Roczniki Filozoficzne, 66 (2018), nr 3

Strony/pages: 35-75



W artykule Autor przyjrzał się typowym zastrzeżeniom przeciwko twierdzeniu, że mózgi to kom­putery, a ściślej — mechanizmy przetwarzania informacji. Pokazując, że praktycznie wszyst­kie popularne obiekcje są oparte na nieżyczliwych (lub po prostu niepoprawnych) interpretacjach tego twierdzenia, uznaje, że twierdzenie to prawdopodobnie będzie prawdziwe, istotne dla współ­czesnej (neuro)kognitywistyki i nietrywialne.




In this paper, the Author reviewed the typical objections against the claim that brains are com­puters, or, to be more precise, information-processing mechanisms. By showing that practi­cally all the popular objections are based on uncharitable (or simply incorrect) interpretations of the claim, he argues that the claim is likely to be true, relevant to contemporary cognitive (neuro) science, and non-trivial.



Słowa kluczowe: komputacjonizm; komputacjonalna teoria umysłu; reprezentacja; komputacja; mo­de­lowanie.

Key words: computationalism; computational theory of mind; representation; computation; mo­deling.





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Informacja o autorze/Information about Author:

Dr hab. Marcin Miłkowski—Department of Logic and Cogni­tive Science at the Institute of Philosophy and Socio­logy of the Polish Academy of Sciences; address for correspondence: ul. Nowy Świat 72, 00‑330 Warszawa; e-mail:



Cytowanie/Citation information:

Miłkowski, Marcin. 2018. Objections to Computationalism: A Survey. "Roczniki Filozoficzne" 66, 3: 35-75, DOI: 10.18290/rf.2018.66.3-3.




Autor: Anna Karczewska
Ostatnia aktualizacja: 10.10.2018, godz. 09:23 - Anna Karczewska