebel cavalry seemed to have caused panic in Lt. Col. Kilpatrick's men, and they ran in confusion, additionally rolling and disorganizing left flank of Lt. Col. Kargé's regiment¹⁷. Some Southerners pursued New Yorkers and outflanked the First New Jersey. Others attacked Kargé's regiment from the front, encountering Lieutenant Henry W. Sawyer's skirmishers. He held fire until

palna wojny secesyjnej (1861–1865), "Przegląd Historyczno-Wojskowy" 2011, No. 4 (237), p. 15; J. B. Whisker, *U.S. and Confederate Arms and Armories During the American Civil War*, vol. 2, *U.S. Civil War Carbines*, Lewiston–Queenston–Lampeter 2002, pp. 110–121.

¹⁵ E. G. Longacre, *op. cit.*, pp. 89–90; No. 3. *Reports of Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard, U. S. Army...*, p. 90; No. 193. *Reports of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army...*, pp. 726–727; No. 194. *Reports of Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson, C. S. Army...*, p. 746.

¹⁶ Confederate reports are inconsistent in reference to the exact composition of rebel forces participating in this attack. Stuart's report suggests that it was made by four cavalry regiments: Seventh Virginia, which pushed forward by the road, and Sixth, Twelfth, and Seventeenth Virginia, which, by his direction moved against the enemy's flank. On the other hand Robertson's report mentions only three regiments: Sixth, Seventh, and Twelfth Virginia. Interestingly, according to Robertson it was the Twelfth, not Seventh Virginia that led the attack against the center of the federal line. I myself lean toward Robertson's report, mainly because it was written closer to these events – in October, 1862. Stuart made his report in February, 1863. See: *Ibid.*, pp. 745–746; No. 193. *Reports of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army...*, pp. 725–727.

¹⁷ No. 3. *Reports of Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard, U. S. Army...*, p. 90; F. C. Kąjenczyński, *op. cit.*, p. 77; E. G. Longacre, *op. cit.*, pp. 90–91. Somewhat differently this episode was presented by Pyne. He claims, that the Second New York received an order to counter charge the enemy. While executing the order, just before the clash of two opposing forces, leading lieutenant drew rein, and backed his horse right through the ranks behind him. As the result the entire front of the column halted in irremediable confusion, which in consequence led to rout the New York regiment. Whereas the History of the First Pennsylvania Cavalry essentially confirm Bayard's version. See: [W. P. Lloyd], *op. cit.*, pp. 28–29; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, pp. 95–96.

the rebel cavalry closed in almost on top of his position. Then, as Confederates, blinded by their own dust, rushed madly down upon him, he gave the order, "Fire!". Sawyer's men, having Burnside's breech-loading carbines managed to pour in three deadly volleys, repulsing the enemy in that section of the battlefield. However, this small success did not change the overall course of the engagement¹⁸.

Lieutenant Colonel Joseph Kargé willing to use the fact, that Confederates that pursued New Yorkers exposed their flank, ordered his men to change front. Before he had finished the maneuver Federal lines were attacked from the front and flank by dashing cavalymen from Sixth and Seventh Virginia. Admittedly, Kargé tried to save the situation and counter charged with a portion of his men, however most of the regiment was dispersed. Those who did not flee, now reinforced by Sawyer's skirmishers started to withdraw to the rear, fighting hand to hand on every step with the foremost of their pursuers¹⁹.

The engagement – final phase

When it seemed that nothing could save fleeing Kargé's soldiers from being captured by pursuing Southerners the situation changed dramatically. All of a sudden Confederates became a target of an attack of two companies of the First New Jersey Cavalry (commanded by Captains Virgil Broderick and John H. Lucas), which charged the rebel chaser column from two sides. A fierce melee fighting took place, during which Lt. Col. Kargé was wounded (he was shot in the leg). Within few minutes attacking Union troops were additionally reinforced by a detachment from the First Pennsylvania Cavalry, commanded by Maj. Richard Falls. It turned the scale in favor of Federals. Confederates surprised by such development of the events were checked and forced to withdraw. While General Bayard, after restoring order within his lines, crossed the Rappahannock river²⁰.

¹⁸ *Ibid.*, p. 96; F. C. Kajencki, *op. cit.*, p. 79.

¹⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 79–80; E. G. Longacre, *op. cit.*, p. 91; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, pp. 96–97; No. 3. *Reports of Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard, U. S. Army...*, p. 90; No. 194. *Reports of Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson, C. S. Army...*, p. 746.

²⁰ No. 3. *Reports of Brig. Gen. George D. Bayard, U. S. Army...*, p. 90; F. C. Kajencki, *op. cit.*, p. 80; [W. P. Lloyd], *op. cit.*, p. 29; E. G. Longacre, *op. cit.*, 91–92; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, 97. Interestingly, Confederate reports are completely omitting this phase of the engagement. Both Stuart, and Robertson claim that after a short fight the enemy withdrew. See: No. 193. *Reports of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army...*, p. 727; No. 194. *Reports of Brig. Gen. Beverly H. Robertson, C. S. Army...*, p. 746.

Summary

Despite undoubtedly unfavorable battle course, especially in its main phase, Bayard's brigade, fighting with superior Confederate forces, fulfilled its main task, i.e. to cover the retreat of the Army of Virginia beyond the Rappahannock river. Even Gen. Jeb Stuart himself admitted that bearing of the Federals on that day forced Confederates to modify their original plan. He claimed at the same time that Southerners had to fight at Brandy Station with two Union cavalry brigades, though it seems that both sides had more or less equal forces²¹. Confederates emphasized large number of captured Union soldiers – 64 (including few officers). From this number a great deal was from Kargé's regiment, who lost on that day 40 out of about 250 men participating in the engagement. On the other hand casualties given by Confederates in their reports are surprisingly low – 3 killed and 13 wounded²².

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²¹ Admittedly Bayard's brigade was composed of five regiments, but as we remember two of them: First Maine, and First Rhode Island crossed the Rappahannock river just after morning skirmishes with Confederate vanguard, and they did not participate in the engagement at Brandy Station.

²² No. 193. *Reports of Maj. Gen. James E. B. Stuart, C. S. Army...*, pp. 726–728; No. 194. *Reports of Brig. Gen. Beverly Robertson, C. S. Army...*, p. 746; F. C. Kąjenci, *op. cit.*, p. 81; E. G. Longacre, *op. cit.*, p. 92; H. R. Pyne, *op. cit.*, pp. 97–98.

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Vergessene deutsche Luftschiffe des Typs „SL” und Konstrukteur Johann Schütte

Der Beginn des Aufbaus einer regulären Luftschifftruppe in Deutschland lässt sich auf den 9. Mai 1884 datieren.

An diesem Tag verfügte der preußische Kriegsminister die Schaffung einer Versuchsstation für Captif-Ballons in Berlin sowie die Aufstellung einer provisorischen Luftschiffereinheit in Stärke von 4 Offizieren, 4 Unteroffizieren und 29 Mannschaften. Als Ausbilder wurde der Berufsluftschiffer Opitz eingesetzt.

Diesem Ereignis vorausgegangen war die Gründung des „Deutschen Vereins zur Förderung der Luftschiffahrt“ am 8. September 1881, von dem im weiteren wichtige Impulse für die Gestaltung des Heeresluftschiffwesens ausgingen¹.

Kurzer Lebenslauf von Johann Schütte

Nach dem Besuch der Oberrealschule in Oldenburg absolvierte er ein Praktikum an der Kaiserlichen Werft in Kiel. 1897 ist er in den Technischen Betrieb des Norddeutschen Lloyd eingetreten. Hier wurde er mit der Planung und Leitung der neu entstehenden Versuchsanstalt für Schleppversuche betraut, wo er die wissenschaftlichen Grundlagen für die Optimierung der Schiffsform kennenlernte. 1908 wendete sich Schütte, nach einem schweren Zeppelin-Unglück, dem Luftschiffbau zu. Zusammen mit dem Mannheimer Landmaschinenhersteller Karl Lanz gründete er 1909 die „Luftschiff- und Flugzeugbau Schütte-Lanz“ mit Werken in Mannheim und Zeesen bei Berlin².

¹ J. Eichler, *Luftschiffe und Luftschiffahrt*, Brandenburgisches Verlagshaus in Siegler / Co. GmbH 1992, S. 19.

² S. Wentzler, *Die Schütte-Lanz-Innovation*, Oldenburg 2000, S. 33–34.



Abbildung Nr. 1. Porträt Johann Schütte

Als im 1904 die neu gegründete Technische Hochschule in Danzig ihre Pforten öffnete, gehörte Johann Schütte zu den jungen Professoren, die dort einen Lehrstuhl erhalten hatten. Er trat seinen Dienst mit der Eröffnung der Hochschule im Oktober 1904 an und übernahm den Lehrstuhl für Theorie des Schiffes und Entwerfen von Schiffen³.

Die Familie siedelte nach Danzig – Langfuhr um und wohnte am Jeschkentaler Weg 47⁴. Dieses Gebäude steht bis heute und befindet sich unweit der Waldbühne.

Der Industrielle und Investor Karl Lanz und das erste Luftschiff „SL1”

Johann Schütte trat zur Realisierung seiner Projekte mit dem Industriellen Karl Lanz eine Verbindung ein. Am 22. April 1909 gründeten sie gemeinsam das Unternehmen „Luftschiffbau Schütte – Lanz”. Die Arbeiten an dem ersten Luftschiff SL I begannen im Herbst 1909 in der neuen Produktionshalle im Mannheim-Rheinau⁵.

Bei der Realisierung des neuen ehrgeizigen Projekts halfen dem Professor seine Schüler aus der Danziger Technischen Hochschule: Walter Bleistein, Georg Christians und Franz Krukenberg.

³ M. Bakun, *Lotnictwo na ziemi gdańskiej 1910–1945*, Toruń 2012, S. 43.

⁴ Neues Adressbuch für Danzig und seine Vororte 1909, S. 444.

⁵ A. Jahn: *Die Luftwaffe 1918 herausgegeben vom Luftfahrerdank*, Berlin 1920, S. 123.

Am 17. Oktober 1911 fand nach vielen Versuchen der erste offizielle Flug des Luftschiffes SL 1 statt. Am 23. April 1913 r. wurde dieses Luftschiff an das Heer verkauft.

Im Sommer 1913 absolvierte das Luftschiff einen Übungsflug von Berlin-Biesdorf nach Königsberg, mit einer Zwischenlandung in Danzig. Die Danziger Bürger konnten zu ersten Mal ein Luftschiff aus der Nähe bewundern. Auf dem Rückflug nach Mannheim verunglückte das Luftschiff in der Nähe von Schneidemühl /Piła/ und wurde komplett zerstört⁶.




Abbildung Nr. 2.
Luftschiff SL 1 um 1912



Abbildung Nr. 3.
Luftschiff SL 1 in Danzig, 1913




Abbildung Nr. 4.
Die Zerstörung des Luftschiffes SL 1
bei Schneidemühl, 1913

⁶ Bundes Militärarchiv in Freiburg, PH 9 XX/93, General Inspektion des Militär-Verkehrswesens, Berlin 01.IX.1913, S.171; „Danziger Zeitung“, 17 VI 1913.

Das Luftschiff Schütte-Lanz SL 2 war unterdessen bestellt und in der Entwicklung. Aus den Erfahrungen und Irrtümern beim Bau des ersten Luftschiffes hatte man schon früh die Konsequenzen gezogen.

Johann Schütte hatte die Fehler in den Berechnungsgrundlagen erkannt. Für das Gerippe war unter der Leitung von Konstruktionschef Franz Krückenberg und in gegenseitiger Diskussion zwischen Schütte und den erprobten Mitarbeitern eine neue Konstruktion entstanden.

Man ging jetzt zu einem System von Längsträgern und Querringen über, ähnlich wie es bei Zeppelin verwendet wurde. Die Fachleute, die den Bau betreuten und überwachten, hatten Erfahrungen aus dem Fahrbetrieb mit den bisherigen Heeresluftschiffen.

So wurde auf Anforderung des Heeres jetzt eine Maybach-Motorenlage eingebaut. Führer- und Motorengondeln wurden getrennt angeordnet. Man versuchte, mängel der ersten Konstruktion, die den Arbeitsablauf der Montage sehr komplizierten, zu vermeiden.

So konnte bei der ersten Probefahrt am 28. Februar 1914 ein Luftschiff vorgestellt werden, bei dem ein hervorragender Wurf gelungen war. Das Luftschiff übertraf an Leistung die Konkurrenz und die Forderungen der Auftraggeber. Der Luftschiffbau Schütte-Lanz hatte einen Vorsprung und eine gute Ausgangsbasis für die Zukunft erreicht⁷.

Am Anfang des Krieges erfüllten die Luftschiffe vor allem Aufklärungsaufgaben. Sie hatten eine längere Flugreichweite und konnten viel mehr Bomben aufnehmen.

Das betrifft vor allem die Luftschiffe des Typs SL 2. Es startete am 22. August 1914 von Legnica zur ersten Flugaufklärung. Die Flugroute ging von Legnica über Piotrków-Dęblin-Łuków-Parczew-Lublin-Chełm mit Zwischenlandung in Przemysł über 1390 km in 24 Stunden. Es leistete eine weitere erfolgreiche Aufklärung im Raum Łódź am 2. September 1914 und ging dann an die Westfront⁸.

⁷ A. Seggern, „Höhenflug eines großen Geistes“... S. 46–47.

⁸ M. Bakun, *Lotnictwo niemieckie na Froncie Wschodnim 1914–1915*, [in:] *Lotnictwo w Przełamaniu Gorlickim 1915 r.*, pod red. A. Olejko, A. Haruk, 2015, S. 208–209.




Abbildung Nr. 5. Luftschiff SL 2 und erste Fahrt 28.02.1914

Charakteristische Merkmale der Luftschiffe des Typs SL:

Gerippe: Stromlinienform: paraboloidförmige Enden und großer Querschnitt etwa auf $\frac{1}{2}$ bis $\frac{2}{5}$ der Gesamtlänge des Luftschiffes.

Baumaterial: 1 mm dicke, zusammengeleimte Holzfourniere aus Espenholz.

Propeller: Anordnung fest eingebaute Höhenschrauben direkt hinter den Motorengondeln; 2 Motoren sollen über eine dritte Welle zwischen den Antriebsswellen auf eine Luftschaube arbeiten.

Lenkapparat: Seitensteuer, Höhensteuer: einfache Ausführung; Bedienung von einem einzigen Lenkapparat aus. Gondeln, unstarre Aufhängung. Verbindung mit dem Schiffsrumpf durch Seile. Übertragung des Propellerschubs durch Zugseile⁹.

⁹ D. Haaland, *Der Luftschiffbau Schütte – Lanz Mannheim-Rheinau*, Mannheim 1990, S. 23; K-H. Hoffman, *Die Technik der Schütte-Lanz-Luftschiffe*, [in:] *Der Traum vom Fliegen: Johann Schütte, ein Pionier der Luftschiffahrt*, Isensee 2000, S. 162–163.



Abbildung Nr. 6. Bau des SL 1 in der Werft in Rheinau 1910




Abbildung Nr. 7. Marine-Luftschiff SL 14 in der Werft in Rheinau, 1916

Wegen der vielen Havarien und Katastrophen wurden die Holzkonstruktionen von Professor Schütte von der Kaiserlichen Marine nicht gern gesehen. Man war der Meinung, dass sie dem feuchten Meeresklima nicht gut widerstehen.

Im Juni 1917 wurde die Heeres-Luftschiff-Abteilung liquidiert, so dass auch die Produktion der Luftschiffe stark eingeschränkt wurde. Das Unternehmen musste nach anderen Möglichkeiten suchen, z.B. Produktion des Wasserflugzeuges. Für diesen Zweck kaufte die Firma Schütte-Lanz im Jahre 1918 ein 14,7ha großes Grundstück in der Nähe der Danziger Bucht, unweit des Ortes Oxhöft, um dort eine Fabrik für Wasserflugzeuge zu bauen. Das Ende des Krieges hat diese Pläne durchkreuzt und die Fabrik ist nie entstanden¹⁰.

Während des Krieges operierten in der Baltic-Region und in der der Danziger Bucht verschiedene Typen der Luftschiffe SL von der Kaiserlichen Marine: SL 4, SL 8, SL 9.

Ihre Hauptbasis befand sich in Seddin, heute Jezierzycze Słupskie¹¹. Insgesamt wurden 22 SL Luftschiffe gebaut.

¹⁰ M. Bakun, *Wodnosamoloty nad Zatoką Gdańską i fabryka, której nie zbudowano*, „Nasza Historia“ IX 2016; R. Ruhna, *Der Luftschiffbau Schütte-Lanz. Danziger Hochschule entwickelte Pläne zum Bau von Luftschiffen*. „Unser Danzig“, 20 IV 1980, no. 8, S. 8–11.

¹¹ Bundes Militärarchiv in Freiburg, RM 49/89: Inhalt der Besprechung mit BdAdO, 7 II 1916; A. Celarek, *Sterowce w pierwszej wojnie światowej*, Gdańsk 2006, S. 12.

Tabelle Nr. 1. Übersicht der Zerstörungen.

Bau Nr.	Abnehmer	Einsätze/ Fahrten	Bemerkungen
SL1	Heer	Übungsfahrten	Juli 1913 durch Sturm am Ankerplatz in Schneidemühl zerstört.
SL2	Heer	6 Einsätze	Anfang 1916 gestrandet und abgerüstet.
SL3	Marine	32 Einsätze	Havarie mit Notwasserlandung, Besatzung wurde gerettet.
SL4	Marine	23 Einsätze	Durch Sturm in der Halle Seddin vernichtet.
SL 5	Heer	-	Bei Überführungsfahrt zerstört.
SL6	Marine	-	Bei 6. Erprobungsfahrt/Aufstieg explodiert, Besatzung tot.
SL7	Heer	6 Einsätze	Ausbildungsfahrzeug, Anfang 1917 als veraltet abgewrackt.
SL8	Marine	37 Einsätze	Bis Ende 1917 im Einsatz, dann als veraltet abgewrackt.
SL9	Marine	16 Einsätze	Durch Blitzschlag in der Luft verbrannt, Besatzung tot.
SL10	Heer	2 Einsätze	Bei Aufklärungsfahrt über dem Schwarzen Meer verschollen, Besatzung tot.
SL11	Heer	3 Einsätze	Bei Angriff auf England eingesetzt und über London abgeschossen, Besatzung tot.
SL12	Marine	9 Einsätze	Bei Inbetriebnahme bereits veraltet, bei Landemanöver zerstört.
SL13	Heer	-	Kriegsunbrauchbar, bei Reparatur durch Halleneinsturz Leipzig vernichtet.
SL14	Marine	4 Einsätze	Bei Inbetriebnahme bereits veraltet, nach Havarie bei Landung abgewrackt.
SL15	Heer	-	Halle Sandhofen, dort abgewrackt.
SL16	Heer	-	Halle Spich, dort abgewrackt.
SL17	Heer	-	Halle Allenstein , dort abgewrackt.
SL 18	Heer	-	Gerippe bei Halleneinsturz Leipzig vernichtet.
SL 19	Heer	-	Nicht mehr gebaut wegen Einstellung der Heeresluftschiffahrt.
SL 20	Marine	2 Einsätze	Bei Explosion der Luftschiffhalle in Ahlhorn vernichtet.
SL 21	Heer	-	Nach Fertigstellung abgerüstet.
SL 22	Marine	-	1920 abgerüstet und in Teilen an die Siegermächte abgeliefert.

Das Ende des Kriegs und das Ende der Ära der Luftschiffe

Die Vorzüge des Systems Schütte-Lanz gegenüber den Konstruktionsprinzipien des Grafen Zeppelin überzeugten auch die Militärführung, die diese Luftschiffe im I. Weltkrieg einsetzte, so dass sich auch Zeppelin gezwungen sah, wesentliche Komponenten zu übernehmen. Charakteristisch für Schüttes Konstruktion waren außer der Form des Schiffskörpers die Aufhängung der Motorgondeln, der durchgehende Kiel und die Verwendung von Holz statt Aluminium. Nach dem I. Weltkrieg stellte Schütte-Lanz den Bau von Luftschiffen ein. Im 1922 wechselte Schütte zur TH Charlottenburg, wo er Schiffbau und Luftschiffbau lehrte. Zu der Danziger Technischen Hochschule kehrte er nicht mehr zurück.

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Hushed brothers in arms. Combat actions of German 10th Infantry Division on the Western Front of World War I – from mobilization to concentration (1914)

In 1815, under the provisions of the Congress of Vienna, the historic area of Greater Poland was incorporated into the Kingdom of Prussia as the Grand Duchy of Posen with the capital in Posen, (Polish: Poznań). In 1848 the Prussian authorities unlawfully changed the name of the region to Provinz Posen (Province of Posen). Until the outbreak of World War I this area retained rural character and in 1910 it had a population of 2.1 million. Of this number, Poles accounted for 61.5%, and Germans for 38,5%¹.

The Province of Posen, as a part of Prussia, bordered on Russian Empire, and thus Posen became the site of an extensive polygonal fortress, called Festung Posen, which was erected between 1828 and 1869. The fortress was modernized in the years 1871–1910 and redeveloped into fortification stronghold with 18 artillery forts surrounding the city. Its heart was the Winiary Fort located on the hill towering over the area². Since 1815 the city of Posen had headquartered the command of 5th Army Corps, and by 1914 modern barracks had been built for numerous units of the corps (including two infantry regiments)³.

It must be added at this point that only a part of the Province of Posen, namely Posen District (Ger: *Regierungsbezirk Posen*), was located within borders of 5th

¹ S. Borowski, *Ludność*, [in:] *Dzieje Wielkopolski*, vol. 2, 1793–1918, ed. W. Jakóbczyk (Poznań: Wydawnictwo Poznańskie, 1973), pp. 361–373.

² J. Biesiadka, A. Gawlak, Sz. Kucharski, M. Wojciechowski, *Twierdza Poznań. O fortyfikacjach miasta Poznania w XIX i XX wieku* (Poznań: Rawelin, 2006), pp. 20–32.

³ H. Sommer, *Das V Generalkommando in Posen von 1815–1918* (Posen: Historischen Gesellschaft für Posesn, 1930), p. 60–61.

Army Corps. Of larger units, the 10th Infantry Division was garrisoned in that area⁴. On the other hand, Bydgoszcz District (Ger: *Regierungsbezirk Bromberg*) – northern part of the Province of Posen, was already under the 2nd Army Corps, headquartered in Stettin (Pl: Szczecin)⁵. Also, Legnica District (Ger: *Regierungsbezirk Liegnitz*) – the north-western part of Province of Silesia (Ger: *Provinz Schlesien*), lied within the boundaries of the 5th Army Corps. The units of 9th Infantry Division were stationed in garrison cities of that district⁶.

Since the Franco-Prussian war in 1870–1871, regiments of both divisions had been commonly referred to as *Katschmarken-Regimenten* (Pl: *Kaczmarek-Regimenty*) after Polish surname: *Kaczmarek*, which was widely present within the territory of the Province of Posen. That German term implied that a significant percentage of soldiers of Polish origin served in the ranks of these regiments. The divisions of 5th Army Corps enjoyed very good reputation in German General Staff, which they had gained during the Prussian-Austrian war in 1866 and the Battle of Nachod (Ger: *Schlacht bei Nachod*) of 27 June 1866. After the end of that war, the soldiers of both divisions were called *Lions of Nachod*, and in 1870, in the a central location in Posen – the Wilhelmplatz, the lion statue (Ger: *Löwendenkmal*) was unveiled in honor of the soldiers of 5th Army Corps killed in that clash⁷.

Both during wars of German unification of 1866, 1870–1871 and World War I, Poles as citizens of Prussia served beside ethnic Germans in the armed forces of German Empire, fighting for foreign cause. In the years 1914–1918 the phenomenon took on a massive scale, when 850,000 soldiers of Polish nationality went through the German army, accounting 6% of all mobilized soldiers of Germany's armed forces⁸. A majority of them served in units of Prussian contingent, though Poles could also be found in troops mobilized by other parts of Wilhelm II's Empire. Before 1914, the reason for such state of affairs was economic migra-

⁴ G. Wegner, *Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815 – 1939*, Band 1: *Die höheren Kommandostellen 1815 – 1939*, (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag, 1990), p. 52–55, p. 103–104.

⁵ *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee und des XIII. (Königlich Württembergischen) Armeekorps für 1914 – Nachdem Stande vom 6. Mai 1914*, (Berlin: Verlag Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1914), 4, p. 66–69, p. 133–134.

⁶ G. von Mutius, *Die Schlacht Bei Longwy* (Oldenburg: Verlag des Deutschen Offizierblattes, 1919), p. 75; For more on the structure and place of stationing of respective units of V Army Corps refer to: B. Kruszyński, *V Korpus Armijny na Froncie Zachodnim I wojny światowej*, „Kronika Miasta Poznania” 3 (2014).

⁷ L. Prauziński, A. Ulrich, *W Marszu i w bitwie. Szlakiem Powstańców Wielkopolskich 1914–1920* (Poznań: Księgarnia Św. Wojciecha, 1939), p. 12–13.

⁸ A. Watson, *Fighting for Another Fatherland: The Polish Minority in the German Army, 1914–1918*, “English Historical Review”, (2010), p. 1138–1139.

tion of Polish-speaking citizens of Prussia (from the rural Province of Posen in particular) to industrial regions of Germany⁹. By the end of 1916, German military authorities tried to carry out Polish-speaking soldiers of Prussian regiments, but despite those endeavors, that remained high until the end of the war¹⁰.

In 1914, according to peacetime terms, the 10th Infantry Division of 5th Army Corps was an active division and was composed of three infantry brigades: 19th Infantry Brigade, 20th Infantry Brigade and 77th Infantry Brigade¹¹. 19th Infantry Brigade included 6th Grenadier Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf, which was stationed in Posen in barracks at Bukerstraße, and since 1912 had been commanded by Col. Kurt von Gallwitz Gen. Dreyling¹². The 19th Infantry Division also comprised the 46th Infantry Division Graf Kirbach, of which the headquarters

⁹ At the turn of 1c and 20th century, the German Empire in terms of economy and civilization dynamically developed and undoubtedly was a leader of innovation in Europe at that time. Its eastern areas, the Province of Posen included, had rural character. However, labor related migration to other regions of Germany, including Westphalia coalmines, concerned a part of the rural population. It involved a change of registered place of residence and, in case of war, assignment to troops in a district covered by a given corps. The scale of economic migration within the area of 5th Army Corps may be seen in preserved writing of a draftee of 1907/1908. That year as many as 25,006 men should have reported, whereas only 14,558 did. Such trend remained until the outbreak of war and mobilization in 1914. The outcome was that Polish-speaking draftees and reservists of the Province of Posen served in troops located all around Germany and in different armed services. Kruszyński, *V Korpus Armijny*, p. 3–14. For more on the position of Germany at the beginning of the 20th century, refer to: P. Szlanta, *Wilhelm II: ostatni z Hohenzollernów* (Warszawa: Książka i Wiedza, 2015)

¹⁰ *Histories of Two Hundred and Fifty-One Divisions of the German Army, Which Participated in the War (1914–1918). Compiled from Records of Intelligence Section of the General Staff, American Expeditionary Forces at General Headquarters* (Washington: Government Printing Office, 1920), p. 180.

¹¹ B. Friedag, *Führer durch Heer und Flotte. Elfter Jahrgang 1914. Ausführliche Beschreibungen der Friedens- und der feldgrauen Ausmarschuniformen des Jahres 1914, Tabellenüber die Bewaffnung der einzelnen Kontingente, Schiffslisten der Flotte*, (Berlin: 1913), p. 105.

¹² In German army before 1914 and during World War I there was a double numbering system and regional nomenclature used for the names of infantry, cavalry and artillery regiments. The system may be tracked down as per the example of 6th Grenadier Regiment of Posen, where the full name read: 1. Westpreussisches Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf Nr. 6. First of the two digits stood for the number of regiment in federated state and referred to its historical lineage, for instance: 1. Westpreussisches – 1. West Prussian, and the second digit signified a number of regiment in general military system of the German Empire, in that case it was no. 6. Franz Döring von Gottberg, *Das Grenadier-Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf (1. Westpreussisches) Nr. 6 Im Weltkriege* (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1935), 34; Günter Wegner, Teil 1: *Stellenbesetzung der Deutschen Heere 1815 – 1939*, Band 2: *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie-Regimenter sowie Jäger- und MG-Bataillone, Wehrbezirkskommandos und Ausbildungsleiter von der Stiftung bzw. Aufstellung bis 1939* (Osnabrück: Biblio Verlag 1992), p. 58.

and staff, I battalion and II battalion were stationed in Kernwerk of Fort Winiary in Posen, while III battalion was located in Wreschen (Pl: *Września*)¹³.

The 20th Infantry Brigade included the following units: 47th Infantry Regiment King Ludwig III of Bavaria which the headquarters and staff, I battalion and III battalion were stationed in Posen, II battalion in Schrimm (Pl: *Śrem*)¹⁴ and 50th Infantry Regiment, with I battalion and II battalion stationed in Rawitsch (Pl: *Rawicz*), and III battalion in Lissa (Pl. *Leszno*)¹⁵.

The 77th Infantry Brigade, under the command of Gen. Emmo von Dewitz, was composed of the 37th Fusiliers Regiment von Steinmetz, stationed in Kroto-schin (Pl: *Krotoszyn*)¹⁶ and the 155th Infantry Regiment, of which the headquarters and staff, I battalion and II battalion were stationed in Ostrowo (Pl: *Ostrów*), and III battalion in Pleschen (pol. *Pleszew*)¹⁷.

Cavalry in this division was represented by 10th Cavalry Brigade under the command of Gen. Eduard Hubert Maria Neven Du Mont¹⁸, and included the 1st King's Mounted Rifles Regiment (Ger: *Königs-Jäger-Regiment zu Pferde Nr. 1*), stationed in Posen in barracks at Kaiserin-Auguste-Viktoria-Straße¹⁹ and the 1st Regiment of Uhlans Emperor Alexander III of Russia of which the headquarters and staff, 1st squadron, 2nd squadron, 4th squadron, and 5th reserve squadron were stationed in Militsch [Pl. *Milicz*], and the 3rd squadron in Ostrowo²⁰.

Artillery in the division was represented by 10th Field Artillery Brigade under the command of Gen. Oskar Freiherr von Watter²¹, and composed of the 20th Field

¹³ Max Zuneher, *Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 Im Weltkrieg 1914/1918* (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1935), p. 96–97; Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 150.

¹⁴ Kruszyński, *V Korpus Armijny*, p. 10–11; J. Kraus, Teil VI: *Infanterie*, Band 3: *Ersatztruppen und Feld-Rekrutendepots* (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2013), p. 98–99; Friedag, p. 105; Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 152.

¹⁵ O. Vogt, 3. *Niederschlesisches Infanterie-Regiment Nr. 50 Rawitsch-Lissa in Posen 1914–1920* (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1931), p. 8–14; Kraus, *Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 102–103; Friedag, p. 105; Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 150.

¹⁶ H. von Altmann, *Das Fusilier-Regiment v. Steinmetz (Westpreussisches) Nr. 37: Im Weltkrieg 1914–1918* (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1931), p. 17–18; Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 132.

¹⁷ W. Arens, *Das Königlich Preußische 7. Westpreuß. Infanterie-Regiment Nr 155* (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1931), p. 8–12; Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 363.

¹⁸ Wegner, *Die höheren Kommandostellen*, p. 440.

¹⁹ Kruszyński, *V Korpus Armijny*, p. 191; Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Regimenter, Bataillone*, p. 191.

²⁰ Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 151–153.

²¹ Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Regimenter, Bataillone*, p. 498.

Artillery Regiment in Posen and the 56th Field Artillery Regiment commanded in Lissa²². It is worth noting that before the outbreak of World War I, each year many soldiers of Polish origin, specifically inhabitants of the Province of Posen, underwent military training in the regiments of 10th Infantry Division.

On 1st of August 1914 in the evening, according to the order of the Emperor Wilhelm II, general mobilization was declared and scheduled to begin, in earnest, on the 2nd of August. In the Posen garrison, the commander of 5th Army Corps, Infantry General Hermann von Strantz, proclaimed the mobilization in German and Polish²³. At the same time, the Polish press appealed for the calm execution of authorities' orders. These loyalist behaviors were dictated by the awareness that any resistance would be harshly suppressed. Since the first days of mobilization, many volunteers even at the age of seventeen began to report to conscription points, including many with Polish-sounding surnames. In the case of the students of the Real School and the Berger Gymnasium in Posen, for example, of 77 volunteers, 3 students had Polish surnames. In 1914 alone, 250,000 Poles were conscripted into the German army²⁴.

Despite declarations from the Polish community, it the German authorities were unsure how the population was going to react to mass conscription to the army. Adam Ulrich, a reservist of Polish origin of 6th Grenadier Regiment of 10th Infantry Division, excellently conveyed the atmosphere of those days:

Seized in iron, the machine-like war organization of imperial Germany was efficient, a Polish reservist or militiaman, went to serve under Prussian command because he had to. Nobody asked him, nor did anybody explain why and what for. Once he put on a soldier uniform, he became an executor of orders and nothing more. His rights were specified by clauses of state Laws, and the duties were expressed in harsh words of war articles. Upon the proclamation of mobilization, there were orders and service regulations that acted. A soldier, having reached the barracks, did not simply

²² Friedag, p. 105; Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Regimenter, Bataillone*, p. 278.

²³ Infantry General Hermann von Strantz took over the position of the commander of 5th Army Corps on 7th of April 1911 from Infantry General Günther Emanuel Graf Kirchbach. Max Zunehmer, *Infanterie Regiment Graf Kirchbach (1. Niederschlesisches) Nr. 46 Im Weltkrieg 1914/1918* (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1935), p. 99–100; K. F. Hildebrand, Ch. Zweng, *Die Ritter des Ordens Pour le Mérite des I. Weltkrieges*, Band 3: P-Z (Bissendorf: Biblio-Verlag, 2011), p. 378–379; *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee und des XIII. (Königlich Württembergischen) Armeekorps für 1914*, Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, (Berlin: Ernst Siegfried Mittler und Sohn, 1914), 66; Der kommandierende General des V. Armeekorps, *Bekanntmachung Seine Majestat der Kaiser haben die Mobilmachung*, „Kurier Poznański“, 176, August 4, 1914.

²⁴ L. Trzeciakowski, *Zabór pruski na przełomie epok*, „Dzieje Najnowsze”, 3 (2004) p. 84.

have time for thinking. Musters, assemblies and inspections, short speech of regiment's commander and departure to the station, where long trains awaited to carry him into the unknown.²⁵

During mobilization, 5th Army Corps was comprised of two large units: 10th Infantry Division and 9th Infantry Division. Concurrently, within the area subject to the command of the Corps, the 5th Reserve Corps was mobilized²⁶ under the command of Infantry General Erich von Gündell²⁷, who had been restored from retirement. Posen 10th Infantry Division (since 4th June 1912) was under the command of talented staff officer Lt Gen Robert Kosch²⁸, who had also held the post of the Commander of Posen before the mobilization. He was a graduate of Prussian Military Academy (Preußische Kriegsakademie), and he had gained front line experience in the 132nd Infantry Regiment, where he commanded a battalion and held the post of adjutant of regiment. The Chief of staff was Maj. Franz Aubert²⁹, chief of adjutancy was Maj. Bielfeld, and the division surgeon was Generaloberarzt dr Vollbrecht³⁰. The division's staff comprised: the commander of the division, chief of staff, 2 adjutants, ordnance officer, commander of transport, commander of division headquarters, division commissary with 5 intendants and 7 supply officers, 2 officers of field court, division medical officer and its assistant, 2 chaplains (protestant and catholic), 5 officers of field post office with 80 non-commissioned officers and military officials of remaining

²⁵ L. Prauziński, A. Ulrich, *W Marszu i w bitwie. Szlakiem Powstańców Wielkopolskich 1914–1920* (Poznań: Księgarnia Św. Wojciecha, 1939), p. 12.

²⁶ Upon completion of mobilization 5th Reserve Corps was composed of two large units: 9th and 10th Reserve Division. 9th Reserve Division comprised 17th Reserve Infantry Brigade: 6th Reserve Infantry Regiment and 7th Reserve Infantry Regiment. On the other hand, 19th Reserve Infantry Brigade consisted of: 19th Reserve Infantry Regiment and 5th Jäger Battalion. 10th Reserve Division was the only active unit in the corps, and it comprised 77th Infantry Brigade: 37th Fusiliers Regiment and 155th Infantry Regiment. Second Brigade in the division was 18th Reserve Infantry Brigade: 37th Reserve Infantry Brigade, 46th Reserve Infantry Brigade, 6th Reserve Dragoon Regiment, 10th Reserve Field Artillery Regiment, two reserve companies of 5th Pioneer Battalion, 10th Reserve Pontoon Unit as well as supply and signal units of the corps. H. Cron, *Imperial German Army 1914–1918* (Solihull-UK: Helion & Company, 2012), p. 316.

²⁷ Hildebrand, Zweng, p. 378–379.

²⁸ H. Möller, *Geschichte der Ritter des Ordens „Pour le Mérite“ im Weltkrieg*, Band 1, (Berlin: Verlag Bernard & Graefe, 1935), p. 607–609; *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 66.

²⁹ *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 68; *Armee-Verordnungsblatt. Verlustliste 1914*, Ausgabe 28, p. 193.

³⁰ *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, 68; *Adress-Buch der Residenzstadt Posen 1914* (Posen, 1914), p. 220.

ranks. During the war, the staff's veterinary officer and intelligence officer joined the division's staff³¹.

During mobilization, substantial changes took place in the structure of 10th Infantry Division. The 77th Infantry Brigade was moved to 10th Reserve Division of 5th Reserve Corps³², and, according to the mobilization establishment, the 10th Infantry Division incorporated two infantry brigades, the first of which was the 19th Infantry Brigade under the command of Gen. Maj. Paul Heinrich Liebeskind³³. During peacetime its staff was stationed in the barracks of 6th Grenadier Regiment. The second one was 20th Infantry Brigade under the command of Gen. Maj. Arnold Freiherr von der Horst, the staff of which was stationed in the barracks of 47th Infantry Regiment³⁴.

Two infantry regiments formed the war structure of 19th Infantry Brigade. The first of them was 6th Grenadier Regiment Graf Kleist von Nollendorf, the command of which was taken over on 3rd of August by LTC Otto Henn. The previous commander of the regiment, von Gallwitz Gen. Dreyling, left to take over the post of the commander of 21st Reserve Brigade³⁵. This regiment was composed of the I (Grenadiers) Battalion, II (Grenadiers) Battalion, III (Fusiliers) Battalion and Machine Gun Company³⁶. The Second regiment of the 19th Infantry Brigade was the 46th Infantry Regiment Graf Kirchbach under the command of Col. Victor von Arent³⁷. The 20th Infantry Brigade was composed of the 47th Infantry Regiment King Ludwig III of Bavaria under the command of Col. Ernst Trieglaff³⁸ and the 50th Infantry Regiment, commanded by Col. Karl Diestel³⁹.

During mobilization, in each infantry regiment a 1st Reserve Battalion was formed (1. Ersatz Bataillon), which was to be responsible for training of draftees and sending supplements to parent regiments to the front. Reserve battalions of respective regiments of 10th Infantry Regiment during the war were stationed as follows: 6th Grenadier Regiment – in Posen (Warthenlager 1914–1915), Krotoschin (1915), Posen (1917–1918); 47th Infantry Regiment: – Posen (Warthenlager 1914–1915), Ostrowo (1915–1918); 46th Infantry Regiment – Posen

³¹ H. Cron, *Imperial German Army 1914–1918* (Solihull-UK: Helion & Company, 2012), p. 96.

³² Wegner, *Die höheren Kommandostellen*, 170.

³³ *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 69; Wegner, *Die höheren Kommandostellen*, p. 243.

³⁴ *Adress-Buch*, p. 220–221; *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 69; Wegner, *Die höheren Kommandostellen*, p. 244.

³⁵ *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 168.

³⁶ Gottberg, p. 28, p. 34.

³⁷ *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 213; Kraus, *Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 96–97.

³⁸ Kraus, *Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 98–99; *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 214.

³⁹ *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 217; Kraus, *Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 102–103.

(Warthenlager 1914–1915), Jarotschin (1915–1918); 50th Infantry Regiment – Rawitsch (1914–1918). Additionally, during mobilization, the reserve battalions were formed on the brigade level. These included the Reserve Battalion of 19th Infantry Brigade (Brigade-Ersatz-Bataillonnr 19); the 1st and 2nd company of Reserve Battalion of 6th Grenadier Regiment; and 3rd and 4th company of Reserve Battalion of 46th Infantry Regiment. Additionally, a Reserve Battalion of the 20th Infantry Brigade was formed, which included the 1st and 2nd company of Reserve Battalion of 47th Infantry Regiment and 3rd and 4th company of Reserve Battalion of 50th Infantry Regiment⁴⁰.

During mobilization, the 10th Cavalry Brigade was dismantled, leaving the division with only the 1st King's Mounted Rifles Regiment under the command of Maj. Otto Graf zu Solms-Wildenfels, which became a reconnaissance unit of the division. The 1st Regiment of Uhlans Emperor Alexander III of Russia was also moved to 9th Infantry Division⁴¹.

The military establishment included 10th Field Artillery Brigade, the staff of which was headquartered in the barracks of 20th Field Artillery Regiment at Magazinstrasse. The commander of the brigade was Gen. Maj. Oskar Freiherr von Watter, and Cpt. von Cleve was the adjutant⁴². The Brigade was composed of the 20th Field Artillery Regiment, commanded by Lt. Col. Otto von Schleicher⁴³, and the 56th Field Artillery Regiment, under the command of Col. Hans Lepper⁴⁴. Engineering units were represented in the division by the 2nd and 3rd Pioneer Company of the 5th Pioneer Battalion and by the 10th Division's Pontoon Unit, and medical services were provided by the 2nd sanitary company⁴⁵.

Per the mobilization orders, the 10th Infantry Division was composed of 12 infantry battalions, 4 machine gun companies (each containing 6 × MG Maxim-08), 4 cavalry squadrons, 12 field artillery batteries, 2 pioneer companies, the division's pontoon unit and sanitary company⁴⁶.

The infantry regiment contained the regimental staff, three infantry battalions and a machine gun company. Each infantry battalion was composed of four companies, and an officer in the rank of captain commanded each of them. In economic terms, the company was divided into ten teams (Ger: *Korporalschaft*) of 25

⁴⁰ J. Kraus, *Teil VI: Infanterie, Band 3: Ersatztruppen und Feld-Rekrutendepots* (Wien: Verlag Militaria, 2013), p. 102–128, p. 58.

⁴¹ Wegner, *Die Stellenbesetzung der aktiven Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 440.

⁴² *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 69.

⁴³ *Adress-Buch*, p. 221; *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 438.

⁴⁴ *Rangliste der Königlich Preussischen Armee*, p. 460.

⁴⁵ *Histories of Two Hundred*, 180; H. Cron, *Imperial*, p. 314–315.

⁴⁶ Cron, *Imperial*, p. 96.

soldiers each, commanded by *gefreiter*. For infantry enlisted soldiers, the *gefreiter* was the first authority in the chain of command, whose responsibilities including running a list of the team, ordering assemblies, reviewing arms, uniform and equipment and checking whether soldiers had blistered feet. Each company comprised three platoons (Ger: *Zug*), commanded by second lieutenant or sergeant. Each platoon consisted of three sections (Ger: *Sektion*). A section, numbering 8 people, was represented the smallest combat unit of regiment⁴⁷.

Establishment of the division's staff included 4 officers (commander of division, adjutant, medical officer and commander of transport column), 49 non-commissioned officers, and soldiers of other ranks, including 37 musicians of division's orchestra⁴⁸. Mobilization of the whole infantry regiment contained 86 officers, 3304 non-commissioned officers and privates, 233 horses and 72 wagons. The regiment included three battalions, each of which numbered four companies. The mobilized infantry battalion consisted of 26 officers (4 company commanders, 18 lieutenants, a medical officer of the battalion and his assistant, paymaster), 83 non-commissioned officers and 972 privates (including 30 wagon soldiers), 58 horses, 19 vehicles, 4 ammunition carts, medical cart, 4 field kitchens, 5 wagons and 5 supply carts. The mobilized company numbered 254 soldiers: 5 officers, 19 non-commissioned officers and 230 privates⁴⁹.

However, at this point it is worth differentiating between ration strength (Ger: *Verpflegungsstärke*) and combat strength of the troop (Ger: *Gefechtsstärke*). A good example of this is 46th Infantry Regiment, which upon arrival to the concentration area in the beginning of August 1914 in its ration strength consisted of 81 officers, 3209 non-commissioned officers and privates as well as 235 horses. On the other hand, in its combat strength the regiment numbered 73 officers, 2920 non-commissioned officers, 6 × MG Maxim 08 as well as 3 ammunition carts. Summarizing, the ration strength included all soldiers of regiment, whereas the combat strength included all present on the first combat line⁵⁰.

As all regiments of 10th Infantry Division were active units, both armaments and soldier equipment represented latest achievements in German military technique. Thus, an infantry soldier (private and non-commissioned officer) was equipped with an *Feldbluse M1907* – jacket of field grey color (Ger: *Feldgrau*) with

⁴⁷ Cron, *Imperial*, p. 112; Prauziński, p. 15, p. 21.

⁴⁸ I. Passingham, *All the Kaiser's Men. The Life and Death of the German Army on the Western Front 1914–1918* (Thrupp – UK: Sutton Publishing Limited, 2003), p. 251.

⁴⁹ Kraus, *Infanterie-Regimenter*, 4–6; Cron, *Imperial*, p. 112.

⁵⁰ Zuneher, p. 32.

8 buttons, while officers had the tunic – *Feldbluse M1910*⁵¹. Trousers – *Hosen M1907* for officers and non-commissioned officers and for officers – *Hosen M1910*, were of the same color as the tunic⁵². Leather combat boots – *Marschstiefel M1866*, hobnailed with high top, were particularly important for infantrymen. This footwear could endure hardships of marching, though it caused (particularly on the newer versions) very painful foot pinching and blistering⁵³. On main leather belt – *Koppel M1895* there was a brass buckle – *Koppelschloß* with circular disk of white metal with inscribed *God With Us* (Ger: *Gott Mit Uns*) caption, and crown of the Kingdom of Prussia⁵⁴. On the main belt were two leather cartridge carriers – *Patronentaschen M1909*, with three chambers on both right and left sides, and with 15 cartridges per chamber (90 pcs in total)⁵⁵. On the right side, behind cartridge carriers, on the main belt there, was the leather bayonet holder – *Seitengewehrtasche M1898*, with a bayonet inside it in a metal sheath, the Bajonett – *Seitengewehr M1898/05* (which was the most frequent model used by active infantry regiments during mobilization in August 1914). Under the bayonet there was an army-shovel – *Feldspaten M1887* (optionally, the soldier could have a hatchet, iron ladder or scissors for wire cutting in place of the shovel). On the back of the right side, attached to main belt was a haversack – *Brotbeutel M1893* (containing 30 cartridges in cardboard boxes and portable food ration)⁵⁶. A water bottle – *Feldflasche M1907* was fastened to the left side of the haversack, in fabric case of masking color⁵⁷.

For headgear, the soldiers have a leather helmet – *Pickelhaube M1895*, with the Prussian eagle on the front (pressed of polished sheet metal of silver color), finished at the top by the characteristic pike (for infantry soldiers), which was to theoretically provide head protection in combat conditions. Artillery soldiers, similarly to infantry, were issued a leather helmet – *Kugelhaube M1895*, finished with a ball of polished silver metal sheet. Considering the development of artillery and firearms, the construction of this helmet was archaic in 1914 and did not provide any protection to infantry soldier. In order to mask the elements

⁵¹ J. Kraus, *Die deutsche Armeeim Ersten Weltkrieg. Uniformierung und Ausrüstung – 1914 bis 1918*, (Vienna: Verlag Militaria, 2004), p. 138–151.

⁵² Kraus, *Die deutsche Armee*, p. 170–176.

⁵³ Kraus, *Die deutsche Armee*, p. 198–199.

⁵⁴ Kraus, *Die deutsche Armee*, p. 590–593.

⁵⁵ Kraus, *Die deutsche Armee*, p. 603–605.

⁵⁶ Kraus, *Die deutsche Armee*, p. 608–609.

⁵⁷ L. Mirouze, *World War I Infantry in Colour Photographs* (Ramsbury: The Crowood Press, 1999), 7; *Uzbrojenie żołnierza niemieckiego*, „Dziennik Poznański”, 207, September 10, 1914; Kraus, *Die deutsche Armee*, p. 610.

made of polished metal sheet, which were present on the helmet, a cover made of fabric of masking color was introduced – Überzug M1892, which protected against light reflections, and thus against revealing soldier's position from a long distance. On the cover, on the front of the helmet the number of regiment was written in red paint. In the internal pocket of uniform jacket, each soldier had field dressing and a prayer book⁵⁸.

An inseparable element of infantry soldier's equipment was a knapsack – *Tornister 07/13* with characteristic cowhide or horsehide on the front side. After putting the knapsack on, its suspenders needed to be hooked to main belt behind left and right cartridge carrier. Thus, the suspenders held the weight of the main belt. The soldier's knapsack contained a shirt, long underwear, four pairs of socks, corded ankle boots, a brush for clothes, a brush for cleaning shoes, a can with shoe dubbin, oakum, wool cloths, a bar for barrel cleaning, and rations. The latter was comprised of canned meat, three cans of coffee, a bag with salt, a packet with canned vegetables, a packet with crackers. Additionally, the knapsack contained a tent bag with three bars, three cords, three metal-fitted pegs, and 30 cartridges in boxes⁵⁹. On a knapsack there was a rolled coat – *Mantel M1907*, a tent canvas – *Zeltbahn M1892* that could be used as raincoat, and a mess tin – *Kochgeschirr M1910*, which was attached to front middle part of the knapsack. Each team also had one soldier who was equipped with a water bag⁶⁰. The soldier's equipment, without a rifle, weighed over 31 kg. Soldiers of the 10th Infantry Division were armed with a repeating rifle – *Mauser Gewehr 98* caliber 7.92 mm⁶¹.

Each of the field artillery regiments of 10th Field Artillery Brigade were comprised of two battalions (each one with three batteries and light ammunition column). Batteries of 20th Field Artillery Regiment were armed with 36 × 7.7 cm FK 96 n.A. field guns, and 56th Field Artillery Regiment with 18 × 7.7 cm FK 96 n.A., and 18 × light 105 mm lFH 98/09 field howitzers⁶². The regiment's staff included 6 officers, the commander of the regiment, adjutant, ordnance officer, commander of transport column, regiment's medical officer, regiment's veterinary officer, 16 non-commissioned officers and soldiers of other ranks. Each field artillery battery comprised: 5 officers, 148 non-commissioned officers and soldiers,

⁵⁸ Mirouze, p. 7; *Uzbrojenie żołnierza*, 1914; Kraus, *Die deutsche Armee*, p. 36–56, p. 58–65.

⁵⁹ Kraus, *Die deutsche Armee*, p. 614–615.

⁶⁰ Kraus, *Die deutsche Armee*, p. 620–623.

⁶¹ *Uzbrojenie żołnierza*, 1914.

⁶² Konrad Angerstein, Paul Schlemm, *Das 2. Posensche Feldartillerie-Regiment Nr. 56 1914 bis 1918* (Berlin: Verlag von Gerhard Stalling, 1927), p. 9–10, p. 180–181.

139 horses, 6 guns (each with cart for six horses) and 9 vehicles⁶³. Experienced officers, professional NCO cadre as well as the well-tuned Prussian draft machine, in perfect working order, guaranteed that the mobilization operation was efficiently completed.

Once again, besides ethnic German soldiers, regiments of 10th Infantry Division also included the Poles. Quite to the surprise of German military authorities, mobilized ethnic Polish reservists in reported after a call-up in a disciplined manner and did not evade military service. Despite the orderly call to arms on behalf of the Polish soldiers, the Polish population in general distanced itself from enthusiasm for the German cause. The "KurierPoznański", a Polish-language daily paper published in Posen, covered the atmosphere of those days in the following manner:

The war, with all its horror and consequences, fell upon us like a natural hurricane, like a plague. It comes like a fire from the sky and nobody can evade its blows. In this collective calamity, common for everyone, there might lie a soothing moment, without which such a disaster would not be bearable at all. Awareness that everyone must succumb to the catastrophic blow, and that in the face of common destiny, the differences between the great and the little, the rich and the poor, disappear, ignites the feeling of love and fraternity that has an alleviating effect in breakthrough moments. The most affected are those whose fathers, sons, brothers and husbands who must set off for combat. In its relentlessness, war knows no borders, no feelings, rips a husband away from his wife's arms, takes away mother's only son, and deprives a family of a father and breadwinner. There is no help for it, all this must be borne, though the heart is filled with pain, and the only hope is the thought of a sunny day inevitably coming after the storm and tempest, when the arms would be held out in joy for the ones returning from a battlefield.⁶⁴

On the evening of that day, in the barracks of 6th Grenadier Regiment at Bukerstrasse (currently Bukowska street), the last assembly was held before departure from garrison⁶⁵. On 7th of August 1914, on the fifth day of mobilization, regiments of 10th Infantry Division achieved marching readiness. Polish nationality reservists from Posen and the Province of Posen, accounted for the majority

⁶³ Cron, *Imperial*, p. 134–135.

⁶⁴ *Wojna*, „Kurier Poznański“, 176, August 4, 1914.

⁶⁵ Gottberg, p. 28.

of soldiers. A smaller percentage of Poles could be found in 9th Infantry Division, a second large unit of 5th Army Corps, the soldiers of which came in majority from the northern part of Lower Silesia⁶⁶.

When the mobilization was finished, at the stations in Posen and garrison towns of the Province of Posen, festively dressed women saw off their sons, husbands and brothers who were about to board the troop trains together with their colleagues and depart for the concentration location. Regiment orchestras played as the soldiers were leaving. In train cars, besides conversations in German, the Polish language could also be heard, which is notable, as it had been forbidden in Prussian regiments before the war⁶⁷.

The railway – one of the products of German industrialization, engineered with typically Prussian precision, enabled the rapid transportation of troops on an unprecedented scale. Before the outbreak of war, the German General Staff specified that 11,000 trains would be used for transport of mobilized troops⁶⁸. Between 2nd and 18th of August 1914 through the Hohenzollern Bridge on Rhine alone, 2,150 trains passed, with 54 railway cars each⁶⁹. According to the German war plan that had been polished over many years, on the 15th day from the date of mobilization proclamation, respective armies were to reach their respective area of concentration⁷⁰.

When the time came to depart from the barracks and leave for the front, the closest relatives of the soldiers of regiments of the 10th Infantry Division saw them off, adorned in flowers at the stations in respective garrison cities of the Province of Posen. Such scenes took place all around Germany. On railway ramps, troop trains were loaded, and before the trains left for the west, women of Red Cross distributed cigarettes, chocolate and provisions for travel. Battalions of the same regiments stationed in different towns of the Province of Posen departed for the concentration location separately. Such was also the case of 47th Infantry Regiment, I battalion, which arrived to the concentration area on 6th of August; whereas the III battalion, regiment staff, heavy machine gun company and the staff of 20th Infantry Brigade, as well as II battalion of Schrimm (pol. Śrem) garrison, arrived a day later on the 7th of August. All regiment's sub-units arrived to the deployment area on 11th of August⁷¹. Meanwhile, on the 8th of August,

⁶⁶ *Histories of Two Hundred*, p. 169.

⁶⁷ *Kraus, Infanterie-Regimenter*, p. 1.

⁶⁸ John Keegan, *The First World War* (Toronto: Vintage Canada, 2000), p. 73.

⁶⁹ Keegan, p. 73.

⁷⁰ Prauziński, p. 16.

⁷¹ G. Loosch, *Das Königl. preuss. Infanterie-Regiment König Ludwig III. von Bayern (2. Niederschl.) Nr. 47 im Weltkrieg 1914–1918 und im Grenzschutz 1919* (Zeulenroda: Bernhard Sporn,

6th Grenadier Regiment, numbering 87 officers with 3,286 non-commissioned officers and privates, departed from the East Ramp at the Main Station in Posen (Pl: Poznań)⁷².

Believing in the power of German armed forces, everyone was convinced that the war would last a mere several weeks, and after one month German divisions would parade in Paris. Morale was very high and soldiers in railway cars put ironic texts and drawings in white chalk: *One thrust, one Frenchman* (Ger: *Jeder Stos ein Franzos*), *For breakfast. To Paris* (Ger: *Zum Fruhstuck. Auf nach Paris*), *To Paris* (Ger: *Nach Paris*). In such a decorated car, Col. Otto Hen departed from Posen together with his 6th Grenadier Regiment. When respective transports left the station, a military orchestra played, and songs like *Wacht am Rhein* and *Heildirim Siegeskranz* echoed behind as the troop trains were leaving for the west. In one of the trains awaiting departure at Posen main station, Polish soldiers in German uniforms sang *Mazurek Dąbrowskiego* – a Polish patriotic anthem⁷³, which Poles were forbidden to sing in public places. However, the Prussian military police did not intervene⁷⁴. During stopovers at railway stations in Germany, women of Red Cross distributed coffee, milk, tea, cigarettes and chocolate to the soldiers. They picked up letters and postcards (Ger: *Feldpost*), which the soldiers had hastily written in pencil to their families. It was also interesting that the military authorities allowed Polish soldiers to correspond in their mother tongue. Additionally, in the beginning of September 1914, the permit was given to deliver Polish language press to the front, though sent only by the publisher⁷⁵.

Between 9th and 11th of August 1914, battalions of respective regiments of 10th Infantry Division reached the area of concentration, located near the border town of Sarrelouis in the Saar Basin (23 km north-west from Saarbrücken and 86 km south-east from Luxemburg). On the 11th of August, in the morning, the transport of 6th Grenadier Regiment reached its destination after 63 hours of travel from Posen. On the 12th of August, the units of 10th Infantry Division were unloaded

1932), p. 10–11.

⁷² Gottberg, p. 28–29.

⁷³ "Mazurek Dąbrowskiego" – Polish patriotic song of the Polish Legions in Italy, the lyrics of which were written in 1797 by Józef Wybicki in the town of Reggio nell'Emilia near Bologna in Italy. It is assumed that the melody was based on a folk mazurka of an unknown authorship. Often sang during Polish national uprisings expressing the hopes of recovering independence. The song, since 26 February 1927 has been the national anthem of the Republic of Poland. 'Symbole narodowe', <<http://www.mkidn.gov.pl/>>, [accessed January 31, 2014].

⁷⁴ J. Pajewski, *Pierwsza Wojna Światowa 1914–1918*, (Warszawa: Państwowe Wydawnictwo Naukowe, 1991), p.186.

⁷⁵ *O gazety polskie dla żołnierzy*, „Kurier Poznański”, September 8, 1914, p. 205.

from troop trains. The following 3 days were devoted to reviews and arrangement of respective units before starting military action.

5th Army Corps, formed by 10th Infantry Division and 9th Infantry Division, belonged to the 5th Army, commanded by the Prussian heir to the throne, Crown Prince Wilhelm of Germany (Ger: *Kronprinz Wilhelm Hohenzollern*)⁷⁶. The army, besides the two Posen-based 5th Army Corps and 5th Reserve Corps, also consisted of Silesian 6th Army Corps and 6th Reserve Corps, as well as the 13th Royal Württemberg Army Corps and 16th Lorraine Army Corps. Gen. Hermann von Strantz, the commander of 5th Army Corps, received an order to operate on a right flank of 5th Army, to go around the town of Longwy from the north and then from the west, and strike from the territory of Belgium in southwestern direction via Etalle, Virton and Marville (already in France). 13th Army Corps was to attack to the left of 5th Army Corps. 3rd Cavalry Division was to operate on the right flank of 5th Army Corps, adhering to the attack route of 4th Army⁷⁷.

The mobilization and concentration of each division on the Western Front were the success of German troops. It was carried out in August 1914. This was also applied to the 5th Army Corps units, including the 10th Infantry Division. Then the epic of soldiers from the Infantry Division begun. Officially there was no Polish nation in the German Empire, but the Germans served with the soldiers of the Polish nationality. German superiors feared a lack of loyalty of the Polish soldiers in Prussian uniforms to the Germany. But these fears proved to be unfounded. The dramatic war experience soon from strangers created comrades in arms and led to the creation of the unity of the subdivisions.

In this article, I reconstructed the process of mobilization and concentration of the 10th Infantry Division, the Ordre de Bataille of the individual regiments and course of the concentration on the French border. The first fights shown, what kinds of training errors were committed in the regiments of the 10th Infantry Division. I present these issues in the next part of the series of articles.

Summary

This paper presents organization of German 10th Infantry Division of 5th Army Corps in the year 1914. Against the backdrop of its mobilization, the specific

⁷⁶ Wilhelm Hohenzollern, *The Memoirs of the Crown Prince of Germany*, (London: Mundus Publishing Company, 1922), 164–165; Wegner, *Die höheren Kommandostellen*, p. 52–55.

⁷⁷ Martin Lezius, *Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee* (Leipzig: Militär Verlag, 1927), 176; Martin Lezius, *Ruhmeshalle unserer Alten Armee*, Band 1 (Berlin: Militär Verlag, 1935), p. 364.

case of the Polish soldiers serving in this unit is presented, historical significance of the unit in the region of the Province of Posen before 1914, mobilization in August 1914, and concentration on the western front.

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“Fifth weapon” – Polish Air Force and Czechoslovak Air Force – versus UPA. Looking from the “3rd Dimension” on the Fights in Bieszczady Mountains between 1946–1947 against Ukrainian Insurgent Army

29th April 1915

We have been observing [in Biecz] aeroplanes flying above us. Soldats [soldiers of the tsar army] are shooting with small arms and heavy machine guns as they are Austro-Hungarian and German. What a sensation! Aeroplanes are dropping bombs. One was dropped in Upper suburb [in Biecz] and hit the ground. It scared the soldiers and they ran away with horses. But we also watch aeroplanes in fear.

This is how Maria Kromkayowa who ran “Journals of Warfare in Biecz” describes the “fifth weapon” seen above the Biecz in the Beskids in spring of 1915, just before the Gorlice Breakthrough from 2nd May 1915. More than 30 years later a sight of an aeroplane in the Carpathian region evoked similar reactions.

The end of the World War II (WW II 1939–1945) in May of 1945 was for the majority of Europe’s inhabitants the end of “days of misery and destruction”. However, not all of European regions were able to enjoy peace. A group of these states included The Kingdom of Greece (pol. Królestwo Grecji – 1944–1949) overpowered by domestic war and torn by pro- and anticommunist forces and Republic of Poland (pol. Rzeczpospolita Polska – 1945–1947). Warfare within Carpathian region was not finished together with the end of the WWII and the tragic events that have taken place at an unfortunate contact point of borders between Republic of Poland, Union of Soviet Socialist Republics (pol. Związek Socjalistycznych Republik Radzieckich), and Republic of Czechoslovakia

(pol. Republika Czechosłowacka) were vividly present in human memory. After 1945 an unsolved issue for the above mentioned countries was the so-called Ukrainian Question. During the WWII the Organization of Ukrainian Nationalists (pol. Organizacja Ukraińskich Nacjonalistów – OUN) showed cruel policy towards Polish speaking population in regions of Wołyń, Podlasie, Galicja, and Podole. Divisions of Ukrainian Insurgent Army (pol. Ukraińska Powstańcza Armia – UPA) in the spring of 1945 attempted to overtake “Zakerzonia” or Trans-Curzon, especially in the territory of Bieszczady Mountains (pol. Bieszczady) and Low Beskids (pol. Beskid Niski) even though those lands were a part of Union of Soviet Socialist Republics and “people’s” Republic of Poland. Between 1945–1947 in the said region apart from the forces OUN-UPA that were against communist authorities there were also Polish partisan groups, for example National Armed Forces (pol. Narodowe Siły Zbrojne) fighting secret political police (pol. Urząd Bezpieczeństwa), Polish Citizen’s Militia (pol. Milicja Obywatelska) and the attacking divisions of Polish People’s Army (pol. ludowe Wojsko Polskie). The sequences of “forgetting” or rather “denial” from historical memory the events that occurred in the said region after 1945 mostly refer to circumstances regarding the action “Vistula” (pol. “Wisła”) in 1947 conducted by Polish People’s Army, The Internal Security Corps (pol. Korpus Bezpieczeństwa Wewnętrznego) with the support of Frontier Guard Troops (pol. Wojska Ochrony Pogranicza) and Polish Citizen’s Militia on Polish territory as a part of the pacification of Ukrainian underground forces (UPA). The operation was aimed against UPA’s and OUN’s structures and became a great in scale action of resettling whose objective was to remove from “the southern borderlands of RP politically hostile” Ukrainian-speaking population as well as “mixed” families. Deportations between 28 April till the end of July 1947 touched more than 140 000 people although last deportations of the above mentioned groups took places in 1950. Fighting UPA was the first use of Polish Air Force after the end of the WWII. It is a little known fact, similarly to the use of the Czechoslovakian Air Forces in the said fights.

In 1945 the command of Polish People’s Army sent “straight from the front-line” to Rzeszowian Voivodeship (pol. Województwo Rzeszowskie) vast forces in order to bring order against forces of OUN-UPA and Polish National Armed Forces. Units of Polish People’s Army sent there (infantry, artillery, armored train supported by air force units) were mostly from The Polish Second Army (pol. 2. Armia Wojska Polskiego – AWP – 8th and 9th Infantry Division [pol. Dywizje Piechoty] of 2nd AWP was in this action) Polish People’s Army had some experience in battle front gained in Łużycka and Praska Operation in 1945

but they lacked it in combating the enemy whose tactic was partisan!¹. After the end of WWII in spring of 1946 in order to coordinate the efforts of Polish People's Army in the Rzeszowian Voivodeship in a better manner by a ruling of Committee for State Security (pol. Państwowy Komitet Bezpieczeństwa) an Operational Group (pol. Grupa Operacyjna) "Rzeszów" was created. The group, in march of 1946 was given by aviation command (pol. Dowództwo Lotnictwa) an air Flight (pol. Eskadra Lotnicza) from the 2nd Independent Mixed Air Regiment (pol. 2. Samodzielny Mieszany Pułk Lotniczy) stationing in airport Mokotów in Warsaw. Regiment had, among others, biplanes type Polikarpov Po-2 (pol. "pociak"), and initially to Operational Group "Rzeszów" six such planes were ascribed and three more were ascribed later. This is how a special air sub-division mostly against UPA on the territory of the Foothills and the Bieszczady mountains was created (The commander of the 2nd Independent Mixed Air Regiment has appointed flight lieutenant Józef Dembowski). The commander of air Flight received from the commander of Operational Group "Rzeszów" the directives regarding warfare and air Flight's airfield was supposed to be the hill in Sanok situated by the 8th Infantry Division headquarters. Three planes were based in Przemyśl by headquarters of the 9th Infantry Division. After a few days five planes Po-2 flew to Sanok (pilots stayed in private accommodation nearby the airstrip however mechanics – who were also airborne gunners for the air Flight lacked look-out men – stayed in tents on the airstrip). Planes of the Po-2 type were armed in machine guns system "Szkas" or in single assembled machine guns of infantry system "Diegtiarowa" supported by a shooter from another cubicle; under the bottom lobes there were assembled light duty ejectors but the main armament of the crews were infantry grenades of F1 type thrown from a watch-man from the second cubicle. Since the redeployment the air Flight crews in spring of 1946 the reconnaissance flights above the uncharted territory began.

- The crew of Po-2 type plane supported from air a platoon from the 8th Infantry Division which was trapped by battalion „Zuch” National Armed Forces of major „Żubryd”
- Between 12th and 15th April 1946 air Flight crews supported divisions of 8th Infantry Division which conducted operations against UPA's sotnya "Chromenki".
- Between 18th and 21st April 1946 one unit conducted a recognition for the 9th Infantry Division in the forest region between Jarosław and Lubaczów during a chase after the UPA's units "Jara" and "Zacharki".

¹ M. Juchniewicz, 36 *Łużycki*, Warszawa 1975 – passim.

- Between 20th and 24th April 1945 crews supported actions against UPA's sotnyas "Smerek" and "Bira"
- Between 25th and 28th April two units supported divisions from 8th Infantry Division by monitoring the territory above the forests in search of UPA's sotnya from kuren "Ren".
- 7th May 1946, a crew's report helped in eliminating a division from UPA in the Bereznica Wyżna region and in another flight the crew has located UPA's sotnya "Wołynianka" at the same time helping to eliminate it between 25th and 29th April 1964 in Wola Różanicka-Moszczanica region.
- 18th May 1946 two crews opened fire with on-board weapons on the road Sanok-Zagórz a National Armed Forces unit from the battalion "Zuch" of major "Żubryd" forcing him to retreat and hiding in the forest.
- In the Huzele region the crew with a one precise shot of explosive charge destroyed a UPA bunker that has been thus far unsuccessfully attacked by soldier from 33rd Infantry Regiment.
- 28th June 1946, two units thanks to air-to-ground surveillance in the region of Roszuski village detected a prosecuted group from UPA's sotnya "Burlaki" and conducted an air attack².
- 29th May 1946 battalions from the 34th and 36th Budziszynski and Łużycki infantry regiment respectively tried to counter UPA's sotnyas from the Liszna-Wujskie borderlines at the foot of the Słonne Mountains. In fights in the said region (nearby Mrzygłód, Sanok, and Jurowce) an aircraft flight of Po-2 planes by air Flight³ commander has been successfully employed. After the above mentioned against UPA's sotnyas, right after landing in Sanok, a new order was waiting for the unit commander – flight lieutenant J. Dembowski were to fly an airplane to Cisna region and drop a report from the 8th Infantry Division commander and contact with their own units in a region between Cisna and Ustrzyki Górne as a situation of one of the battalions of infantry was unknown to the commander. In Cisna region pilots dropped a report in a marked place but when the airplane flew into the mountain valley between Cisna and Ustrzyki Górne the plane was shot down by assault weapons from UPA division (weapons damaged the engine and the machine with gunshots on the wings was forced to land on a small sloughy meadow near Smerek [today a reserve of alder forest]).

² Cz. Krzemiński, *Lotnictwo polskie w pierwszych latach powojennych*, Warszawa 1981, p. 120–121; I. Koliński, *Lotnictwo Polski Ludowej 1944–1947*, Warszawa 1987, p. 403–405.

³ *Finiał wojny we wspomnieniach lotników*, Warszawa 1972, p. 232–234.

The plane did a turnover and damaged the rotor)⁴. A subdivision of infantry from a 34th Infantry Regiment of Budziszyn commanded by lieutenant colonel Jan Gerhard saved crew that has been shot⁵ (a plane that has been burnt down was erased from air Flight stock and the photographs taken that day by lieutenant colonel J. Gerhard were given after 18 years on 28th May 1964 as a souvenir to a pilot who in 1946 from an airport in Sanok did 97 sorties over the "blind loop" of Bieszczady Mountains). After this event flight lieutenant J. Dembowski returned to his original 2nd Independent Mixed Air Regiment and the command of air Flight in Sanok has been given to flight lieutenant Tadeusz Pytel⁶.

Units quartering in Sanok often did liaison flights retaining flow of information between General Command of the Polish People's Army (pol. Naczelne Dowództwo Wojska Polskiego) and the command of the 5th Military District (pol. V Okręg Wojskowy) transferring reports, carriers and the like. During one of such flights the crew that consisted of flying warrant officer Z. Danyłow and captain Butkiewicz the 8th Infantry Division in the Królik Polski region detected a marching UPA group which the crew attacked from air by assault weapons. Operations by air Flight lasted until 9th September 1946 when it was terminated. Planes Po-2 together with the crew and ground staff returned to original 2nd Independent Mixed Air Regiment in Warsaw yet, for the command of the 8th and 9th Infantry Division two planes of the said type remained (planes ascribed in the autumn of 1946 to the command of the 8th Infantry Division probably still had their base in Sanok).

In 1946 not only the Polish side used air force in operations against UPA's forces. Air force has been employed as well by Czechoslovak Army in operations against the said forces. The territory mainly of Eastern Slovakia and Moravia has been taken into consideration by the command of Czechoslovak Air Force as base territory for selected air forces that predominantly aimed at recognition of the UPA forces from air on the Polish-Czechoslovak borderland. First air operations of this kind took place in 1946. Between April and September 1946 one squadron – airplanes Ilyushin Il-2 m 3 ("sturmoviks") from the 30th Assault Air Regiment (pol. Pułk Lotnictwa Bombowego) has been deployed to an airport in Košice (pol. Koszyce) and used for recognition from air. Until the 21st April

⁴ J. Woźniak, *Loty nad „ślepą kiszka”* – a copy in author's collection.

⁵ J. Gerhard, *Łuny w Bieszczadach*, Warszawa 1968, p. 189.

⁶ J. Woźniak, op. cit.; A. Olejko, *Z lotów nad Bieszczadami*, „Lotnictwo Wojskowe” 2002, no. 6, p. 53–58.

1946 as a part of Operational Group "Ocel" consisting of divisions from the 3rd and 4th Military Districts (the command had their base in Prešov – pol. Preszów]) the crews performed airborne operations in the Western region of Republic of Czechoslovakia. Probably by the 10th April 1946 the air recognition has detected a UPA division in the region of Humenne where a confrontation with Czechoslovakian army took place. What is more a few fighter aircrafts Lavochkin La-5 FN and La-7 from the 1st Fighter Squadron (pol. 1 Dywizjon Myśliwski) commanded by major pilot Ludovit Koza. During one of such flights east of Koszyce on the 12th July 1946 of a three planes aircraft flight (the pilots of La-7 were L. Koza, L. Solar, and Ś. Konvalinka) the engine of the airplane no 45210797 navigated by L. Solar stopped working and the pilot was forced to land in Szikoszc village region in Hungary (the pilot suffered severe wounds)⁷.

Actions of UPA forces in winter 1946/1947 in Bieszczady mountains and the Low Beskids has diminished and both parties activated in spring 1947 after death of deputy minister of Homeland Security (pol. Minister Obrony Narodowej), lieutenant general Karol Świerczewski – "Walter" – 28th March 1947 in Jabłonki. The last journey of "Walter" led to Sub-Carpathian region from Kraków via Rzeszów-Jasionka airport where together with him and his company there planes Po-2 from the 2nd Independent Mixed Air Regiment from Warsaw-Mokotow airport landed⁸. The arrival of Homeland Security deputy from Rzeszów to Krosno on 27th March 1947 took place either on a Douglas DC-3 cargo aircraft or in a Po-2 limousine which he took to Rzeszów. After the events in Jabłonki the body of "Walter" was transported to Sanok by a car and from the local airport it has been taken by an air ambulance Po-2 to an airplane in Krosno and the transportation of his casket has done by a DC-3 cargo aircraft navigated by flight lieutenant J. Dembowski. In 1947 in the operations conducted by Operational Group "Vistula" (pol. Wisła) against UPA's forces (Operation "Vistula") infantry, artillery, armored forces, and air forces (air Flight) were employed. The crews of Po-2 planes again have been used in combat flights. The command of 8th Infantry Division planned, together with the arrival of spring 1947 to activate recognition flights over the lands where UPA was

⁷ *Finat*, op. cit., p. 232–234; M. Irra, *Letectvo v akcii B*, „Letectvi+Kosmonavtika” 2001, no. 5, s. 22.

⁸ The report published in 1947 in „*Żołnierzu Polskim*” – a copy in author's collection. The way from Rzeszów to Krosno on 27th March gen. Karol Świerczewski covered by wheel transportation though in another version it was to be a on a transportation plane DC-3 to Krosno or in a plane Po-2 co which is confirmed by H. Motyka (*Tak było w Bieszczadach*, Warszawa 1999, p. 282) when He Wites „it was about sending cars to Krosno from where the generals came” (another general was Mikołaj Prus-Więckowski, the commander of Military District) “they had cars to go to Sanok”.

the strongest: Wola Michowa-Komańcza-Szczawne-Kulaszne-Bukowiec-Terka-Suche Rzeki. In spring 1947 as a part of Operational Group "Vistula" air Flight was again brought to life. It consisted of nine Po-2 planes and one DC-3 cargo plane; a little later, a four planes formation flight of Il-2 from the 6th Attack Aviation Regiment (pol. Pułk Lotnictwa Szturmowego – its workings have been controlled by 27 members of ground staff) were added. The air Flight flying crew consisted of experienced pilots – instructors and navigators from The Polish Air Force Academy (pol. Oficerska Szkoła Lotnicza) in Dęblin and from Military Districts. Flight lieutenant Dionizy Maciążek from a special aviation regiment (he began his combat flight over Bieszczady Mountains in 1946) became the commander. The squadron was to perform flights over the "S" like Sanok territory. The flying staff was constituted by pilots-instructors and from The Polish Air Force Academy from Dęblin as well as pilots from airline liaison working by Military Districts command's side. The crews of "sturmoviks" Il-2 m 3 attack aircraft were constituted by flight lieutenant Burow, flight lieutenant Władysław Czubkowski, flight lieutenant Konstanty Licewicz, second flight lieutenant Władysław Faściuk as pilots and sergeants Bogdan Trzebuchowski and Franciszek Tarnawski as airborne gunners. On air Flight boards of Po-2 that were to support Operational Group "Vistula". The remaining pilots came from airline liaison formations of Military Districts Wrocław, Poznań, Kraków and Lublin. The DC-3 cargo plane was operated by captain Włodzimierz Paliwoda and second lieutenant Zygmunt Danyłow⁹.

On the 21st April 1947 air Flight that was formed to meet the needs of Operational Group "Vistula" was deployed by means of a flight to Rzeszów-Jasionka airport, entered a supply list of the 8th Infantry Division and received an off-road car and a truck (the command was now in a commander's HQ that was equipped with a phone). After getting familiar with the region the air Flight pilots began flying over the territory south of Rzeszów up to the borderlands with Republic of Czechoslovakia, infrequently Biłgoraj and Hrubieszów regions. Po-2 planes could easily land in random territory and having relatively low speed they were perfect for observations in mountain territory with a lot of thicket south from Jasło-Ustrzyki Dolne railway. The most important task given to air Flight crews was to observe UPA's groups in Bieszczady Mountains territory which was not easy as the groups conducted active maneuver operations. The marching routes of the army crossed repeatedly with the marching routes of UPA's sotnyas and the situation in mountains could change within an hour. Upon spotting UPA's forces pilots would pass a message about it by reporting it on the ground close

⁹ Cz. Krzemiński, op. cit., p. 120–121; I. Koliński, op. cit., p. 403–405.

to the nearest Polish People's Army division, or launching rockets towards the prosecuted opponents, or landing near its own divisions. General major Stefan Mosor, the commander of Operational Group "Vistula" ordered at least two planes to be always in the air with staff monitoring the regions that were encompassed by conflict as they assumed that even if crews failed to detect anything their very presence would paralyze UPA's forces and make them hide constantly. "Air blockage" was to last all day and night. Taking into account that all operations were to take place on wolds, covered with prolific brushes and forests detecting an enemy would not be easy, even more so as the UPA's divisions repeatedly used Polish uniforms they had captured. For this reason, observation was conducted by single units and from a low altitude. From Rzeszów-Jasionka airport the first recognition flights were conducted over Lesko-Baligród-Cisna-Przysłop-Wetlina territory attacking the detected UPA' sotnya group "Bira" from air¹⁰.

From 23rd April 1947 air Flight was deployed from Rzeszów-Jasionka airport to an airfield in Sanok where in 1946 stationed its predecessor. Air Flight immediately began systematic recognition flights over Bieszczady Mountains. The mode was as follows: two Po-2 planes kept in air and the next two were on a stand-by. Initially the recognition was done twice a day – in the morning and in the evening and as the combat developed crews worked all day long. Po-2 planes were deprived of on-board machine guns and explosives – it was a deliberate order of the Operational Group "Vistula" commander who thought that since both parties used Polish People's Army uniforms it was difficult to distinguish which division were under the plane. This helped to avoid shooting their own divisions by mistake. Still, the crews took F-1 infantry grenades on board and personal TT guns. In of the flights second lieutenant Bolesław Balwirczak noticed a polish Infantry Divisions leaving forest, they did not launch a rocket. The pilot was convinced that it is UPA division and ordered the watchman to attack it with F 1 hand grenades and when the plane did a U-turn the division on the ground launched a recognition racket – the attack has been stopped in the nick of time. What is more, the said planes were not equipped with radio stations which made it impossible to connect with the ground. 18th June 1947 the crew that consisted of warrant officer and pilot Bronisław Świątkowski lieutenant navigator Jan Dzieńkowski detected in Solina region a UPA units – while going south the pilots dropped report to their divisions and after an hour of being circled the UPA units has been eliminated. New orders from the Operational Group "Vistula" commander forced the crews to fly also at night (those flights were mostly done from Rzeszów-Jasionka airport as the airport in Sanok was not

¹⁰ T. Dalecki, *Opowieści spod skrzydeł*, Rzeszów 1984, p. 133–140.

fitted for such flights – a Russian pilot senior lieutenant Wojtalianow came to air Flight in order to train pilots who have not previously flown at nights. Night flights have been started by, among others, second lieutenant Jerzy Figarski and second lieutenant Kazimierz Oleński – night flights were trained every night on Sanok-Rzeszów-Jasionka route). The help received from the air force was not little – for instance on 12th and 13th May 1947 crews delivered reports to Operational Group "Vistula" headquarters in Baligród about fights against a UPA units from kuren "Rena" in a massif Chryszczata. The majority of air Flight's pilot were young people who have faced combat conditions precisely for the very first time above Bieszczady mountains. A selected air craft formation of Po-2 planes was deployed to an airfield in Baligród – one crew was on a standby, and the other in air (UPA forces were detected around Rabe and Kamionka). After a few weeks of combat the HQ of Operational Group "Vistula" was moved to Rzeszów and on 18th May (21st May?) air Flight crews were yet again deployed to Rzeszów-Jasionka airport from where on 5th June 1947 they supported operations against UPA's sotnyas "Burłaki", "Kryłacz" and "Łastiwki" that were surrounded under Bircza, Wola Korzeniecka and Leszczawa Górna (in region of Kwaszenina three planes Po-2 with suspended containers for the wounded helped by transporting wounded polish soldiers to a hospital in Rzeszów). Propaganda flights were also systematically conducted and leaflets for Ukrainian populations were dropped (on average in one flight 10 000 leaflets were delivered)¹¹.

On 17th June 1947 air Flight commander received an order to deploy to Sanok the liaison formation consisting of two Po-2 planes. Lieutenant Juliusz Hibner – the Internal Security Corps Operational Group „Vistula” deputy flew such planes in order to meet with russian Red Army and Czechoslovakian Army commanders. Recognition fights from Sanok started the very next day and as a result, two divisions of UPA were detected under Baligród and Komańcza; they were eliminated by Polish People's Army divisions thanks to locating from air. A tragic end was a part of a 19th June 1947 flight during which the crew consisting of a warrant officer pilot B. Świątkowski and lieutenant navigator J. Dzieńkowski recognized forest massif where, between Baligród and Komańcza a UPA sotnya "Burłaki" was hiding – in the fire coming from the anti-aircraft defense of the enemy the crew's navigator was killed¹². As a personal order of second lieutenant pilot Józef Figarski and second lieutenant navigator Ignacy Krikszer captured a 100

¹¹ Cz. Krzemiński, op. cit.; I. Koliński, op. cit.; A. Olejko, *Działania powietrzne w pasie karpackim na terenie Beskidu Niskiego, Bieszczadów i Pogórza Przemyskiego w okresie 1941–1947*, [in:] *Lotnicza historia, archeologia, tradycja miejsca*, Nowy Targ 2002, p. 153–166.

¹² Cz. Krzemiński, op. cit., p. 124–126.

people UPA division commanded by lieutenant J. Dzieńkowski and led a polish division to it. In an operation on 27th June 1947 at around 8.00 nearby Turzańsk, Duszatyn and Chryszczata three “sturmoviks” Il-2 m 3 attack aircrafts from 6th Attack Aviation Regiment were used in an formation. In the first flight planes were used under the command of lieutenant pilot Kazimierz Czubkowski stationing in Rzeszów-Jasionka airport and soon, in the region of Turzańsk, again two “sturmoviks” navigated by rockets launched by Po-2 plane crew appeared and supported Internal Security Corps infantry¹³. However, UPA’s grouping was not yet destroyed as they have fled Chryszczata region and Duszyńskich lakes. On 8th July 1946 there was an airplane crash warrant officer Kozłowski who was a fighter pilot begged his friends to let him fly Po-2 and after receiving their permission he... crashed the plane as he was unable to navigate it. It was this month when, together with a gradual weakening of the fights the number of flights over Bieszczady as well as the number of combat flights have diminished¹⁴. In Operational Group “Vistula” there was a Internal Security Corps division formed on 16th April 1947 which was supported by air force consisting of four (three?) Po-2 planes formation that has been separated from the 9th Independent Mixed Air Regiment Internal Security Corps (pol. Samodzielna Eskadra Lotnictwa Łącznikowego) stationing in Warsaw on Mokotów airport – 103. Flight Regiment [pol. 103. Eskadra Łącznikowa] from a Vistula Military Units of Homeland Security (from Warsaw-Bemowo) became a continuator of this tradition. 9th Independent Mixed Liaison Squadron Internal Security Corps was created from a transformed Independent Liaison Squadron with still “frontline” history and its pilots have already done their very flights over the region of Rzeszów in 1946 (the commander of the 1st “Bieszczady” formation was second lieutenant pilot and, apart from him, the other pilots were: officer pilot Jan Czwakiel and officer pilot Jerzy Leszek). The formation ensured communication between Operational Group “Vistula” units. It was not far away for the Po-2 crews from Sanok and Baligród field airports to the regions of UPA’s sotnyas operations – the aim was to shorten the time of flights to monitoring zones and, in so doing, prolong the effective time in the air, and, most importantly, to hasten the delivery of recognition reports. Po-2 planes were working from airstrips in Baligród (headquarters), Rzeszów and Sanok, they have resigned from using Krosno airport¹⁵. Soon, the latter was used in combat, for example during fights in forest massif in Chryszczata between 11th–13th May 1947. Po-2 planes landed nearby general major S. Mossor’s headquarters in Bali-

¹³ T. Dalecki, op. cit., p. 127–138.

¹⁴ Data from M. Wawrzyński collection.

¹⁵ F. Sikorski, *Kabewiaczy w Akcji „Wista”*, Warszawa 1988, p. 97–100.

gród and informed him "live" about the combat. Numerous the Operational Group "Vistula" commander performed, as a passenger, monitoring a battlefield and gave instructions to his subordinates commanders from air and from Po-2 board. Apart from liaison flights, different machines of the above mentioned type from 9th Independent Mixed Liaison Squadron Internal Security Corps would occasionally fly to Sanok; for example, on 19th May 1947 a commander of a Internal Security Corps division, captain Feliks Sikorski visited the place and between 25th and 26th June 1947, pilot officer Sławomir Kapeluszný covered the route Warsaw-Radom-Rzeszów-Baligród-Krosno-Warszawa in order to fetch a wounded soldier. Internal Security Corps formation realized monitoring, recognition, and propaganda tasks, it also served to transport wounded soldiers in Krakow and Warsaw. At least once, on the Sanok airport territory a captured post-german Fieseler Fi-156 „Storch” liaison plane that was not recognized in statistics of 9th Independent Mixed Liaison Squadron Internal Security Corps – the machine might have not appeared in squadron's stock but was rather used as an "air taxi". Thanks to support of the above mentioned formation between 21st April and 15th May 1947 a Internal Security Corps division has successfully performed 32 out of 43 operations. The need for liaison flights was great because the conditions on the roads were chaotic and the breakdowns in telephone communication were frequent – thus, a plane turned out to be the most reliable means of transferring necessary information. As a result Po-2 crews flew covering almost entire territory of the fights. In effect crews from the 9th Independent Mixed Liaison Squadron Internal Security Corps performer In the spring-summer time 387 flights in 892 hours. In 1947 on Sanok airstrip a captured post-german plane Fieseler Fi-156 „Storch” (C 5 "Čap") appeared with Czechoslovakian command who flew in to discuss with Operational Group "Vistula" common operations with Internal Security Corps division against UPA's divisions. A machine in Czechoslovakian coloration stationed there very shortly but the pilots from Operational Group "Vistula" fighter squadron were given a chance to study the machine. According to the arrangements both parties could be used beyond borders only for observation purposes – (up to 30 kilometers inland). Finally in July of 1947 Operational Group "Vistula" terminated the operation against UPA's forces. That is why on 30th July 1947 Operational Group „Vistula" and the fighter squadron that supported it was also terminated.

In operations against UPA in 1947 Czechoslovakian Air Force was used once again – during a so-called "Operation B". The territory of mainly this state was the area which was crossed not only by UPA's delivery routes that led to American zone but also by evacuation routes established in Poland by polish army and Internal Security Corps divisions for UPA's sotnyas. Activating operational air

force of Czechoslovakia took place at the moment of ending the main fights with UPA in Poland and the return (from Czechoslovakian territory to West) of groups that survived. Between 8th July and 29th September 1947 planes from the 1st Fighter Squadron and 30th Assault Aviation Regiment of 4th Flying Division (pol. 4. Dywizja Lotnicza) of the following types: La-5 FN, La-7 and Po-2 have been moved after a deployment from Tri Duby airport to the territory of East Slovakia. Soon after that planes from Regiment of Aviation Transport joined the above mentioned machines. The crews of the said machines did mostly recognition flights in the region of mountain massif of Small Fatra (sl. Mala Fatra) using rockets to mark the routes of UPA forces yet, because of a big number of tourists that appeared in the region, the crews were not allowed to attack from air with any on-board weapons as to avoid hurting any civilians. The first operations involving air force have probably taken place even before "Operation B" – in the beginning of 1947 in East Slovakian territory an air force unit appeared by a code name "Juraj" was active in the said region between do 30th April of 1947. From the second half of July of 1947 the operation of relocating the UPA forces that have been present in Poland and in Czechoslovakia grew stronger – among them especially "Chromenki" and "Burlaka" sotnyas proved to be powerful. The aim of air recognition of the said forced activated operations by Czechoslovakian Air Forces. On 27th July 1947 on Koszyce airport another detached aviation division appeared and captain Pšorn became its commander. It consisted of 41st Aviation Regiment with five C 5 "Čap" liaison machines, one Aero C 3 A Transport plane (a German name Siebel Si 204 D) and three Aero C 3 B planes (the machines were distinguished form the aviation command of 1st Military District and 6th Aviation Workshops [pol. Warsztaty Lotnicze] of 2nd Military District). Activities were to be managed from Kamenica by Cirocha airport to where the machines were moved on 30th July 1947. The squadron was supervised by a 10th Infantry Division commander and was to co-operate with a „Slovensko" division of Slovakian National Security Corps (sl. Sbor Narodnej Bezpečnosti – SNB) led by lieutenant Cyprich (two fighter planes and three liaisons planes that from 1st July 1947 have been moved to Koszyce airport)¹⁶.

On 15th July 1947 at the Koszyce airport Slovakian National Security Corps aviation division was formed. The main tasks of Czechoslovakian crews was to recognize from air regions where UPA's forces could operate and to establish communication with divisions of Czechoslovakian army operating in the region of air recognition. As their task was to recognize the campsites of UPA's division that were on the move through the East part of Czechoslovakia, they performed mainly

¹⁶ F. Sikorski, op. cit.; Cz. Krzemiński, op. cit.; I. Koliński, op. cit.

night flights in search of camp fires. Upon detecting a camp they would introduce type C 2 planes that by using on-board weapons would bomb the campsite. Those operation however never came to fruition – the machines of C 5 "Čap" types with no weapon were not planned to be used for destructive operations as during some recognition flights a few cases of shooting them were noted. In July 1947 some of the above-mentioned machines of C 5 "Čap" were deployed to Tri Duby airport – according to a report by captain Pšorný between 3rd and 9th August 1947 in the region of Low Tatras Mountains (sl. Niske Tatry), Choć Hill, Small Fatra and Oravska Magura (sl. Oravska Magura) 24 operational flights in 37 h 25 minutes were performed. At the same time, the subdivision grew to eight C 5 "Čap" type machines delivered from 43rd Aviation Regiment (pol. Pułk Lotniczy). One of the effects of the flights was finding near Magura Hill (kota 1316) by Ružemberok six dead and two wounded soldieries about whom the command of "Teplice" Operational Group in Banská Bystrica (pol. Bańska Bystrzyca) had no information. On-board weapons were not used but, as a result of an agreement with Polish command, a permit to conduct recognition flights without a possibility to use on-board weapons and bombs over Polish territory was granted (in winter of 1947 it was planned to use them against the divisions of Polish underground crossing the borders with Czechoslovakia in Spiš pol. Spisz)¹⁷. The remaining machines of the said unit – five machines of Aero C 3 B type was left in Košice airport where it was to collect 200 bombs of SD 70 German type, 70 kg each and ammunition for 10 combat machines. Lieunant Konopicky arrived to Košice airport for three days in order to train the staff of the unit in the usage of bombs – and indeed, the bombs were eventually used. A lot of trouble was caused by the night flights for which the crew of C 5 "Čap" were not trained; in order to resolve the issue on 14th July 1947 in Košice airport another detached aviation subdivision with experienced night flights crews under škpt. Psorn was created (two transportations D 47 machines with crews – Czechoslovakian coloring of machines Douglas C 47 [Lisunov Li 2]) and eight watchmen from aviation schools) operating within 10th Infantry Division and Operational Group "Teplice". On the very same day 14th July 1947 between 09.45 pm and 04.20 am the first recognition flight took place and, during the next flight certain radio communication issues between the plane and ground troops were reported (a report from the flight was sent to an encrypting point in Prešov but at the Košice airport the crew cooperating with the plane radio station failed to receive it). During a flight on 18th July 1947 four reports have been sent and they were forwarded but the radio station crew of the 10th Infantry Division... was sleeping. That

¹⁷ M. Irra, op. cit., p. 23.

is why the recognition was done in waste. Similar communication problems appeared during flights on 21st and 24th July 1947 – as a result of the problems the reports were forwarded to the division's headquarters only after the machine has landed. The supplying of the said machines was also problematic. On 26th July 1947 during the fueling of one of the machines sand got inside a carburetor and the plane was immobilized for four days. After this incident machines were sent back to their original airport and the emergency service of machines Aero C 3 B stationing in Košice was withdrawn, the order to attack the UPA's forces with bombs has also been recanted. On 1st August 1947 two planes were sent back to a airport in Malačky and the third one to 44th Aviation Regiment. In case of a need for combat the crews of three Aero C 3 B machines in Malačky airport were kept on standby. As to complete the detached subdivision that was based at Tri Budy airport three C 5 "Čap" machines from 43rd Aviation Regiment (that was from 23rd August to overtake the combat activity in 41st Aviation Regiment) were sent. Keeping a five hour long standby at the airport in Malačky proved to be problematic – at the same time two machines of this type were conveyed from Košice on 1st August 1947 – both were not functional from 16th September 1947¹⁸.

In September 1947 divisions of UPA were being reported as present in Moravia (pol. Morawy) – mainly from sotnya "Chromenki" and "Romana – Brodycza" – the situation that occurred forced the command of 3rd Military District to use air force against them. To that aim, a subdivision from 43rd Aviation Regiment was formed – it was deployed to an airport in Prerov (its command was from 23rd September 1947 škpt. Teodor Fukala). From Tri Duby airport three liaison K 65 planes (it was a new way of identifying C 5 "Čap" machines introduced in August 1947), what is more, combat emergency service among the Aero C 3 B crews in the Malačky airport was implemented. This new subdivision with a code name "Orel" performed at least six liaison flights on the Prerov-Brno route and 10 operational flights (mainly between 12th–20th October 1947 r.). At the turn of September and October 1947 the operational flights were performed at the borderlands of Slovakia and Moravia; for instance on 22nd and 23rd October in the Šumperk region a 20 people division has been detected from air, they were thought to be "Bandérivtsi" (pol. Banderowcy) – supporters of the revolution. The region Jihlava-Trešt-Štonarov and Svatoslavi regions were also recognized; the subdivision of škpt. Teodor Fukali had three K 65 machines: two taking part in the operation and two on standby¹⁹.

¹⁸ Ibidem. Data from J. Staigel collection.

¹⁹ M. Irra, op. cit., p. 24.

From 6th July 1947 in Jasionka airport general major S. Mossor has awarded warrant officer B. Świątkowskiego with 3rd class ribbon Order of the Cross of Grunwald, lieutenant pilot D. Maciążek, officer navigator Ignacy Krikszer, officer navigator Zbigniew Dereń, operator lieutenant B. Balwierczak with Cross of Valour, warrant officer Franciszek Sokół with a silver medal for Merit on the Field of Glory, the commander of attack aircraft formation from the 6th Attack Aviation Regiment – officer navigator Burow with Cross of Valour for the combat flights in the Southern-Eastern Poland. In time of fights between 21 April and 30th July 1947 the squadron has flown over the Dynowsko-Przemyskie foothill, Bieszczady Mountains and the Low Beskids over 1500 hours having only 10 Po-2 planes!!! Such results is truly impressive. The toll that has been taken: one killed pilot and two crashed Po-2 multi-role combat aircrafts. After terminating Operational Group "Vistula" there still were operational subdivisions "Sanok" (the name has been altered to "Gorlice" after deployment to Gorlice) and "Lubaczów" present in the region. Their commanders were given two Po-2 planes formation from 9th Independent Mixed Liaison Squadron Internal Security Corps. Planes from this formations had their base in Sanok, Lubaczów and Glinik Mariampolski near Gorlice and were still flying over the territories which have been recently a battlefield. In the fall of 1947 last Po-2 left Sanok²⁰.

The Czechoslovakian Air Force warfare in "Operation B" ended on 19th November 1947 when its command closed all subdivisions fighting against UPA (according to date collected on 17th November 1947 above mentioned units had 8044 soldiers, 1960 partisans, and 5458 soldiers from Slovakian National Security Corps). From 10th July to 12th November 1947 the toll of UPA caused by, among others, air force in Czechoslovak Republik included: 61 killed, 260 captured, and 29 voluntarily joining Czechoslovakian side. Only small groups of UPA were able to flounder towards the Austrian and Hungarian border via Nova Bystrica–Dolní Dvorište region.

Summary

The events that occurred between 1945 and 1947 on the Polish-Czechoslovakian border are still not well known. The conflicts between the Ukrainian Insurgent Army and the Polish airforce with Czechoslovakian support are the topic of the article based on both Polish and Czech sources.

²⁰ Ibidem.

A Presentation of Few Bushido Principles

For many people, Japan is associated with the specific warriors, samurai. Probably, everyone could say about them, however more persons do not know how was their life. The most samurai lived according to the Bushido rules¹, but what was this Bushido? In Japanese language word *bushi* means warrior², and *do* means a way³. So, we can say that Bushido is the samurai code. They lived according to this code, but of course not everyone⁴.

One famous Japanese warrior, Yuzan Daidōji⁵, wrote the Bushido rules⁶. His work is known as *The Code of the Samurai: A Modern Translation of the Bushido Shoshinshu*⁷. The purpose of this article is show some more important rules.

As many knows, the education is very important to people, The Japanese warriors paid special attention to education. Yuzan in his work wrote:

Warriors stand in a position above the other three castes, and are supposed to be professional administrators, so they need to study and gain an extensive understanding of the principles of things.⁸

As we can see, Yuzan paid attention to education like the most samurai. He explained why education is so important to warriors. As he wrote, the Japanese warriors was the first caste in modern Japan. In that case, every one of them had

¹ W. E. Deal, *Medieval & Early Modern Japan*, New York 2006, p. 113.

² K. G. Henshall, *Historia Japonii*, Warszawa 2011, p. 293.

³ Ibidem.

⁴ An example was Katsu Kokichi. Look: [K. Katsu, *Spowiedź samuraja*, Bydgoszcz 2010]

⁵ His full name was Daidōji Yuzan Taira-no Shigesuke. Look: [Y. Daidōji, *Wprowadzenie do Bushidō. Budō Shoshinshū*, Bydgoszcz 2009, p. 3.]

⁶ W. Nowakowski, *O Autorze*, [w:] Y. Daidōji, *Wprowadzenie do Bushidō. Budō Shoshinshū*, Bydgoszcz 2009, p. 8.

⁷ Y. Daidōji, *Code of the Samurai. A Modern Translation of the Bushido Shoshinshu of Taira Shigesuke*, Boston, Rutland, Vermont, Tokyo 1999.

⁸ Ibid., p. 6.

to learn and exercise. It is worth thinking about what was the most important in education for bushi. The answer can be found in *The Code of the Samurai*:

[...] they should be taught classical literature, reading, and writing, from the age of seven or eight. Then when they are fifteen or sixteen, they ought to be taught to practice archery, horsemanship, and all the other martial arts. This should be the basic aim of educating the children of warriors in peaceful time.⁹

We should pay attention to peaceful time. Yuzan wrote his work in Edo period (1603–1868). He never experienced wartime. Of course, he probably knew everything about martial arts. His ancestor fought on the Tokugawa side¹⁰ during the Azuchi-Momoyama and early Edo periods. So, the Yuzan's family had a war tradition. As we can see, the theoretical knowledge was really important, like the martial exercise. But, what is the *classical literature*? The author had in mind the Confucian writings¹¹, like Four Books and Five Classics¹². Samurai children started military exercises only from fifteen or sixteen. It seems unlikely. They probably started this training earlier, at least some of them. One of the samurai, Katsu Kokichi wrote in his memories, that he started horsemanship when he was ten years old¹³. It should be added that Kokichi wrote down his memories in the end of the Edo period¹⁴. Anyway, as we can see, the most important martial exercise were practise archery and horsemanship. The author did not mention combat training with a sword, and the sword of course was the most important weapon in modern Japan¹⁵. Maybe Yuzan thought that it is too obvious.

Of course not everyone had got proper education. Who was guilty in that case? Yuzan answered the question:

There is no legitimate reason for illiteracy among warriors in an era of peace. Children are not to blame for this; it is only due to the negligence and irresponsibility of the parents. Ultimately, it is because they do not know the way to love their children.¹⁶

⁹ Ibid., p. 6–7.

¹⁰ W. Nowakowski, *O Autorze*, p. 7.

¹¹ Y. Daidōji, *Wprowadzenie do Bushidō. Budō Shoshinshū*, Bydgoszcz 2009, p. 15.

¹² Ibid.,

¹³ K. Katsu, *Spowiedź samuraja*, p. 45.

¹⁴ Ibid., s. 29.

¹⁵ S. Turnbull, *Samuraje. Dzieje japońskich wojowników*, Warszawa 2007, p. 150.

¹⁶ Y. Daidōji, *Code of the Samurai*, p. 7.

As we can see, Yuzan blamed only parents. In his opinion, if they had not provided education to their children, they would have meant no idea about parental love. We may risk the statement that such parents were useless, of course in Yuzan opinion. True parental love means sacrificing and providing education. A similar opinion can be seen in other samurai authors¹⁷, for example in Hagakure¹⁸.

It is worth to note that Yuzan wrote about peaceful time. However, he also mentioned earlier times:

During the Era of the Civil Wars, there were any number of warriors who couldn't even look up a word in the dictionary. That was not necessarily because of their own negligence, or because their parents raised them badly, but because their immediate need was to concentrate on military arts.¹⁹

In Yuzan mind, illiteracy was permissible during the wartime. The Era of Civil Wars means Sengoku and Azuchi-Momoyama periods²⁰. During the war, warriors had not time to learn. Yuzan knew it. The most important was a sacrifice, but for whom? The Emperor was not an authority at that time²¹, just like the Ashikaga shogunate²². The most warriors fought for their daimio, the feudal lords²³. The daimio of Yuzan ancestor was Tokugawa Ieyasu (1540–1615)²⁴. In any case, only few paid attention to education during the war. The Japanese warriors's training is mentioned by the researchers, but work on this subject is rare. It is worth noting the of Jinichi Tokeshi's work, *Kendo: Elements, Rules, and Philosophy*²⁵. However, this book deals only with sword combat²⁶. The author does not mention about archery or horsemanship, which were the basis of the samurai training. The same is true for reading and writing. Authors only mention about this need. At this point, note should be made of prof. Inazo Nitobe, who wrote about samurai education. His work, *Bushido: Soul of Japan*²⁷, deals with Bushido principles, as the title implies.

¹⁷ For example: Miyamoto Musuashi. Yagyu Munenori, Yamamoto Kansuke, Yamamoto Tsunetomo.

¹⁸ T. Yamamoto, *Hagakure. Ukryte w listowiu*, Bydgoszcz 2012, p. 18.

¹⁹ Y. Daidōji, *Code of the Samurai*, p. 6.

²⁰ K. G. Henshall, *Historia Japonii*, p. 59.

²¹ Ibid., p. 55.

²² Ibid., p. 57–58.

²³ S. Turnbull, *Samuraje.*, p. 255.

²⁴ W. Nowakowski, *O Autorze*, p. 7.

²⁵ J. Tokeshi, *Kendo: Elements, Rules, and Philosophy*, University of Hawaii Press 2003.

²⁶ J. Tokeshi, *Kendo. Podstawy, filozofia i zasady walki*, Bydgoszcz 2008, p. 93.

²⁷ I. Nitobe, *Bushido: Soul of Japan*, Tokyo 2002.

Another important rule was family relationships. Daidoji Yuzan wrote in *The Code of Samurai*;

For warriors, taking good care of parents is fundamental. If people do not care for their parents, they are not good, even if they exceptionally smart, well-spoken, and handsome.²⁸

So, this principle meant literally: take care of parents. This rule seems to be obvious. Everyone should take care of their parents, not only Japanese warriors. And it is obvious, when someone is *smart, well-spoken and handsome*, he is wrong if he will not care of his parents. Yuzan explained it more accurately:

Knowing the root and the branch means understanding that our parents are the root of our bodies, and our bodies are branches of the flesh and bones of our parents. It is because of the desire to establish ourselves, who are the branches, that circumstances arise whereby we neglect our parents, who are the roots. This is because of failure to understand root and branch.²⁹

Yuzan made a good comparison. In other words, parents give their children "the Gift of Life". In that case Japanese warriors must remember about them, because without them, they would never exist. Word *understanding* was really important for samurai. We can see it in other treatises³⁰. In Yuzan's and the other Japanese samurai authors opinion samurai never learned without understanding. In that case, education was impossible. Miyamoto Musashi (1564–1635) thought, warrior, who never tried to understanding, was stupid³¹. Musashi was a great samurai. Most people know who he was. So, the second important principle was taking care of the parents. We should think about it. If the parents take care of his child, he or she will take care of them. It is obvious, Yuzan wrote:

Now then, there are two ways of taking care of your parents.³²

As we can see, Yuzan noticed the possible differences of taking care of the parents. further wrote:

²⁸ Y. Daidōji, *Code of the Samurai*, p. 7.

²⁹ *Ibid.*, p. 8.

³⁰ For example: *Gorin-no Sho* or *Hagakure*.

³¹ M. Miyamoto, *Gorin-no Sho. Księga pięciu kręgów*, Bydgoszcz 2010, p. 25.

³² Y. Daidōji, *Code of the Samurai*, p. 8.

Suppose there are parents of mild temperament, who educate their children with true kindness and affection, provide for them, marry them well, and then retire, leaving them well situated, with an adequate estate, For children of such parents to take ordinary care of them is nothing particularly praiseworthy or impressive.³³

In that case, taking care of the parents was obvious. Everyone would like to repay them for their care. It is worth to pay attention to what was the upbringing in Yuzan opinion. As we can see, the parents should educate their children with true kindness and affection. That means, they should provide for them, marry them and leaving them well situated, with an adequate estate, Yuzan wrote that, because he was good watcher. He saw how people behaved. In The Code of Samurai we can read:

Even with strangers, when they have treated us kindly and helped us out personally or financially, we do not overlook it – if they are need, we are even willing to set aside our own affairs. How much less could we ever expect to think that we have done enough to care for our parents, considering the depth of the love they have shown us in every way! For this this reason I say that ordinary familial duty is nothing remarkable.³⁴

In the above quote we can see a similar situation as before. The difference is, of course, the strangers. If they had helped someone, then those persons would have wanted to repay them. For example, if any daimio took care of his samurai, then this warrior would take care of his lord too. So, if it is obvious, then taking care of parents is more obvious. In the most cases, parents care most about their children. As we can see, the author wrote, that *ordinary familial duty is nothing remarkable*, and it is true. Probably the most people could agree with him. Yuzan wrote about modern Japan, but this situation is similar today.

It was easy way to taking care of the parents. That situation was simple. Time to hard way, Yuzan, in his work, wrote:

Now suppose there are parents who are obstreperous, cranky, and argumentative, who insist on running the household and refuse to hand over anything, who are importunate, inconsiderate, and demanding, and on top of that complain to others how vexed and troubled they are by the poor

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Ibid.

treatment, they got from their sons, thus damaging their children's reputations. To honor even such unreasonable parents as parents, to take the trouble to humor them, to lament their aging and decline, and take care of them sincerely, without a bit of negligence – this is aim of dutiful children.³⁵

This case is definitely more difficult than before. Now, we can see the parents, who do not take care of their children and they are an obstacle for them. And in this case, the author wrote that children should take care of those parents too. Now it may be not obvious, however for most warriors it was. As was mentioned, taking care of the parents was duty. That is why we can see this in Bushido Code. Yuzan had seen people like this, then he wrote that in The Code of Samurai³⁶. It is worth to pay attention to reputation in this quotation. As author wrote, these parents damaged their children's reputation. The reputation was really important for Japanese warriors³⁷. Without it, they could have a problem finding a job, and noone wanted to be a ronin³⁸. However taking care of those parents would raise reputation. Yuzan wrote:

If man who is not caring toward his parents at home does go into the service of a lord, he keeps his eyes on his employer's balance sheet, and as soon as he sees any little slip his attitude changes; in an emergency he will flee or turn traitor. There are cases like this past and present; this is something to be ashamed of, something to be wary of.³⁹

In Yuzan's opinion, warrior, who never took care his parents, he could not serve well his lord. The service was everything for samurai, it was their entire life⁴⁰. So, warriors, who do not care their parents were wrong, and they never would serve well. Speaking of Bushido principles, this important rule can not be omitted. The parents were very important in samurai life.

Family relationships are usually not mentioned by researchers. This subject still requires more research. Dr. Turnbull noted that the word samurai originally

³⁵ Ibid., p. 8–9.

³⁶ W. Nowakowski, *O Autorze*, p. 8.

³⁷ Y. Daidōji, *Code of the Samurai*, p. 9–10.

³⁸ S. Turnbull, *Samuraje*, p. 255.

³⁹ Y. Daidōji, *Code of the Samurai*, p. 9–10.

⁴⁰ I. Nitobe, *Bushido – Duch Jaaponii*, Bydgoszcz 2008, p. 66.

meant a person who cares about the elders⁴¹. So we can assume that caring of parents was not just obvious. It was a duty, arising from birth.

Time to present one of the most important Bushido principle, perhaps the most important. In *The Code of the Samurai* we can read:

One who is supposed to be a warrior considers it his foremost concern to keep death in mind all times, every day and every night, from the morning of New Year's Day through the night of New Year's Eve.⁴²

This rule was, of course, keeping death in mind. It was obvious during the wartime, when samurai could die in the battlefield. During the peaceful time, the greatest threat were bandits or diseases. Sometimes there were duels, where usually someone died. Miyamoto Musashi killed every his opponent, during the duels⁴³. However keeping death in mind was still important for Japanese warriors. Yuzan knew this, which is why it was the first rule in his work⁴⁴.

Paradoxically, several works about rubbish have been written. However, they do not refer to what Yuzan wrote. Most of the positions are about *seppuku*⁴⁵ or *harakiri*⁴⁶, the ritual suicide. It is worth adding that the author of *The Code of the Samurai: A Modern Translation of the Bushido Shoshinshu*, wrote nothing about seppuku.

In this article, is presented only three Bushido rules. However, they were very important for Samurai. The education affected warrior's entire life. Caring of parents had a lifelong effect, he could be good or bad. And finally keeping death in mind was important, because it made him a samurai.

The Bushido's theme still needs to be developed. The exception is Inazo Nitobe's work. The work on this topic is too general. Researchers usually refer to bushido when describing another problem, like samurai presentation⁴⁷. Most of the information can be found in the sources, for example in *Code of the Samurai* or *Hagakure*⁴⁸. Authors usually did not pay attention to topics such as taking care of parents. Yuzan or Yamamoto Tsunetomo⁴⁹ are an exception.

⁴¹ S. Turnbull, *Samurai Warfare*, New York 1996, p. 16.

⁴² Y. Daidōji, *Code of the Samurai*, p. 3.

⁴³ M. Miyamoto, *Gorin-no Sho*, p. 20.

⁴⁴ Y. Daidōji, *Code of the Samurai*, p. 3.

⁴⁵ M. Mydel, *Harakiri, seppuku czy jigai?*, [w:] A. B. Mitford, *Harakiri*, Bydgoszcz 2009, p. 20.

⁴⁶ Ibid, p. 20–21.

⁴⁷ A. Śpiewakowski, *Samuraje*, Warszawa 2007, p. 10.

⁴⁸ T. Yamamoto, *Hagakure*, p. 12.

⁴⁹ Hagakure's author.

References to Bushido usually can be found in textbooks⁵⁰, not in separate works. As a result, the topic is still open to young researchers. Interested parties may find a lot of information and start a serious study.

A presentation of few Bushido principles

Summary

The aim of this paper is presentation three Bushido rules. The first selected principle is samurai education. The Japanese warrior's children had special education, thanks to which they became samurai. Another selected rule, taking care of parents, is unusual, but still very important. The third principle is the memory of dying. This rule is known, perhaps even obvious, but it should be remembered. The samurai education and caring of parents do not apply to the fight itself, but they were still very important for the samurai. The third principle concerns fighting as well as the whole life.

⁵⁰ J. W. Hall (ed.), *The Cambridge History of Japan*, Vol. 4, Cambridge 2008, p. 92.

Bushido

Source: <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/f/fc/Bushido_Calligraphy.jpg>



Samurai



Source: <<https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/commons/5/5c/Satsuma-samurai-during-boshin-war-period.jpg>>

Samurai with his equipment



Source: <<https://en.wikipedia.org/wiki/Samurai#/media/File:Samurai.png>>

Kendo training



Source: <https://upload.wikimedia.org/wikipedia/ja/1/1e/%E5%B9%95%E6%9C%AB_%E5%89%A3%E9%81%93.jpg>

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